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## **IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR5) “CLIMATE CHANGE 2014”**

### **SYNTHESIS REPORT** **Adopted Longer Report**

(Submitted by the IPCC Chair)

#### **IPCC Secretariat**

c/o WMO • 7bis, Avenue de la Paix • C.P. 2300 • 1211 Geneva 2 • Switzerland  
telephone : +41 (0) 22 730 8208 / 54 / 84 • fax : +41 (0) 22 730 8025 / 13 • email : IPCC-Sec@wmo.int • [www.ipcc.ch](http://www.ipcc.ch)



# **CLIMATE CHANGE 2014**

## **SYNTHESIS REPORT**

Longer report

Adopted  
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**Core Writing Team members**

Myles R. Allen (United Kingdom), Vicente Ricardo Barros (Argentina), John Broome (United Kingdom), Wolfgang Cramer (Germany/France), Renate Christ (Austria/WMO), John A. Church (Australia), Leon Clarke (USA), Qin Dahe (China), Purnamita Dasgupta (India), Navroz K. Dubash (India), Ottmar Edenhofer (Germany), Ismail Elgizouli (Sudan), Christopher B. Field (USA), Piers Forster (United Kingdom), Pierre Friedlingstein (United Kingdom), Jan Fuglestvedt (Norway), Luis Gomez-Echeverri (Colombia), Stephane Hallegatte (France/World Bank), Gabriele Hegerl (United Kingdom), Mark Howden (Australia), Kejun Jiang (China), Blanca Jimenez Cisneros (Mexico/UNESCO), Vladimir Kattsov (Russian Federation), Hoesung Lee (Republic of Korea), Katharine J. Mach (USA), Jochem Marotzke (Germany), Michael D. Mastrandrea (USA), Leo Meyer (The Netherlands), Jan Minx (Germany), Yacob Mulugetta (Ethiopia), Karen O'Brien (Norway), Michael Oppenheimer (USA), R.K. Pachauri (India), Joy J. Pereira (Malaysia), Ramón Pichs-Madruga (Cuba), Gian-Kasper Plattner (Switzerland), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Scott B. Power (Australia), Benjamin Preston (USA), N.H. Ravindranath (India), Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), Keywan Riahi (Austria), Matilde Rusticucci (Argentina), Robert Scholes (South Africa), Kristin Seyboth (USA), Youba Sokona (Mali), Robert Stavins (USA), Thomas F. Stocker (Switzerland), Petra Tschakert (USA), Detlef van Vuuren (The Netherlands), Jean-Pascal van Ypersele (Belgium)

**Extended Core Writing Team members**

Gabriel Blanco (Argentina), Michael Eby (Canada), Jae Edmonds (USA), Marc Fleurbaey (France), Reyer Gerlagh (The Netherlands), Sivan Kartha (USA), Howard Kunreuther (USA), Joeri Rogelj (Belgium), Michiel Schaeffer (The Netherlands), Jan Sedláček (Switzerland), Ralph Sims (New Zealand), Diana Ürges-Vorsatz (Hungary), David Victor (USA), Gary Yohe (USA)

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*This report is dedicated to the memory of Stephen H. Schneider 1945 – 2010*

## Introduction

The Synthesis Report (SYR) of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) provides an overview of the state of knowledge concerning the science of climate change, emphasizing new results since the publication of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 (AR4). The SYR synthesizes the main findings of the AR5 (IPCC) based on contributions from Working Group I (The Physical Science Basis), Working Group II (Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability), and Working Group III (Mitigation of Climate Change), plus two additional IPCC reports (Special Report on Renewable Energy and Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation).

The AR5 SYR is divided into four topics. Topic 1 (Observed changes and their causes) focuses on observational evidence for a changing climate, the impacts caused by this change and the human contributions to it. Topic 2 (Future climate changes, risks, and impacts) assesses projections of future climate change and the resultant projected impacts and risks. Topic 3 (Future Pathways for Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development) considers adaptation and mitigation as complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate change. Topic 4 (Adaptation and mitigation) describes individual adaptation and mitigation options and policy approaches. It also addresses integrated responses that link mitigation and adaptation with other societal objectives.

The challenge of understanding and managing risks and uncertainties are important themes in this report. See Box 1 ('Risk and the management of an uncertain future') and Box 2 ('Sources and treatment of uncertainty').

This report includes information relevant to Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

### Box Introduction.1: Risk and the management of an uncertain future

Climate change exposes people, societies, economic sectors and ecosystems to risk. Risk is the potential for consequences when something of value is at stake and the outcome is uncertain, recognizing the diversity of values. {WGIII 2.1, WG II SPM Background Box SPM.2, SYR Glossary}

Risks from climate change impacts arise from the interaction between hazard (triggered by an event or trend related to climate change), vulnerability (susceptibility to harm), and exposure (people, assets or ecosystems at risk). Hazards include processes that range from brief events, such as severe storms, to slow trends, such as multi-decade droughts or multi-century sea-level rise. Vulnerability and exposure are both sensitive to a wide range of social and economic processes, with possible increases or decreases depending on development pathways. (1.5)

Risks and co-benefits also arise from policies that aim to mitigate climate change or to adapt to it. Risk is often represented as the probability of occurrence of hazardous events or trends multiplied by the magnitude of the consequences if these events occur. Therefore, high risk can result not only from high probability outcomes, but also from low probability outcomes with very severe consequences. This makes it important to assess the full range of possible outcomes, from low probability 'tail outcomes to very likely outcomes. For example, it is *unlikely* that global mean sea level will rise by more than one metre in this century, but the consequence of a greater rise could be so severe that this possibility becomes a significant part of risk assessment. Similarly, *low confidence* but high consequence outcomes are also policy relevant; for instance the possibility that the response of Amazon forest could substantially amplify climate change merits consideration despite our currently imperfect ability to project the outcome. (2.4, Table 2.3) {WGI: Table 13.5, WGII: 4.4, Box 4-3, WG III: Box 3-9}

Risk can be understood either qualitatively or quantitatively. It can be reduced and managed using a wide range of formal or informal tools and approaches that are often iterative. Useful approaches for managing risk do not necessarily require that risk levels can be accurately quantified. Approaches recognizing diverse qualitative values, goals, and priorities, based on ethical, psychological, cultural, or social factors, could increase the effectiveness of risk management. {WGII 1.1.2; WGII 2.4, 2.5, 19.3; WGIII 2.4, 2.5, 3.4}

**Box Introduction.2: Communicating the degree of certainty in assessment findings**

An integral feature of IPCC reports is the communication of the strength of and uncertainties in scientific understanding underlying assessment findings. Uncertainty can result from a wide range of sources. Uncertainties in the past and present are the result of limitations of available measurements, especially for rare events, and the challenges of evaluating causation in complex or multi-component processes that can span physical, biological, and human systems. For the future, climate change involves changing likelihoods of diverse outcomes. Many processes and mechanisms are well understood, but others are not. Complex interactions among multiple climatic and non-climatic influences changing over time lead to persistent uncertainties, which in turn, lead to the possibility of surprises. Compared to past IPCC reports, the AR5 assesses a substantially larger knowledge base of scientific, technical, and socio-economic literature. {*WGI: 1.4, WGII: 1.1.2, SPM A-3, WGIII: 2.3*}

The IPCC *Guidance Note on Uncertainty* (2010) defines a common approach to evaluating and communicating the degree of certainty in findings of the assessment process. Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. In many cases, a synthesis of evidence and agreement supports an assignment of confidence, especially for findings with stronger agreement and multiple independent lines of evidence. The degree of certainty in each key finding of the assessment is based on the type, amount, quality, and consistency of evidence (e.g., data, mechanistic understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) and the degree of agreement. The summary terms for evidence are: limited, medium, or robust. For agreement, they are low, medium, or high. Levels of confidence include five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, and very high, and are typeset in italics, e.g., *medium confidence*. The likelihood, or probability, of some well-defined outcome having occurred or occurring in the future can be described quantitatively through the following terms: virtually certain, 99–100% probability; extremely likely, 95–100%; very likely, 90–100%; likely, 66–100%; more likely than not, >50–100%; about as likely as not, 33–66%; unlikely, 0–33%; very unlikely, 0–10%; extremely unlikely, 0–5%; and exceptionally unlikely, 0–1%. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., *very likely*. Unless otherwise indicated, findings assigned a likelihood term are associated with *high* or *very high confidence*. Where appropriate, findings are also formulated as statements of fact without using uncertainty qualifiers. {*WG II Box SPM.3, WG I SPM B, WG III 2.1*}

## Topic 1: Observed Changes and their Causes

**Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems.**

Topic 1 focuses on observational evidence of a changing climate, the impacts caused by this change and the human contributions to it. It discusses observed changes in climate (1.1) and external influences on climate (forcings), differentiating those forcings that are of anthropogenic origin, and their contributions by economic sectors and greenhouse gases (1.2). Section 1.3 attributes observed climate change to its causes and attributes impacts on human and natural systems to climate change, determining the degree to which those impacts can be attributed to climate change. The changing probability of extreme events and their causes are discussed in Section 1.4, followed by an account of exposure and vulnerability within a risk context (1.5) and a section on adaptation and mitigation experience (1.6).

### 1.1 Observed changes in the climate system

**Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen.**

[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 HERE]

**Figure 1.1: Multiple observed indicators of a changing global climate system.** (a) Observed globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature anomalies (relative to the mean of 1986 to 2005 period, as annual and decadal averages) with an estimate of decadal mean uncertainty included for one data set (grey shading). {[WGI Figure SPM.1](#); [WGI Figure 2.20](#); a listing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary Material [WGI TS.SM.1.1](#)} (b) Map of the observed surface temperature change, from 1901 to 2012, derived from temperature trends determined by linear regression from one data set (orange line in Panel a). Trends have been calculated where data availability permitted a robust estimate (i.e., only for grid boxes with greater than 70% complete records and more than 20% data availability in the first and last 10% of the time period), other areas are white. Grid boxes where the trend is significant, at the 10% level, are indicated by a + sign. {[WGI Figure SPM.1](#); [WGI Figure 2.21](#); [WGI Figure TS.2](#); a listing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary Material [WGI TS.SM.1.2](#)} (c) Arctic (July to September average) and Antarctic (February) sea ice extent. {[WGI Figure SPM.3](#); [WGI Figure 4.3](#); [WGI Figure 4.SM.2](#); a listing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary Material [WGI TS.SM.3.2](#)} (d) Global mean sea level relative to the 1986–2005 mean of the longest running data set, and with all data sets aligned to have the same value in 1993, the first year of satellite altimetry data. All time series (coloured lines indicating different data sets) show annual values, and where assessed, uncertainties are indicated by coloured shading. {[WGI Figure SPM.3](#); [WGI Figure 3.13](#); a listing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary Material [WGI TS.SM.3.4](#)} (e) Map of observed precipitation change, from 1951 to 2010; trends in annual accumulation calculated using the same criteria as in Panel b. {[WGI Figure SPM.2](#); [WGI TS TFE.1, Figure 2](#); [WGI Figure 2.29](#). A listing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary Material [WGI TS.SM.2.1](#)}.

#### 1.1.1 Atmosphere

**Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850.** The period from 1983 to 2012 was *very likely* the warmest 30-year period of the last 800 years in the Northern Hemisphere, where such assessment is possible (*high confidence*) and *likely* the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years (*medium confidence*). {[WGI 2.4.3](#), [5.3.5](#)}

The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data as calculated by a linear trend, show a warming of 0.85 [0.65 to 1.06] °C<sup>1</sup> over the period 1880 to 2012, for which multiple independently

<sup>1</sup> Ranges in square brackets indicate a 90% uncertainty interval unless otherwise stated. The 90% uncertainty interval is expected to have a 90% likelihood of covering the value that is being estimated. Uncertainty intervals are not necessarily symmetric about the corresponding best estimate. A best estimate of that value is also given where available.

produced datasets exist. The total increase between the average of the 1850–1900 period and the 2003–2012 period is 0.78 [0.72 to 0.85] °C, based on the single longest dataset available. For the longest period when calculation of regional trends is sufficiently complete (1901 to 2012), almost the entire globe has experienced surface warming (Figure 1.1). {WGI [SPM B.1, 2.4.3](#)}

In addition to robust multi-decadal warming, the globally averaged surface temperature exhibits substantial decadal and interannual variability (Figure 1.1). Due to this natural variability, trends based on short records are very sensitive to the beginning and end dates and do not in general reflect long-term climate trends. As one example, the rate of warming over the past 15 years (1998–2012; 0.05 [–0.05 to 0.15] °C per decade), which begins with a strong El Niño, is smaller than the rate calculated since 1951 (1951–2012; 0.12 [0.08 to 0.14] °C per decade; see Box 1.1). {WGI [SPM B.1, 2.4.3](#)}

Based on multiple independent analyses of measurements, it is *virtually certain* that globally the troposphere has warmed and the lower stratosphere has cooled since the mid-20th century. There is *medium confidence* in the rate of change and its vertical structure in the Northern Hemisphere extratropical troposphere. {WGI [SPM B.1, 2.4.4](#)}

*Confidence* in precipitation change averaged over global land areas since 1901 is *low* prior to 1951 and *medium* afterwards. Averaged over the mid-latitude land areas of the Northern Hemisphere, precipitation has *likely* increased since 1901 (*medium confidence* before and *high confidence* after 1951). For other latitudes area-averaged long-term positive or negative trends have *low confidence* (Figure 1.1). {WGI [Figure SPM.2, SPM B1, 2.5.1](#)}

### 1.1.2 Ocean

**Ocean warming dominates the increase in energy stored in the climate system, accounting for more than 90% of the energy accumulated between 1971 and 2010 (*high confidence*) with only about 1% stored in the atmosphere (Figure 1.2). On a global scale, the ocean warming is largest near the surface, and the upper 75 m warmed by 0.11 [0.09 to 0.13] °C per decade over the period 1971 to 2010. It is *virtually certain* that the upper ocean (0–700 m) warmed from 1971 to 2010, and it *likely* warmed between the 1870s and 1971. It is *likely* that the ocean warmed from 700 m to 2000 m from 1957 to 2009 and from 3000 m to the bottom for the period 1992 to 2005 (Figure 1.2). {WGI [SPM B.2, 3.2, Box 3.1](#)}**

[INSERT FIGURE 1.2 HERE]

**Figure 1.2: Energy accumulation within the Earth’s climate system.** Estimates are in  $10^{21}$  J, and are given relative to 1971 and from 1971 to 2010, unless otherwise indicated. Components included are upper ocean (above 700 m), deep ocean (below 700 m; including below 2000 m estimates starting from 1992), ice melt (for glaciers and ice caps, Greenland and Antarctic ice sheet estimates starting from 1992, and Arctic sea ice estimate from 1979 to 2008), continental (land) warming, and atmospheric warming (estimate starting from 1979). Uncertainty is estimated as error from all five components at 90% confidence intervals. {WGI [Box 3.1, Figure 1](#)}

It is *very likely* that regions of high surface salinity, where evaporation dominates, have become more saline, while regions of low salinity, where precipitation dominates, have become fresher since the 1950s. These regional trends in ocean salinity provide indirect evidence for changes in evaporation and precipitation over the oceans and thus for changes in the global water cycle (*medium confidence*). There is no observational evidence of a long-term trend in the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). {WGI [SPM B.2, 2.5, 3.3, 3.4.3, 3.5, 3.6.3](#)}

Since the beginning of the industrial era, oceanic uptake of CO<sub>2</sub> has resulted in acidification of the ocean; the pH of ocean surface water has decreased by 0.1 (*high confidence*), corresponding to a 26% increase in acidity, measured as hydrogen ion concentration. There is *medium confidence* that, in parallel to warming, oxygen concentrations have decreased in coastal waters and in the open ocean thermocline in many ocean regions since the 1960s, with a *likely* expansion of tropical oxygen minimum zones in recent decades. {WGI [SPM B.5; TS2.8.5, 3.8.1, 3.8.2, 3.8.3, 3.8.5, Figure 3.20](#)}

### 1.1.3 Cryosphere

**Over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been losing mass (*high confidence*). Glaciers have continued to shrink almost worldwide (*high confidence*). Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover has continued to decrease in extent (*high confidence*). There is *high confidence* that there are strong regional differences in the trend in Antarctic sea ice extent, with a *very likely* increase in total extent. {WGI [SPM B.3](#), [4.2–4.7](#)}**

Glaciers have lost mass and contributed to sea-level rise throughout the 20th century. The rate of ice mass loss from the Greenland ice sheet has *very likely* substantially increased over the period 1992 to 2011, resulting in a larger mass loss over 2002 to 2011 than over 1992 to 2011. The rate of ice mass loss from the Antarctic ice sheet, mainly from the northern Antarctic Peninsula and the Amundsen Sea sector of West Antarctica, is also *likely* larger over 2002 to 2011. {WGI [SPM B.3](#), [SPM B.4](#), [4.3.3](#), [4.4.2](#), [4.4.3](#)}

The annual mean Arctic sea ice extent decreased over the period 1979 (when satellite observations commenced) to 2012. The rate of decrease was *very likely* in the range 3.5 to 4.1% per decade. Arctic sea ice extent has decreased in every season and in every successive decade since 1979, with the most rapid decrease in decadal mean extent in summer (*high confidence*). For the summer sea ice minimum, the decrease was *very likely* in the range of 9.4% to 13.6% per decade (range of 0.73 to 1.07 million km<sup>2</sup> per decade) (see Figure 1.1). It is *very likely* that the annual mean Antarctic sea ice extent increased in the range of 1.2% to 1.8% per decade (range of 0.13 to 0.20 million km<sup>2</sup> per decade) between 1979 and 2012. However, there is *high confidence* that there are strong regional differences in Antarctica, with extent increasing in some regions and decreasing in others. {WGI [SPM B.5](#); [4.2.2](#), [4.2.3](#)}

There is *very high confidence* that the extent of northern hemisphere snow cover has decreased since the mid 20th century by 1.6 [0.8 to 2.4]% per decade for March and April, and 11.7% per decade for June, over the 1967 to 2012 period. There is *high confidence* that permafrost temperatures have increased in most regions of the Northern Hemisphere since the early 1980s, with reductions in thickness and areal extent in some regions. The increase in permafrost temperatures has occurred in response to increased surface temperature and changing snow cover. {WGI [SPM B.3](#), [4.5](#), [4.7.2](#)}

#### 1.1.4 Sea level

**Over the period 1901–2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 [0.17 to 0.21] m (Figure 1.1). The rate of sea-level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia (*high confidence*). {WGI [SPM B.4](#), [3.7.2](#), [5.6.3](#), [13.2](#)}**

It is *very likely* that the mean rate of global averaged sea-level rise was 1.7 [1.5 to 1.9] mm yr<sup>-1</sup> between 1901 and 2010 and 3.2 [2.8 to 3.6] mm yr<sup>-1</sup> between 1993 and 2010. Tide-gauge and satellite altimeter data are consistent regarding the higher rate during the latter period. It is *likely* that similarly high rates occurred between 1920 and 1950. {WGI [SPM B.4](#), [3.7](#), [13.2](#)}

Since the early 1970s, glacier mass loss and ocean thermal expansion from warming together explain about 75% of the observed global mean sea-level rise (*high confidence*). Over the period 1993–2010, global mean sea-level rise is, with *high confidence*, consistent with the sum of the observed contributions from ocean thermal expansion, due to warming, from changes in glaciers, the Greenland ice sheet, the Antarctic ice sheet, and land water storage. {WGI [SPM B.4](#), [13.3.6](#)}

Rates of sea-level rise over broad regions can be several times larger or smaller than the global mean sea-level rise for periods of several decades, due to fluctuations in ocean circulation. Since 1993, the regional rates for the Western Pacific are up to three times larger than the global mean, while those for much of the Eastern Pacific are near zero or negative. {WGI [3.7.3](#), [FAQ 13.1](#)}

There is *very high confidence* that maximum global mean sea level during the last interglacial period (129,000 to 116,000 years ago) was, for several thousand years, at least 5 m higher than present and *high confidence* that it did not exceed 10 m above present. During the last interglacial period, the Greenland ice sheet *very likely* contributed between 1.4 and 4.3 m to the higher global mean sea level, implying with *medium confidence* an additional contribution from the Antarctic ice sheet. This change in sea level occurred



in the context of different orbital forcing and with high-latitude surface temperature, averaged over several thousand years, at least 2 °C warmer than present (*high confidence*). {WGI [SPM B.4](#), [5.3.4](#), [5.6.2](#), [13.2.1](#)}

### Box 1.1: Recent temperature trends and their implications

**The observed reduction in surface warming trend over the period 1998 to 2012 as compared to the period 1951 to 2012, is due in roughly equal measure to a reduced trend in radiative forcing and a cooling contribution from natural internal variability, which includes a possible redistribution of heat within the ocean (*medium confidence*).** The rate of warming of the observed global mean surface temperature over the period from 1998 to 2012 is estimated to be around one-third to one-half of the trend over the period from 1951 to 2012 (Box 1.1, Figures 1a and 1c). Even with this reduction in surface warming trend, the climate system has *very likely* continued to accumulate heat since 1998 (Figure 1.2), and sea level has continued to rise (Figure 1.1). {WGI [SPM D.1](#), [Box 9.2](#)}

The radiative forcing of the climate system has continued to increase during the 2000s, as has its largest contributor, the atmospheric concentration of CO<sub>2</sub>. However, the radiative forcing has been increasing at a lower rate over the period from 1998 to 2011, compared to 1984 to 1998 or 1951 to 2011, due to cooling effects from volcanic eruptions and the cooling phase of the solar cycle over the period from 2000 to 2009. There is, however, *low confidence* in quantifying the role of the forcing trend in causing the reduction in the rate of surface warming. {WGI [8.5.2](#), [Box 9.2](#)}

For the period from 1998 to 2012, 111 of the 114 available climate-model simulations show a surface warming trend larger than the observations (Box 1.1, Figure 1a). There is *medium confidence* that this difference between models and observations is to a substantial degree caused by natural internal climate variability, which sometimes enhances and sometimes counteracts the long-term externally forced warming trend (compare Box 1.1 Figures 1a and 1b; during the period from 1984 to 1998, most model simulations show a smaller warming trend than observed). Natural internal variability thus diminishes the relevance of short trends for long-term climate change. The difference between models and observations may also contain contributions from inadequacies in the solar, volcanic, and aerosol forcings used by the models and, in some models, from an overestimate of the response to increasing greenhouse gas and other anthropogenic forcing (the latter dominated by the effects of aerosols). {WGI [2.4.3](#), [9.4.1](#); [10.3.1.1](#), WGI [Box 9.2](#)}

For the longer period from 1951 to 2012, simulated surface warming trends are consistent with the observed trend (Box 1.1, Figure 1c, *very high confidence*). Furthermore, the independent estimates of radiative forcing, of surface warming, and of observed heat storage (the latter available since 1970) combine to give a heat budget for the Earth that is consistent with the assessed *likely* range of equilibrium climate sensitivity (1.5–4.5 °C)<sup>2</sup>. The record of observed climate change has thus allowed characterisation of the basic properties of the climate system that have implications for future warming, including the equilibrium climate sensitivity and the transient climate response (see topic 2). {WGI [Box 9.2](#), [10.8.1](#), [10.8.2](#), [Box 12.2](#), [Box 13.1](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 1.1, FIGURE 1]

**Box 1.1, Figure 1:** Trends in the global mean surface temperature over the periods from 1998 to 2012 (a), 1984 to 1998 (b), and 1951 to 2012 (c), from observations (red) and the 114 available simulations with current-generation climate models (grey bars). The height of each grey bar indicates how often a trend of a certain magnitude (in °C per decade) occurs among the 114 simulations. The width of the red-hatched area indicates the statistical uncertainty that arises from constructing a global average from individual station data. This observational uncertainty differs from the one quoted in the text of Section 1.1.1; there, an estimate of natural internal variability is also included. Here, by contrast, the magnitude of natural internal variability is characterised by the spread of the model ensemble. {based on WGI [Box 9.2](#), [Figure 1](#)}

<sup>2</sup> The connection between the heat budget and equilibrium climate sensitivity, which is the long-term surface warming under an assumed doubling of the atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration, arises because a warmer surface causes enhanced radiation to space, which counteracts the increase in the Earth's heat content. How much the radiation to space increases for a given increase in surface temperature, depends on the same feedback processes (e.g., cloud feedback, water vapour feedback) that determine equilibrium climate sensitivity.

## 1.2 Past and recent drivers of climate change

Natural and anthropogenic substances and processes that alter the Earth's energy budget are physical drivers of climate change. Radiative forcing (RF) quantifies the perturbation of energy into the Earth system caused by these drivers. RFs larger than zero lead to a near-surface warming, and RFs smaller than zero lead to a cooling. RF is estimated based on in-situ and remote observations, properties of greenhouse gases and aerosols, and calculations using numerical models. The RF over the 1750–2011 period is shown in Figure 1.4 in major groupings. The ‘Other Anthropogenic’ group is principally comprised of cooling effects from aerosol changes, with smaller contributions from ozone changes, land-use reflectance changes and other minor terms. {WGI [SPM C, 8.1, 8.5.1](#)}

**Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era driven largely by economic and population growth. From 2000 to 2010 emissions were the highest in history. Historical emissions have driven atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, to levels that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years, leading to an uptake of energy by the climate system.**

### 1.2.1 Natural and anthropogenic radiative forcings

**Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are at levels that are unprecedented in at least 800,000 years. Concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O have all shown large increases since 1750 (40%, 150% and 20%, respectively) (Figure 1.3).** CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations are increasing at the fastest observed decadal rate of change ( $2.0 \pm 0.1$  ppm yr<sup>-1</sup>) for 2002–2011. After almost one decade of stable CH<sub>4</sub> concentrations since the late 1990s, atmospheric measurements have shown renewed increases since 2007. N<sub>2</sub>O concentrations have steadily increased at a rate of  $0.73 \pm 0.03$  ppb yr<sup>-1</sup> over the last three decades. {WGI SPM B5, [2.2.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 6.3](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 1.3]

**Figure 1.3: Observed changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.** Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>, green), methane (CH<sub>4</sub>, orange), and nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O, red). Data from ice cores (symbols) and direct atmospheric measurements (lines) are overlaid. {WGI [2.2, 6.2, 6.3, WGI Figure 6.11](#)}

**The total anthropogenic RF over 1750–2011 is calculated to be a warming effect of 2.3 [1.1 to 3.3] W m<sup>-2</sup> (Figure 1.4), and it has increased more rapidly since 1970 than during prior decades. Carbon dioxide is the largest single contributor to RF over 1750–2011 and its trend since 1970.** The total anthropogenic RF estimate for 2011 is substantially higher (43%) than the estimate reported in AR4 for the year 2005. This is caused by a combination of continued growth in most greenhouse gas concentrations and an improved estimate of RF from aerosols. {WGI [SPM C, 8.5.1](#)}

**The RF from aerosols, which includes cloud adjustments, is better understood and indicates a weaker cooling effect than in AR4. The aerosol RF over 1750–2011 is estimated as  $-0.9$  [ $-1.9$  to  $-0.1$ ] W m<sup>-2</sup> (medium confidence). RF from aerosols has two competing components: a dominant cooling effect from most aerosols and their cloud adjustments and a partially offsetting warming contribution from black carbon absorption of solar radiation.** There is *high confidence* that the global mean total aerosol RF has counteracted a substantial portion of RF from well-mixed greenhouse gases. Aerosols continue to contribute the largest uncertainty to the total RF estimate. {WGI [SPM C, 7.5, 8.3, 8.5.1](#)}

**Changes in solar irradiance and volcanic aerosols cause natural RF (Figure 1.4).** The RF from stratospheric volcanic aerosols can have a large cooling effect on the climate system for some years after major volcanic eruptions. Changes in total solar irradiance are calculated to have contributed only around 2% of the total radiative forcing in 2011, relative to 1750. {WGI [SPM C, 8.4; Figure SPM.5](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 1.4 HERE]

**Figure 1.4: Radiative forcing (RF) of climate change during the industrial era (1750–2011).** Bars show RF from well-mixed greenhouse gases (WMGHG), other anthropogenic forcings, total anthropogenic forcings and natural forcings. The error bars indicate the 5%–95% uncertainty. Other anthropogenic forcings include aerosol, land-use surface reflectance and ozone changes. Natural forcings include solar and volcanic effects. The total anthropogenic

radiative forcing for 2011 relative to 1750 is  $2.3 \text{ W m}^{-2}$  (uncertainty range 1.1 to  $3.3 \text{ W m}^{-2}$ ). This corresponds to a CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentration (see Glossary) of 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 - 520 ppm). *{Data from WGI 7.5 and Table 8.6}*

### 1.2.2 Human activities affecting emission drivers

About half of the cumulative anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 1750 and 2011 have occurred in the last 40 years (*high confidence*). Cumulative anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of  $2040 \pm 310 \text{ GtCO}_2$  were added to the atmosphere between 1750 and 2011. Since 1970 cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion, cement production and flaring have tripled and, cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from forestry and other land use (FOLU)<sup>3</sup> have increased by about 40% (Figure 1.5)<sup>4</sup>. In 2011 annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion, cement production and flaring were  $34.8 \pm 2.9 \text{ GtCO}_2 \text{ yr}^{-1}$ . For 2002-2011 average annual emissions from forestry and other land use were  $3.3 \pm 2.9 \text{ GtCO}_2 \text{ yr}^{-1}$ . *{WGI 6.3.1, 6.3.2, WGIII SPM.3}*

[INSERT FIGURE 1.5 HERE]

**Figure 1.5:** Annual global anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions ( $\text{GtCO}_2 \text{ yr}^{-1}$ ) from fossil fuel combustion, cement production and flaring, and forestry and other land use (FOLU), 1750–2011. Cumulative emissions and their uncertainties are shown as bars and whiskers, respectively, on the right-hand side. The global effects of the accumulation of CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions are shown in Figure 1.3. GHG Emission data from 1970 to 2010 are shown in Figure 1.6. *{modified from WGI Figure TS.4 and WGIII Figure TS.2}*

**About 40% of these anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have remained in the atmosphere ( $880 \pm 35 \text{ GtCO}_2$ ) since 1750. The rest was removed from the atmosphere by sinks, and stored in natural carbon cycle reservoirs.** Sinks from ocean uptake and vegetation with soils account, in roughly equal measures, for the remainder of the cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon dioxide, causing ocean acidification. *{WGI 3.8.1, 6.3.1}*

**Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions have continued to increase over 1970 to 2010 with larger absolute increases between 2000 and 2010. (*high confidence*).** Despite a growing number of climate change mitigation policies, annual GHG emissions grew on average by  $1.0 \text{ GtCO}_2\text{eq}$  (2.2%) per year, from 2000 to 2010, compared to  $0.4 \text{ GtCO}_2\text{eq}$  (1.3%) per year, from 1970 to 2000 (Figure 1.6).<sup>5</sup> Total anthropogenic GHG emissions from 2000 to 2010 were the highest in human history and reached  $49 (\pm 4.5) \text{ GtCO}_2\text{eq yr}^{-1}$  in 2010. The global economic crisis of 2007/2008 reduced emissions only temporarily. *{WGIII SPM.3, 1.3, 5.2, 13.3, 15.2.2, Box TS.5, Figure 15.1}*

**CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes contributed about 78% to the total GHG emission increase between 1970 and 2010, with a contribution of similar percentage over the 2000–2010 period (*high confidence*).** Fossil-fuel-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reached  $32 (\pm 2.7) \text{ GtCO}_2 \text{ yr}^{-1}$ , in 2010, and grew further by about 3% between 2010 and 2011, and by about 1% to 2% between 2011 and 2012. CO<sub>2</sub> remains the major anthropogenic greenhouse gas, accounting for 76% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010. Of the total, 16% comes from methane (CH<sub>4</sub>), 6.2% from nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O), and 2.0% from fluorinated gases (Figure 1.6)<sup>6</sup>. Annually, since 1970, about 25% of anthropogenic GHG emissions have been in the form of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases.<sup>7</sup> *{WGIII SPM.3, 1.2, 5.2}*

<sup>3</sup> Forestry and other land use (FOLU)—also referred to as LULUCF (land use, land-use change and forestry)—is the subset of agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) emissions and removals of GHGs related to direct human-induced LULUCF activities, excluding agricultural emissions and removals (see WGIII AR5 Glossary).

<sup>4</sup> Numbers from WGI 6.3 converted into  $\text{GtCO}_2$  units. Small differences in cumulative emissions from Working Group 3 *{WGIII SPM.3, TS.2.1}* are due to different approaches to rounding, different end years and the use of different data sets for emissions from FOLU. Estimates remain extremely close, given their uncertainties.

<sup>5</sup> CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emission is a common scale for comparing emissions of different GHGs. Throughout the SYR, when historical emissions of GHGs are provided in  $\text{GtCO}_2\text{eq}$ , they are weighted by Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon ( $\text{GWP}_{100}$ ), taken from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) unless otherwise stated. A unit abbreviation of  $\text{GtCO}_2\text{eq}$  is used. *{Box 3.2, Glossary}*

<sup>6</sup> Using the most recent  $\text{GWP}_{100}$  values from the Fifth Assessment Report *{WGI 8.7}* instead of  $\text{GWP}_{100}$  values from the Second Assessment Report, global GHG emission totals would be slightly higher ( $52 \text{ GtCO}_2\text{eq yr}^{-1}$ ) and non-CO<sub>2</sub> emission shares would be 20% for CH<sub>4</sub>, 5% for N<sub>2</sub>O and 2.2% for F-gases.

<sup>7</sup> For this report, data on non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHGs, including fluorinated gases, were taken from the EDGAR database *{WGIII Annex II.9}*, which covers substances included in the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.

[INSERT FIGURE 1.6 HERE]

**Figure 1.6:** Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions (gigatonne of CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent per year, GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup>) for the period 1970 to 2010, by gases: CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; CO<sub>2</sub> from Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU); methane (CH<sub>4</sub>); nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O); fluorinated gases covered under the Kyoto Protocol (F-gases). Right hand side shows 2010 emissions, using alternatively CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emission weightings based on Second Assessment Report (SAR) and AR5 values. Unless otherwise stated, CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emissions in this report include the basket of Kyoto gases (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O as well as F-gases) calculated based on 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP<sub>100</sub>) values from the SAR (see Glossary). Using the most recent 100-year Global Warming Potential values from the AR5 (right-hand bars) would result in higher total annual greenhouse gas emissions (52 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eqyr<sup>-1</sup>) from an increased contribution of methane, but does not change the long-term trend significantly. Other metric choices would change the contributions of different gases (see Box 3.2). The 2010 values are shown again broken down into their components with the associated uncertainties (90% confidence interval) indicated by the error bars. Global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion are known with an 8% uncertainty margin (90% confidence interval). There are very large uncertainties (of the order of ±50%) attached to the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from FOLU. Uncertainty about the global emissions of CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O and the F-gases has been estimated at 20%, 60% and 20%, respectively. 2010 was the most recent year for which emission statistics on all gases as well as assessments of uncertainties were essentially complete at the time of data cut off for this report. The uncertainty estimates only account for uncertainty in emissions, not in the GWPs (as given in WGI 8.7). {WGIII [Figure SPM.1](#)}

**Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased by about 10 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq between 2000 and 2010. This increase directly came from the energy (47%), industry (30%), transport (11%) and building (3%) sectors (medium confidence). Accounting for indirect emissions raises the contributions by the building and industry sectors (high confidence).** Since 2000, GHG emissions have been growing in all sectors, except in agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU)<sup>3</sup>. In 2010, 35% of GHG emissions were released by the energy sector, 24% (net emissions) from AFOLU, 21% by industry, 14% by transport and 6.4 % by the building sector. When emissions from electricity and heat production are attributed to the sectors that use the final energy (i.e. indirect emissions), the shares of the industry and building sectors in global GHG emissions are increased to 31% and 19%, respectively (Figure 1.7). {WGIII [SPM.3](#), [7.3](#), [8.1](#), [9.2](#), [10.3](#), [11.2](#)} See also Box 3.2 for contributions from various sectors, based on metrics other than GWP<sub>100</sub>.

[INSERT FIGURE 1.7 HERE]

**Figure 1.7: Total anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup>) from economic sectors in 2010.** The circle shows the shares of direct GHG emissions (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from five economic sectors in 2010. The pull-out shows how shares of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from electricity and heat production are attributed to sectors of final energy use. ‘Other Energy’ refers to all GHG emission sources in the energy sector as defined in Annex II, other than electricity and heat production {WGIII [Annex II.9.1](#)}. The emission data on agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) includes land-based CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from forest fires, peat fires and peat decay that approximate to net CO<sub>2</sub> flux from the sub-sectors of forestry and other land use (FOLU) as described in Chapter 11 of the WGIII report. Emissions are converted into CO<sub>2</sub> equivalents based on GWP<sub>100</sub>, taken from the IPCC Second Assessment Report.<sup>6</sup> Sector definitions are provided in Annex II.9. {WGIII [Figure SPM.2](#)}

**Globally, economic and population growth continue to be the most important drivers of increases in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The contribution of population growth between 2000 and 2010 remained roughly identical to that of the previous three decades, while the contribution of economic growth has risen sharply (high confidence).** Between 2000 and 2010, both drivers outpaced emission reductions from improvements in energy intensity of GDP (Figure 1.8). Increased use of coal relative to other energy sources has reversed the long-standing trend in gradual decarbonisation (i.e., reducing the carbon intensity of energy) of the world’s energy supply. {WGIII [SPM.3](#), [1.3](#), [5.3](#), [7.2](#), [7.3](#), [14.3](#), [TS.2.2](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 1.8 HERE]

**Figure 1.8:** Decomposition of the change in total annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion by decade and four driving factors: population, income (GDP) per capita, energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy. The bar segments show the changes associated with each individual factor, holding the respective other factors constant. Total emission changes are indicated by a triangle. The change in emissions over each decade is measured in gigatonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> per year [GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr]; income is converted into common units, using purchasing power parities. {WGIII [SPM.3](#)}

### 1.3 Attribution of climate changes and impacts

The causes of observed changes in the climate system, as well as in any natural or human system impacted by climate, are established following a consistent set of methods. Detection addresses the question of whether climate or a natural or human system affected by climate has actually changed in a statistical sense, while attribution evaluates the relative contributions of multiple causal factors to an observed change or event with an assignment of statistical confidence<sup>8</sup>. Attribution of climate change to causes quantifies the links between observed climate change and human activity, as well as other, natural, climate drivers. In contrast, attribution of observed impacts to climate change considers the links between observed changes in natural or human systems and observed climate change, regardless of its cause. Results from studies attributing climate change to causes provide estimates of the magnitude of warming in response to changes in radiative forcing and hence support projections of future climate change (topic 2). Results from studies attributing impacts to climate change provide strong indications for the sensitivity of natural or human systems to future climate change. {WGI [10.8](#), WGII [SPM A-1](#), WGI/II/III/SYR Glossaries}.

**The evidence for human influence on the climate system has grown since AR4. Human influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in reductions in snow and ice, and in global mean sea-level rise; and it is *extremely likely* to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate change, irrespective of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems to changing climate**

### 1.3.1 Attribution of climate changes to human and natural influences on the climate system

It is *extremely likely* that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together (Figure 1.9). The best estimate of the human induced contribution to warming is similar to the observed warming over this period. Greenhouse gases contributed a global mean surface warming *likely* to be in the range of 0.5 °C to 1.3 °C over the period 1951 to 2010, with further contributions from other anthropogenic forcings, including the cooling effect of aerosols, natural forcings, and from natural internal variability (see Figure 1.9). Together these assessed contributions are consistent with the observed warming of approximately 0.6 °C to 0.7 °C over this period. {WGI [SPM D.3](#), [10.3.1](#)}

It is *very likely* that anthropogenic influence, particularly greenhouse gases and stratospheric ozone depletion, has led to a detectable observed pattern of tropospheric warming and a corresponding cooling in the lower stratosphere since 1961. {WGI [SPM D.3](#), [2.4.4](#), [9.4.1](#), [10.3.1](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 1.9 HERE]

**Figure 1.9:** Assessed *likely* ranges (whiskers) and their mid-points (bars) for warming trends over the 1951–2010 period from well-mixed greenhouse gases, other anthropogenic forcings (including the cooling effect of aerosols and the effect of land use change), combined anthropogenic forcings, natural forcings, and natural internal climate variability (which is the element of climate variability that arises spontaneously within the climate system, even in the absence of forcings). The observed surface temperature change is shown in black, with the 5%–95% uncertainty range due to observational uncertainty. The attributed warming ranges (colours) are based on observations combined with climate model simulations, in order to estimate the contribution by an individual external forcing to the observed warming. The contribution from the combined anthropogenic forcings can be estimated with less uncertainty than the separate contributions from greenhouse gases and other anthropogenic forcings separately. This is because these two contributions are partially compensational, resulting in a signal that is better constrained by observations. {Based on [Figure WGI TS.10](#)}

**Over every continental region except Antarctica, anthropogenic forcings have *likely* made a substantial contribution to surface temperature increases since the mid-20th century (Figure 1.10).** For Antarctica, large observational uncertainties result in *low confidence* that anthropogenic forcings have

<sup>8</sup> definitions were taken from the ‘Good Practice Guidance Paper on Detection and Attribution, the agreed product of the IPCC Expert Meeting on Detection and Attribution Related to Anthropogenic Climate Change’; see glossary'

contributed to the observed warming averaged over available stations. In contrast, it is *likely* that there has been an anthropogenic contribution to the very substantial Arctic warming since the mid-20th century. Human influence has *likely* contributed to temperature increases in many sub-continental regions. {WGI [SPM D.3](#), [10.3.1](#), [TS.4.8](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 1.10 HERE]

Figure 1.10: Comparison of observed and simulated change in continental surface temperatures on land (yellow panels), Arctic and Antarctic September sea ice extent (white panels), and upper ocean heat content in the major ocean basins (blue panels). Global average changes are also given. Anomalies are given relative to 1880–1919 for surface temperatures, to 1960–1980 for ocean heat content, and to 1979–1999 for sea ice. All time series are decadal averages, plotted at the centre of the decade. For temperature panels, observations are dashed lines if the spatial coverage of areas being examined is below 50%. For ocean heat content and sea ice panels, the solid lines are where the coverage of data is good and higher in quality, and the dashed lines are where the data coverage is only adequate, and, thus, uncertainty is larger (note that different lines indicate different data sets; for details, see WG1 Figure SPM6). Model results shown are Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) multi-model ensemble ranges, with shaded bands indicating the 5% to 95% confidence intervals. {WGI [Figure SPM 6](#); for detail, see WGI [Figure TS.12](#).}

**Anthropogenic influences have very likely contributed to Arctic sea ice loss since 1979 (Figure 1.10).** There is *low confidence* in the scientific understanding of the small observed increase in Antarctic sea ice extent due to the incomplete and competing scientific explanations for the causes of change and *low confidence* in estimates of natural internal variability in that region. {WGI [SPM D.3](#), [10.5.1](#), [Figure 10.16](#)}

Anthropogenic influences *likely* contributed to the retreat of glaciers since the 1960s and to the increased surface melting of the Greenland ice sheet since 1993. Due to a low level of scientific understanding, however, there is *low confidence* in attributing the causes of the observed loss of mass from the Antarctic ice sheet over the past two decades. It is *likely* that there has been an anthropogenic contribution to observed reductions in Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover since 1970. {WGI [4.3.3](#), [10.5.2](#), [10.5.3](#)}

**It is likely that anthropogenic influences have affected the global water cycle since 1960.** Anthropogenic influences have contributed to observed increases in atmospheric moisture content (*medium confidence*), to global-scale changes in precipitation patterns over land (*medium confidence*), to intensification of heavy precipitation over land regions where data are sufficient (*medium confidence*; see 1.4), and to changes in surface and subsurface ocean salinity (*very likely*). {WGI [SPM D.3](#); [2.5.1](#), [2.6.2](#), [3.3.2](#), [3.3.3](#), [7.6.2](#), [10.3.2](#), [10.4.2](#), [10.6](#)}

**It is very likely that anthropogenic forcings have made a substantial contribution to increases in global upper ocean heat content (0–700 m) observed since the 1970s (Figure 1.10).** There is evidence for human influence in some individual ocean basins. It is *very likely* that there is a substantial anthropogenic contribution to the global mean sea-level rise since the 1970s. This is based on the *high confidence* in an anthropogenic influence on the two largest contributions to sea-level rise: thermal expansion and glacier mass loss. Oceanic uptake of anthropogenic carbon dioxide has resulted in gradual acidification of ocean surface waters (*high confidence*). {WGI [SPM D.3](#), [3.2.3](#), [3.8.2](#), [10.4.1](#), [10.4.3](#), [10.4.4](#), [10.5.2](#), [13.3](#), [Box 3.2](#), [TS.4.4](#); WGII [6.1.1.2](#); [Box CC-OA](#)}

### 1.3.2 Observed impacts attributed to climate change

**In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate change, irrespective of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems to changing climate.** Evidence of observed climate-change impacts is strongest and most comprehensive for natural systems. Some impacts on human systems have also been attributed to climate change, with a major or minor contribution of climate change distinguishable from other influences (Figure 1.11). Impacts on human systems are often geographically heterogeneous, because they depend not only on changes in climate variables but also on social and economic factors. Hence, the changes are more easily observed at local levels, while attribution can remain difficult. {WGII [SPM A-1,A-3](#), [18.1](#), [18.3-6](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 1.11 HERE]

**Figure 1.11: Widespread impacts in a changing world (A)** Based on the available scientific literature since the AR4, there are substantially more impacts in recent decades now attributed to climate change. Attribution requires defined scientific evidence on the role of climate change. Absence from the map of additional impacts attributed to climate change does not imply that such impacts have not occurred. The publications supporting attributed impacts reflect a growing knowledge base, but publications are still limited for many regions, systems and processes, highlighting gaps in data and studies. Symbols indicate categories of attributed impacts, the relative contribution of climate change (major or minor) to the observed impact, and confidence in attribution. Each symbol refers to one or more entries in WGII Table SPM.A1, grouping related regional-scale impacts. Numbers in ovals indicate regional totals of climate change publications from 2001 to 2010, based on the Scopus bibliographic database for publications in English with individual countries mentioned in title, abstract or key words (as of July 2011). These numbers provide an overall measure of the available scientific literature on climate change across regions; they do not indicate the number of publications supporting attribution of climate change impacts in each region. The inclusion of publications for assessment of attribution followed IPCC scientific evidence criteria defined in WGII Chapter 18. Studies for polar regions and small islands are grouped with neighboring continental regions. Publications considered in the attribution analyses come from a broader range of literature assessed in the WGII AR5. See WGII Table SPM.A1 for descriptions of the attributed impacts. (B) Average rates of change in distribution (km per decade) for marine taxonomic groups based on observations over 1900-2010. Positive distribution changes are consistent with warming (moving into previously cooler waters, generally poleward). The number of responses analysed is given for each category. (C) Summary of estimated impacts of observed climate changes on yields over 1960-2013 for four major crops in temperate and tropical regions, with the number of data points analysed given within parentheses for each category. {WGII [Figure SPM.2](#)}

**In many regions, changing precipitation or melting snow and ice are altering hydrological systems, affecting water resources in terms of quantity and quality (*medium confidence*).** Glaciers continue to shrink almost worldwide due to climate change (*high confidence*), affecting runoff and water resources downstream (*medium confidence*). Climate change is causing permafrost warming and thawing in high-latitude regions and in high-elevation regions (*high confidence*). {WGII [SPM A-1](#)}

**Many terrestrial, freshwater, and marine species have shifted their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, migration patterns, abundances, and species interactions in response to ongoing climate change (*high confidence*).** While only a few recent species extinctions have been attributed as yet to climate change (*high confidence*), natural global climate change at rates slower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years (*high confidence*). Increased tree mortality, observed in many places worldwide, has been attributed to climate change in some regions. Increases in the frequency or intensity of ecosystem disturbances such as droughts, wind-storms, fires, and pest outbreaks have been detected in many parts of the world and in some cases are attributed to climate change (*medium confidence*). Numerous observations over the last decades in all ocean basins show changes in abundance, distribution shifts poleward and/or to deeper, cooler waters for marine fishes, invertebrates, and phytoplankton (*very high confidence*), and altered ecosystem composition (*high confidence*), tracking climate trends. Some warm-water corals and their reefs have responded to warming with species replacement, bleaching, and decreased coral cover causing habitat loss (*high confidence*). Some impacts of ocean acidification on marine organisms have been attributed to human influence, from the thinning of pteropod and foraminiferan shells (*medium confidence*) to the declining growth rates of corals (*low confidence*). Oxygen minimum zones are progressively expanding in the tropical Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, due to reduced ventilation and O<sub>2</sub> solubility in warmer, more stratified oceans, and are constraining fish habitat (*medium confidence*). {WGII [SPM A-1](#), [TS A-1](#), [Table SPM.A1](#), [6.3.2.5](#), [6.3.3](#), [18.3-4](#), [30.5.1.1](#), [Box CC-OA](#), [Box CC-CR](#)}

**Assessment of many studies covering a wide range of regions and crops shows that negative impacts of climate change on crop yields have been more common than positive impacts (*high confidence*).** The smaller number of studies showing positive impacts relate mainly to high-latitude regions, though it is not yet clear whether the balance of impacts has been negative or positive in these regions (*high confidence*). Climate change has negatively affected wheat and maize yields for many regions and in the global aggregate (*medium confidence*). Effects on rice and soybean yield have been smaller in major production regions and globally, with a median change of zero across all available data, which are fewer for soy compared to the other crops. (See Figure 1.11C) Observed impacts relate mainly to production aspects of food security rather than access or other components of food security. Since AR4, several periods of rapid food and cereal price increases following climate extremes in key producing regions indicate a sensitivity of current markets to climate extremes among other factors (*medium confidence*). {WGII [SPM A-1](#)}

**At present the worldwide burden of human ill-health from climate change is relatively small compared with effects of other stressors and is not well quantified.** However, there has been increased heat-related mortality and decreased cold-related mortality in some regions as a result of warming (*medium confidence*). Local changes in temperature and rainfall have altered the distribution of some water-borne illnesses and disease vectors (*medium confidence*). {WGII [SPM A-1](#)}

‘Cascading’ impacts of climate change can now be attributed along chains of evidence from physical climate through to intermediate systems and then to people. (Figure 1.12) The changes in climate feeding into the cascade, in some cases, are linked to human drivers (e.g., a decreasing amount of water in spring snowpack in Western North America), while, in other cases, assessments of the causes of observed climate change leading into the cascade are not available. In all cases, confidence in detection and attribution to observed climate change decreases for effects further down each impact chain. {WGII [18.6.3](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 1.12 HERE]

**Figure 1.12:** Major systems where new evidence indicates interconnected, ‘cascading’ impacts from recent climate change through several natural and human subsystems. Bracketed text indicates confidence in the detection of a climate change effect and the attribution of observed impacts to climate change. The role of climate change can be major (solid arrow) or minor (dashed arrow). Initial evidence indicates that ocean acidification is following similar trends with respect to impact on human systems as ocean warming. {WGII [Figure 18-4](#)}

#### 1.4 Extreme events

**Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950. Some of these changes have been linked to human influences, including a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an increase in warm temperature extremes, an increase in extreme high sea levels and an increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions.**

**It is *very likely* that the number of cold days and nights has decreased and the number of warm days and nights has increased on the global scale.** It is *likely* that the frequency of heat waves has increased in large parts of Europe, Asia and Australia. It is *very likely* that human influence has contributed to the observed global scale changes in the frequency and intensity of daily temperature extremes since the mid-20th century. It is *likely* that human influence has more than doubled the probability of occurrence of heat waves in some locations. {WGI [SPM B.1](#), [SPM D.3](#), [Table SPM.1](#), WGI [FAQ 2.2](#), [2.6.1](#), [10.6](#)}

**There is *medium confidence* that the observed warming has increased heat-related human mortality and decreased cold-related human mortality in some regions.** {WGII [SPM A-1](#)} Extreme heat events currently result in increases in mortality and morbidity in North America (*very high confidence*), and in Europe with impacts that vary according to people’s age, location and socioeconomic factors (*high confidence*). {WGII [SPM A-1](#), [26.6.1.2](#)}

**There are *likely* more land regions where the number of heavy precipitation events has increased than where it has decreased.** The frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events has *likely* increased in North America and Europe. In other continents, confidence in trends is at most *medium*. It is *very likely* that global near-surface and tropospheric air specific humidity have increased since the 1970s. In land regions where observational coverage is sufficient for assessment, there is *medium confidence* that anthropogenic forcing has contributed to a global-scale intensification of heavy precipitation over the second half of the 20th century. {WGI [SPM B-1](#), [2.5.1](#), [2.5.4](#), [2.5.5](#), [2.6.2](#), [10.6](#), [Table SPM.1](#), [FAQ 2.2](#), SREX [Table 3-1](#), [3.2](#)}

**There is *low confidence* that anthropogenic climate change has affected the frequency and magnitude of fluvial floods on a global scale.** The strength of the evidence is limited mainly by a lack of long-term records from unmanaged catchments. Moreover, floods are strongly influenced by many human activities impacting catchments, making the attribution of detected changes to climate change difficult. However, recent detection of increasing trends in extreme precipitation and discharges in some catchments implies greater risks of flooding on a regional scale (*medium confidence*). Costs related to flood damage, worldwide, have been increasing since the 1970s, although this is partly due to the increasing exposure of people and assets. {WGI [2.6.2](#); WGII [3.2.7](#); SREX [SPM B](#)}



There is *low confidence* in observed global- scale trends in droughts, due to lack of direct observations, dependencies of inferred trends on the choice of the definition for drought, and due to geographical inconsistencies in drought trends. There is also *low confidence* in the attribution of changes in drought over global land areas since the mid 20th century, due to the same observational uncertainties and difficulties in distinguishing decadal scale variability in drought from long-term trends. {WGI [Table SPM.1](#), [2.6.2.3](#), [10.6](#), Figure 2.33; WGII [3 ES](#), [3.2.7](#)}

There is *low confidence* that long-term changes in tropical cyclone activity are robust and there is *low confidence* in the attribution of global changes to any particular cause. However, it is *virtually certain* that intense tropical cyclone activity has increased in the North Atlantic since 1970. {WGI: [Table SPM.1](#), [2.6.3](#), [10.6](#)}

It is *likely* that extreme sea levels (for example, as experienced in storm surges) have increased since 1970, being mainly the result of mean sea-level rise. Due to a shortage of studies and the difficulty to distinguish any such impacts from other modifications to coastal systems, limited evidence is available on the impacts of sea-level rise. {WGI [3.7.4](#), [3.7.5](#), [3.7.6](#), [Figure 3.15](#), WGII [5.3.3.2](#), [18.3](#)}

Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires, reveal significant vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems and many human systems to current climate variability (*very high confidence*). Impacts of such climate-related extremes include alteration of ecosystems, disruption of food production and water supply, damage to infrastructure and settlements, human morbidity and mortality, and consequences for mental health and human well-being. For countries at all levels of development, these impacts are consistent with a significant lack of preparedness for current climate variability in some sectors. {WGII [SPM A-1](#), [3.2](#), [4.2-3](#), [8.1](#), [9.3](#), [10.7](#), [11.3](#), [11.7](#), [13.2](#), [14.1](#), [18.6](#), [22.2.3](#), [22.3](#), [23.3.1.2](#), [24.4.1.3](#), [25.6-8](#), [26.6-7](#), [30.5](#), WGII Tables [18-3](#) and [23-1](#), WGII [Figure 26-2](#), WGII Boxes [4-3](#), [4-4](#), [25-5](#), [25-6](#), [25-8](#), and [CC-CR](#)}

Direct and insured losses from weather-related disasters have increased substantially in recent decades, both globally and regionally. Increasing exposure of people and economic assets has been the major cause of long-term increases in economic losses from weather- and climate-related disasters (*high confidence*). {WGII [10.7.3](#), SREX [SPM B](#), SREX [4.5.3.3](#)}

## 1.5 Exposure and vulnerability

The character and severity of impacts from climate change and extreme events emerge from risk that depends not only on climate-related hazards but also on exposure (people and assets at risk) and vulnerability (susceptibility to harm) of human and natural systems.

Exposure and vulnerability are influenced by a wide range of social, economic, and cultural factors and processes that have been incompletely considered to date and that make quantitative assessments of their future trends difficult (*high confidence*). These factors include wealth and its distribution across society, demographics, migration, access to technology and information, employment patterns, the quality of adaptive responses, societal values, governance structures, and institutions to resolve conflict. {SREX [SPM B](#), WGII [SPM A-3](#)}

Differences in vulnerability and exposure arise from non-climatic factors and from multidimensional inequalities often produced by uneven development processes (*very high confidence*). These differences shape differential risks from climate change. People who are socially, economically, culturally, politically, institutionally or otherwise marginalized are especially vulnerable to climate change and also to some adaptation and mitigation responses (*medium evidence, high agreement*). This heightened vulnerability is rarely due to a single cause. Rather, it is the product of intersecting social processes that result in inequalities in socioeconomic status and income, as well as in exposure. Such social processes include, for example, discrimination on the basis of gender, class, ethnicity, age, and (dis)ability. {WGII [SPM A-1](#); [Figure SPM.1](#), WGII [8.1-2](#), [9.3-4](#), [10.9](#), [11.1](#), [11.3-5](#), [12.2-5](#), [13.1-3](#), [14.1-3](#), [18.4](#), [19.6](#), [23.5](#), [25.8](#), [26.6](#), [26.8](#), [28.4](#), WGII Box [CC-GC](#)}

**Climate-related hazards exacerbate other stressors, often with negative outcomes for livelihoods, especially for people living in poverty (*high confidence*).** Climate-related hazards affect poor people's lives directly through impacts on livelihoods, reductions in crop yields, or the destruction of homes, and indirectly through, for example, increased food prices and food insecurity. Observed positive effects for poor and marginalized people, which are limited and often indirect, include examples such as diversification of social networks and of agricultural practices. {WGII [SPM A-1](#), [8.2-3](#), [9.3](#), [11.3](#), [13.1-3](#), [22.3](#), [24.4](#), [26.8](#)}

**Violent conflict increases vulnerability to climate change (*medium evidence, high agreement*).** Large-scale violent conflict harms assets that facilitate adaptation, including infrastructure, institutions, natural resources, social capital, and livelihood opportunities. {WGII [SPM A-1](#), [12.5](#), [19.2](#), [19.6](#)}

## 1.6 Human responses to climate change: adaptation and mitigation

Throughout history, people and societies have adjusted to and coped with climate, climate variability, and extremes, with varying degrees of success. In today's changing climate, accumulating experience with adaptation and mitigation efforts can provide opportunities for learning and refinement. (see topics 3, 4) {[WGII SPM A-2](#)}

**Adaptation and mitigation experience is accumulating across regions and scales, even while global anthropogenic GHG emissions have continued to increase.**

**Adaptation is becoming embedded in some planning processes, with more limited implementation of responses (*high confidence*).** Engineered and technological options are commonly implemented adaptive responses, often integrated within existing programmes, such as disaster risk management and water management. There is increasing recognition of the value of social, institutional, and ecosystem-based measures and of the extent of constraints to adaptation. {WGII [SPM A-2](#), [4.4](#), [5.5](#), [6.4](#), [8.3](#), [9.4](#), [11.7](#), [14.1](#), [14.3-4](#), [15.2-5](#), [17.2-3](#), [21.3](#), [21.5](#), [22.4](#), [23.7](#), [25.4](#), [26.8-9](#), [30.6](#), [Boxes 25-1](#), [25-2](#), [25-9](#), and [CC-EA](#)}

**Governments at various levels have begun to develop adaptation plans and policies and integrate climate-change considerations into broader development plans.** Examples of adaptation are now available from all regions of the world (see Topic 4 for details on adaptation options and policies to support their implementation). {WGII [SPM A-2](#), [22.4](#), [23.7](#), [24.4-6](#), [24.9](#), [25.4](#), [25.10](#), [26.7-9](#), [27.3](#), [28.2](#), [28.4](#), [29.3](#), [29.6](#), [30.6](#), [Tables 25-2](#) and [29-3](#), [Figure 29-1](#), [Boxes 5-1](#), [23-3](#), [25-1](#), [25-2](#), [25-9](#), and [CC-TC](#)}

**Global increases in anthropogenic emissions and climate impacts have occurred, even while mitigation activities have taken place in many parts of the world.** Though various mitigation initiatives between the sub-national and global scales have been developed or implemented, a full assessment of their impact may be premature. {WG III [SPM.3](#); [SPM.5](#)}

## Topic 2: Future Climate Changes, Risks and Impacts

**Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adaptation, can limit climate change risks.**

Topic 2 assesses projections of future climate change and the resulting risks and impacts. Factors that determine future climate change, including scenarios for future GHG emissions, are outlined in Section 2.1. Descriptions of the methods and tools used to make projections of climate, impacts and risks, and their development since AR4, are provided in Boxes 2.1 to 2.3. Details of projected changes in the climate system, including the associated uncertainty and the degree of expert confidence in the projections are provided in Section 2.2. The future impacts of climate change on natural and human systems and associated risks are assessed in Section 2.3. Topic 2 concludes with an assessment of irreversible changes, abrupt changes, and changes beyond 2100, in Section 2.4.

### 2.1 Key drivers of future climate and the basis on which projections are made

**Cumulative emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond. Projections of greenhouse gas emissions vary over a wide range, depending on both socio-economic development and climate policy.**

Climate models are mathematical representations of processes important in the Earth's climate system. Results from a hierarchy of climate models are considered in this report; ranging from simple idealized models, to models of intermediate complexity, to comprehensive General Circulation Models (GCMs), including Earth System Models (ESMs) that also simulate the carbon cycle. The GCMs simulate many climate aspects, including the temperature of the atmosphere and the oceans, precipitation, winds, clouds, ocean currents, and sea-ice extent. The models are extensively tested against historical observations (Box 2.1). {WGI [1.5.2](#), [9.1.2](#), [9.2](#), [9.8.1](#)}

#### Box 2.1: Advances, confidence and uncertainty in modelling the Earth's climate system

**Improvements in climate models since the AR4 are evident in simulations of continental-scale surface temperature, large-scale precipitation, the monsoon, Arctic sea ice, ocean heat content, some extreme events, the carbon cycle, atmospheric chemistry and aerosols, the effects of stratospheric ozone, and the El Niño-Southern Oscillation.** Climate models reproduce the observed continental-scale surface temperature patterns and multi-decadal trends, including the more rapid warming since the mid 20th century, and the cooling immediately following large volcanic eruptions (*very high confidence*). The simulation of large-scale patterns of precipitation has improved somewhat since the AR4, although models continue to perform less well for precipitation than for surface temperature. Confidence in the representation of processes involving clouds and aerosols remains low. {WGI [SPM D.1](#), [7.2.3](#), [7.3.3](#), [7.6.2](#), [9.4](#), [9.5](#), [9.8](#), [10.3.1](#)}

The ability to simulate ocean thermal expansion, glaciers and ice sheets, and thus sea level, has improved since the AR4, but significant challenges remain in representing the dynamics of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. This, together with advances in scientific understanding and capability, has resulted in improved sea-level projections in this report, compared with the AR4 report. {WGI [SPM E.6](#), [9.1.3](#), [9.2](#), [9.4.2](#), [9.6](#), [9.8](#), [13.1](#), [13.4](#), [13.5](#)}

There is overall consistency between the projections from climate models in AR4 and AR5 for large-scale patterns of change, and the magnitude of the uncertainty has not changed significantly, but new experiments and studies have led to a more complete and rigorous characterisation of the uncertainty in long-term projections. {WGI [12.4](#)}

In order to obtain climate change projections, the climate models use information described in scenarios of greenhouse gas and air pollutant emissions and land-use patterns. Scenarios are generated by a range of approaches, from simple idealised experiments to Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs, see Glossary). Key factors driving changes in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are economic and population growth, lifestyle and behavioural changes, associated changes in energy use and land use, technology, and climate policy, which are fundamentally uncertain. {WGI [11.3](#), [12.4](#), WGIII [5](#), [6](#), [6.1](#)}

The standard set of scenarios used in the AR5 is called Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs, Box 2.2). {WGI [Box SPM.1](#)}

### Box 2.2: The ‘Representative Concentration Pathways’ (RCPs)

**The RCPs describe four different 21st century pathways of greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric concentrations, air pollutant emissions and land use.** The RCPs have been developed using IAMs as input to a wide range of climate model simulations to project their consequences for the climate system. These climate projections, in turn, are used for impacts and adaptation assessment. The RCPs are consistent with the wide range of scenarios in the mitigation literature assessed by WGIII<sup>9</sup>. The scenarios are used to assess the costs associated with emission reductions consistent with particular concentration pathways. The RCPs represent the range of greenhouse gas emissions in the wider literature well (Box 2.2, Figure 1); they include a stringent mitigation scenario (RCP2.6), two intermediate scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6.0), and one scenario with very high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5). Scenarios without additional efforts to constrain emissions (“baseline scenarios”) lead to pathways ranging between RCP6.0 and RCP8.5. RCP2.6 is representative of a scenario that aims to keep global warming *likely* below 2 °C above pre-industrial temperatures. The majority of models indicate that scenarios meeting forcing levels similar to RCP2.6 are characterized by substantial net negative emissions<sup>10</sup> by 2100, on average around 2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>/yr. The land-use scenarios of RCPs, together, show a wide range of possible futures, ranging from a net reforestation to further deforestation, consistent with projections in the full scenario literature. For air pollutants such as SO<sub>2</sub>, the RCP scenarios assume a consistent decrease in emissions as a consequence of assumed air pollution control and greenhouse gas mitigation policy (Box 2.2, Figure 1). Importantly, these future scenarios do not account for possible changes in natural forcings (e.g. volcanic eruptions) (see Box 1.1). {WGI Box SPM 1, [6.4](#), [8.5.3](#), [12.3](#), [AnnexII](#), WGII [19](#), [21](#), WGIII [6.3.2](#), [6.3.6](#)}.

**The RCPs cover a wider range than the scenarios from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) used in previous assessments, as they also represent scenarios with climate policy.** In terms of overall forcing, RCP8.5 is broadly comparable to the SRES A2/A1FI scenario, RCP6.0 to B2 and RCP4.5 to B1. For RCP2.6, there is no equivalent scenario in SRES. As a result, the differences in the magnitude of AR4 and AR5 climate projections are largely due to the inclusion of the wider range of emissions assessed.

[INSERT FIGURE BOX 2.2, FIGURE 1 HERE]

**Box 2.2, Figure 1:** Emission scenarios and the resulting radiative forcing levels for the RCPs (lines) and the associated scenarios categories used in WGIII (coloured areas, see Table 3.1). Panels a to d show the emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O and SO<sub>2</sub>. Panel e shows future radiative forcing levels for the RCPs calculated, using the simple carbon cycle climate model MAGICC for the RCPs (per forcing agent) and for the WGIII scenario categories (total). {WGI [8.2.2](#), [8.5.3](#), [Figure 8.2](#), WGI [Annex II](#), WGIII Tables [SPM.1](#) and [6.3](#)}. The WGIII scenario categories summarize the wide range of emission scenarios published in the scientific literature and are defined based on total CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentrations (in ppm) in 2100 (Table 3.1). The vertical lines to the right of the panels (panel a–d) indicate the full range of the WGIII AR5 scenario database.

The methods used to estimate future impacts and risks resulting from climate change are described in Box 2.3. Modelled future impacts assessed in this report are generally based on climate-model projections using

<sup>9</sup> Roughly 300 baseline scenarios and 900 mitigation scenarios are categorized by CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentration (CO<sub>2</sub>-eq) by 2100. The CO<sub>2</sub>-eq includes the forcing due to all GHGs (including halogenated gases and tropospheric ozone), aerosols and albedo change (see Glossary).

<sup>10</sup> Net negative emissions can be achieved when more greenhouse gases are sequestered than are released into the atmosphere, e.g. by using bio-energy in combination with carbon capture and storage.

the RCPs, and in some cases, the older Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). {WGII [1.1](#), [1.3](#), [2.2-3](#), [19.6](#), [20.2](#), [21.3](#), [21.5](#), [26.2](#), [Box CC-RC](#); WGI [Box SPM.1](#)}

**Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction between climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) and the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems.** Alternative development paths influence risk by changing the likelihood of climatic events and trends, through their effects on greenhouse gases, pollutants and land use, and by altering vulnerability and exposure. {WGII [SPM](#), WGII [19.2.4](#), [Figure 19-1](#), [Box 19-2](#)}

**Experiments, observations, and models used to estimate future impacts and risks have improved since the AR4, with increasing understanding across sectors and regions.** For example, an improved knowledge base has enabled expanded assessment of risks for human security and livelihoods and for the oceans. For some aspects of climate change and climate-change impacts, uncertainty about future outcomes has narrowed. For others, uncertainty will persist. Some of the persistent uncertainties are grounded in the mechanisms that control the magnitude and pace of climate change. Others emerge from potentially complex interactions between the changing climate and the underlying vulnerability and exposure of people, societies, and ecosystems. The combination of persistent uncertainty in key mechanisms plus the prospect of complex interactions motivates a focus on risk in this report. Because risk involves both probability and consequence, it is important to consider the full range of possible outcomes, including low-probability, high-consequence impacts that are difficult to simulate. {WGII [2.1-4](#), [3.6](#), [4.3](#), [11.3](#), [12.6](#), [19.2](#), [19.6](#), [21.3-5](#), [22.4](#), [25.3-4](#), [25.11](#), [26.2](#)}

### **Box 2.3: Models and methods for estimating climate change risks, vulnerability and impacts**

**Future climate-related risks, vulnerabilities and impacts are estimated in the AR5 through experiments, analogies, and models, as in previous assessments.** ‘Experiments’ involve deliberately changing one or more climate-system factors affecting a subject of interest to reflect anticipated future conditions, while holding the other factors affecting the subject constant. ‘Analogies’ make use of existing variations and are used when controlled experiments are impractical due to ethical constraints, the large area or long time required, or high system complexity. Two types of analogies are used in projections of climate and impacts. Spatial analogies identify another part of the world currently experiencing similar conditions to those anticipated to be experienced in the future. Temporal analogies use changes in the past, sometimes inferred from paleo-ecological data, to make inferences about changes in the future. ‘Models’ are typically numerical simulations of real-world systems, calibrated and validated using observations from experiments or analogies, and then run using input data representing future climate. Models can also include largely descriptive narratives of possible futures, such as those used in scenario construction. Quantitative and descriptive models are often used together. Impacts are modelled, among other things, for water resources; biodiversity and ecosystem services on land, for inland waters, the oceans and ice bodies, as well as for urban infrastructure, agricultural productivity, health, economic growth and poverty. {WGII [2.2.1](#), [2.4.2](#), [3.4.1](#), [4.2.2](#), [5.4.1](#), [6.5](#), [7.3.1](#), [11.3.6](#), [13.2.2](#)}

**Risks are evaluated based on the interaction of projected changes in the Earth system with the many dimensions of vulnerability in societies and ecosystems.** The data are seldom sufficient to allow direct estimation of probabilities of a given outcome; therefore, expert judgment using specific criteria (large magnitude, high probability, or irreversibility of impacts; timing of impacts; persistent vulnerability or exposure contributing to risks; or limited potential to reduce risks through adaptation or mitigation) is used to integrate the diverse information sources relating to the severity of consequences and the likelihood of occurrence into a risk evaluation, considering exposure and vulnerability in the context of specific hazards. {WGII [11.3](#), [19.2](#), [21.1](#), [21.3-5](#), [25.3-4](#), [25.11](#), [26.2](#)}

## **2.2 Projected changes in the climate system**

The projected changes in Section 2.2 are for 2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005, unless otherwise indicated.

**Surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st century under all assessed emission scenarios. It is very likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that extreme precipitation**

**events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise.**

### 2.2.1 Air Temperature

**The global mean surface temperature change for the period 2016–2035 relative to 1986–2005 is similar for the four RCPs, and will likely be in the range 0.3 °C to 0.7 °C (medium confidence)<sup>11</sup>.** This range assumes no major volcanic eruptions or changes in some natural sources (e.g., CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O), or unexpected changes in total solar irradiance. Future climate will depend on committed warming caused by past anthropogenic emissions, as well as future anthropogenic emissions and natural climate variability. By the mid 21st century, the magnitude of the projected climate change is substantially affected by the choice of emissions scenarios. Climate change continues to diverge among the scenarios through to 2100 and beyond (Table 2.1, Figure 2.1). The ranges provided for particular RCPs (Table 2.1), and those given below in Section 2.2, primarily arise from differences in the sensitivity of climate models to the imposed forcing. {WGI SPM [E.1](#), [11.3.2](#), [12.4.1](#)}

**Relative to 1850–1900, global surface temperature change for the end of the 21st century (2081–2100) is projected to likely exceed 1.5 °C for RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (high confidence). Warming is likely to exceed 2 °C for RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (high confidence), more likely than not to exceed 2 °C for RCP4.5 (medium confidence), but unlikely to exceed 2 °C for RCP2.6 (medium confidence).** {WGI SPM [E.1](#), [12.4.1](#), Table [12.3](#)}

The Arctic region will continue to warm more rapidly than the global mean, (Figure 2.2, *very high confidence*). The mean warming over land will be larger than over the ocean (*very high confidence*) and larger than global average warming (Figure 2.2). {WGI SPM [E.1](#), [11.3.2](#), [12.4.3](#), [14.8.2](#)}

**It is virtually certain that there will be more frequent hot and fewer cold temperature extremes over most land areas on daily and seasonal timescales, as global mean surface temperature increases.** It is *very likely* that heat waves will occur with a higher frequency and longer duration. Occasional cold winter extremes will continue to occur. {WGI SPM [E.1](#), [12.4.3](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 2.1 HERE]

**Figure 2.1:** (a) Time series of global annual change in mean surface temperature for the 1900–2300 period (relative to 1986–2005) from Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) concentration-driven experiments. Projections are shown for the multi-model mean (solid lines) and the 5% to 95% range across the distribution of individual models (shading). Grey lines and shading represent the CMIP5 historical simulations. Discontinuities at 2100 are due to different numbers of models performing the extension runs beyond the 21st century and have no physical meaning. (b) Same as (a) but for the 2006–2100 period (relative to 1986–2005). (c) Change in Northern Hemisphere September sea-ice extent (5 year running mean). The dashed line represents nearly ice-free conditions (i.e., when September sea-ice extent is less than 10<sup>6</sup> km<sup>2</sup> for at least five consecutive years). (d) Change in global mean sea level. (e) Change in ocean surface pH. For all panels, changes are relative to the 1986–2005 period; time series of projections and a measure of uncertainty (shading) are shown for scenarios RCP2.6 (blue) and RCP8.5 (red). The number of CMIP5 models used to calculate the multi-model mean is indicated. The mean and associated uncertainties averaged over the 2081–2100 period are given for all RCP scenarios as coloured vertical bars on the right hand side of panels (b) to (e). For sea-ice extent (c), the projected mean and uncertainty (minimum–maximum range) is only given for the subset of models that most closely reproduce the climatological mean state and the 1979–2012 trend in the Arctic sea ice. For sea level (d), based on current understanding (from observations, physical understanding and modelling), only the collapse of marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, if initiated, could cause global mean sea level to rise substantially above the *likely* range during the 21st century. However, there is *medium confidence* that this additional contribution would not exceed several tenths of a meter of sea-level rise during the 21st century. {WGI [Figure SPM.7](#), [Figure SPM9](#), [Figure 12.5](#), [6.4.4](#) [12.4.1](#), [13.4.4](#), [13.5.1](#)}

**Table 2.1:** Projected change in global mean surface temperature and global mean sea-level rise for the mid and late 21st century, relative to the 1986–2005 period. {WGI [Table SPM.2](#), [12.4.1](#) [13.5.1](#), [Table 12.2](#), [Table 13.5](#)}

[INSERT TABLE 2.1 HERE]

<sup>11</sup> The 1986–2005 period was approximately 0.61 °C [0.55 to 0.67] °C warmer than the period 1850–1900. {WGI SPM [E](#), [2.4.3](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 2.2 HERE]

**Figure 2.2:** CMIP5 multi-model mean projections (i.e. the average of the model projections available) for the 2081–2100 period under the RCP2.6 (left) and RCP8.5 (right) scenarios for (a) change in annual mean surface temperature and (b) change in annual mean precipitation, in percentages, and (c) change in average sea level. Changes are shown relative to the 1986–2005 period. The number of CMIP5 models used to calculate the multi-model mean is indicated in the upper right corner of each panel. Stippling (dots) on (a) and (b) indicates regions where the projected change is large compared to natural internal variability (i.e., greater than two standard deviations of internal variability in 20-year means) and where 90% of the models agree on the sign of change. Hatching (diagonal lines) on (a) and (b) shows regions where the projected change is less than one standard deviation of natural internal variability in 20-year means. {WGI [Figure SPM.8](#), [Figure 13.20](#), Box 12.1}

### 2.2.2 Water cycle

**Changes in precipitation in a warming world will not be uniform.** The high latitudes and the equatorial Pacific are *likely* to experience an increase in annual mean precipitation by the end of this century under the RCP8.5 scenario. In many mid-latitude and subtropical dry regions, mean precipitation will *likely* decrease, while in many mid-latitude wet regions, mean precipitation will *likely* increase under the RCP8.5 scenario (Figure 2.2). {WGI [SPM E.2](#), [7.6.2](#), [12.4.5](#), [14.3.1](#), [14.3.5](#)}

Extreme precipitation events over most mid-latitude land masses and over wet tropical regions will *very likely* become more intense and more frequent as global mean surface temperature increases. {WGI [SPM E.2](#), [7.6.2](#), [12.4.5](#)}

Globally, in all RCPs, it is *likely* that the area encompassed by monsoon systems will increase and monsoon precipitation is *likely* to intensify and El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) related precipitation variability on regional scales will *likely* intensify. {WGI [SPM E.2](#), [14.2](#), [14.4](#)}

### 2.2.3 Ocean, cryosphere and sea level

**The global ocean will continue to warm during the 21st century.** The strongest ocean warming is projected for the surface in tropical and Northern Hemisphere subtropical regions. At greater depth the warming will be most pronounced in the Southern Ocean (*high confidence*). {WGI [SPM E.4](#), [WGI 6.4.5](#), [12.4.7](#)}

**It is very likely that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) will weaken over the 21st century**, with best estimates and model ranges for the reduction of 11% (1-24%) for the RCP2.6 scenario, 34% (12-54%) for the RCP8.5. Nevertheless, it is *very unlikely* that the AMOC will undergo an abrupt transition or collapse in the 21st century. {WGI [SPM E.4](#), [12.4.7.2](#)}

**Year-round reductions in Arctic sea ice are projected for all RCP scenarios.** The subset of models that most closely reproduce the observations<sup>12</sup> project that a nearly sea ice-free Arctic Ocean<sup>13</sup> in September is *likely* for RCP8.5 before mid-century (*medium confidence*) (Figure 2.1). In the Antarctic, a decrease in sea ice extent and volume is projected with *low confidence*. {WGI [SPM E.5](#), [WGI 12.4.6.1](#)}

The area of Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover is *likely* to decrease by 7% for RCP2.6 and by 25% in RCP8.5 by the end of the 21st century for the multi-model average (*medium confidence*). {WGI [SPM E.5](#), [WGI 12.4.6](#)}

It is *virtually certain* that near-surface permafrost extent at high northern latitudes will be reduced as global mean surface temperature increases. The area of permafrost near the surface (upper 3.5 m) is *likely* to decrease by 37% (RCP2.6) to 81% (RCP8.5) for the multi-model average (*medium confidence*). {WGI [SPM E.5](#), [WGI 12.4.6](#)}

<sup>12</sup> Climatological mean state and the 1979–2012 trend in Arctic sea-ice extent.

<sup>13</sup> When sea-ice extent is less than one million km<sup>2</sup> for at least five consecutive years.

The global glacier volume, excluding glaciers on the periphery of Antarctica (and excluding the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets), is projected to decrease by 15 to 55% for RCP2.6, and by 35 to 85% for RCP8.5 (*medium confidence*). {WGI [SPM E.5](#), WGI [13.4.2](#), [13.5.1](#)}

**Global mean sea level will continue to rise during the 21st century (Table 2.1, Figure 2.1).** There has been significant improvement in understanding and projection of sea-level change since the Fourth Assessment Report. Under all RCP scenarios, the rate of sea-level rise will *very likely* exceed the observed rate of 2.0 [1.7–2.3] mm yr<sup>-1</sup> during 1971–2010, with the rate of rise for RCP8.5 during 2081–2100 of 8 to 16 mm yr<sup>-1</sup> (*medium confidence*). {WGI SPM B4, [SPM E.6](#), WGI [13.5.1](#)}

**Sea-level rise will not be uniform across regions.** By the end of the 21st century, it is *very likely* that sea level will rise in more than about 95% of the ocean area. Sea-level rise depends on the pathway of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, not only on the cumulative total; reducing emissions earlier rather than later, for the same cumulative total, leads to a larger mitigation of sea-level rise. About 70% of the coastlines worldwide are projected to experience sea-level change within ±20% of the global mean (Figure 2.2). It is *very likely* that there will be a significant increase in the occurrence of future sea-level extremes in some regions by 2100. {WGI [SPM E.6](#), WGI TS 5.7.1, WGI 12.4.1, 13.4.1, 13.5.1, [13.6.5](#), [13.7.2](#), Table 13.5}

#### 2.2.4 Carbon cycle and biogeochemistry

**Ocean uptake of anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> will continue under all four RCPs through to 2100, with higher uptake for higher concentration pathways (*very high confidence*).** The future evolution of the land carbon uptake is less certain. A majority of models projects a continued land carbon uptake under all RCPs, but some models simulate a land carbon loss due to the combined effect of climate change and land-use change. {WGI [SPM E.7](#), WGI [6.4.2](#), [6.4.3](#)}

**Based on Earth System Models, there is high confidence that the feedback between climate change and the carbon cycle will amplify global warming.** Climate change will partially offset increases in land and ocean carbon sinks caused by rising atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>. As a result more of the emitted anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> will remain in the atmosphere, reinforcing the warming. {WGI [SPM E.7](#), WGI [6.4.2](#), [6.4.3](#)}

Earth System Models project a global increase in ocean acidification for all RCP scenarios by the end of the 21st century, with a slow recovery after mid-century under RCP2.6. The decrease in surface ocean pH is in the range of 0.06 to 0.07 (15–17% increase in acidity) for RCP2.6, 0.14 to 0.15 (38–41%) for RCP4.5, 0.20 to 0.21 (58–62%) for RCP6.0, and 0.30 to 0.32 (100–109%) for RCP8.5 (Figure 2.1). {WGI SPM, E.7, WGI 6.4.4}

**It is very likely that the dissolved oxygen content of the ocean will decrease by a few per cent during the 21st century** in response to surface warming, predominantly in the subsurface mid-latitude oceans. There is no consensus on the future volume of low oxygen waters in the open ocean because of large uncertainties in potential biogeochemical effects and in the evolution of tropical ocean dynamics. {WGI [TS 5.6](#), [6.4.5](#), WGII TS B-2, WGII 6.1}

#### 2.2.5 Climate system responses

Climate system properties that determine the response to external forcing have been estimated both from climate models and from analysis of past and recent climate change. The equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS)<sup>14</sup> is *likely* in the range 1.5 °C–4.5 °C, *extremely unlikely* less than 1 °C, and *very unlikely* greater than 6 °C. {WGI [SPM D.2](#), WGI [TS TFE.6](#), WGI [10.8.1](#), [10.8.2](#), WGI [12.5.4](#), [Box 12.2](#)}

**Cumulative emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond.** Multiple lines of evidence indicate a strong and consistent near-linear relationship across all scenarios considered between net cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (including the impact of CO<sub>2</sub> removal) and

<sup>14</sup> Defined as the equilibrium global average surface warming following a doubling of CO<sub>2</sub> concentration (relative to pre-industrial).



projected global temperature change to the year 2100 (Figure 2.3). Past emissions and observed warming support this relationship within uncertainties. Any given level of warming is associated with a range of cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (depending on non-CO<sub>2</sub> drivers), and therefore, e.g., higher emissions in earlier decades imply lower emissions later. {WGI [SPM E.8](#), WGI [TS TFE.8](#), WGI [12.5.4](#)}

**The global mean peak surface temperature change per trillion tonnes of carbon (1000 GtC) emitted as CO<sub>2</sub> is likely in the range of 0.8 °C to 2.5 °C.** This quantity, called the transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE), is supported by both modeling and observational evidence and applies to cumulative emissions up to about 2000 GtC. {WGI [SPM D.2](#), WGI [TS TFE.6](#), WGI [12.5.4](#), [Box 12.2](#)}

**Warming caused by CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is effectively irreversible over multi-century timescales unless measures are taken to remove CO<sub>2</sub> from the atmosphere.** Ensuring CO<sub>2</sub>-induced warming remains likely less than 2°C requires cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from all anthropogenic sources to remain below about 3650 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (1000 GtC), over half of which were already emitted by 2011. {WGI [SPM E.8](#), WGI [TS TFE.8](#), WGI [12.5.2](#), [12.5.3](#), [12.5.4](#)}

Multi-model results show that limiting total human-induced warming (accounting for both CO<sub>2</sub> and other human influences on climate) to less than 2°C relative to the period 1861–1880 with a probability of >66% would require total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from all anthropogenic sources since 1870 to be limited to about 2900 GtCO<sub>2</sub> when accounting for non-CO<sub>2</sub> forcing as in the RCP2.6 scenario, with a range of 2550–3150 GtCO<sub>2</sub> arising from variations in non-CO<sub>2</sub> climate drivers across the scenarios considered by WGIII (Table 2.2). About 1900 [1650 to 2150] GtCO<sub>2</sub> were emitted by 2011, leaving about 1000 GtCO<sub>2</sub> to be consistent with this temperature goal. Estimated total fossil carbon reserves exceed this remaining amount by a factor of 4 to 7, with resources much larger still. {WGI [SPM E.8](#), WGI [12.5.4](#), [Figure 12.45](#); WGI [TS TFE.8](#), [Figure 1](#), [TS.SM.10](#), [WG III Tables \[SPM.1\]\(#\), \[6.3\]\(#\) and \[7.2\]\(#\)](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 2.3 HERE]

**Figure 2.3:** Global mean surface temperature increase as a function of cumulative total global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from various lines of evidence. Multi-model results from a hierarchy of climate carbon-cycle models for each RCP until 2100 are shown (coloured lines). Model results over the historical period (1860 to 2010) are indicated in black. The coloured plume illustrates the multi-model spread over the four RCP scenarios and fades with the decreasing number of available models in RCP8.5. Dots indicate decadal averages, with selected decades labelled. Ellipses show total anthropogenic warming in 2100 versus cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 1870 to 2100 from a simple climate model (median climate response) under the scenario categories used in WGIII. Temperature values are always given relative to the 1861–1880 period, and emissions are cumulative since 1870. Black filled ellipse shows observed emissions to 2005 and observed temperatures in the decade 2000–2009 with associated uncertainties. {WGI [SPM E.8](#), WGI [12.5.4](#), [Figure 12.45](#); WGI [TS TFE.8](#), [Figure 1](#), [TS.SM.10](#), [WG III Tables \[SPM.1\]\(#\) and \[6.3\]\(#\)](#)}

**Table 2.2:** Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emission consistent with limiting warming to less than stated temperature limits at different levels of probability, based on different lines of evidence. {WGI [12.5.4](#); [WGIII](#), [6](#)}

[INSERT TABLE 2.2 HERE]

### 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate

**Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development. Increasing magnitudes of warming increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and irreversible impacts for people, species and ecosystems. Continued high emissions would lead to mostly negative impacts for biodiversity, ecosystem services, and economic development and amplify risks for livelihoods and for food and human security.**

Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and magnitudes of warming and other changes in the climate system, accompanied by ocean acidification, increase the risk of severe, pervasive, and in some cases irreversible detrimental impacts. Future climate change will amplify existing climate-related risks and create new risks.

Key risks are potentially severe impacts relevant to understanding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Risks are considered key due to high hazard or high vulnerability of societies and systems exposed, or both. Their identification is based on large magnitude or high probability of impacts; irreversibility or timing of impacts; persistent vulnerability or exposure; or limited potential to reduce risks. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure 2.4), while others are global (Table 2.3). For risk assessment it is important to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. Risk levels often increase with temperature (Box 2.3) and are sometimes more directly linked to other dimensions of climate change, such as the rate of warming, as well as the magnitudes and rates of ocean acidification, and sea-level rise (Figure 2.5). {WGII SPM A-3, [B-1](#)}

**Key risks that span sectors and regions include the following (*high confidence*):**

1. Risk of severe ill-health and disrupted livelihoods resulting from storm surges, sea-level rise, and coastal flooding; inland flooding in some urban regions; and periods of extreme heat.
2. Systemic risks due to extreme weather events leading to breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical services.
3. Risk of food and water insecurity and loss of rural livelihoods and income, particularly for poorer populations.
4. Risk of loss of ecosystems, biodiversity, and ecosystem goods, functions, and services. {WGII SPM [B-1](#)}

**The overall risks of future climate change impacts can be reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change, including ocean acidification.** Some risks are considerable even at 1 °C global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels. Many global risks are high to very high for global temperature increases of 4 °C or more (see Box 2.4). These risks include severe and widespread impacts on unique and threatened systems, the extinction of many species, large risks to food security, and compromised normal human activities, including growing food or working outdoors in some areas for parts of the year, due to the combination of high temperature and humidity (*high confidence*). The precise levels of climate change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds in the earth system or in interlinked human and natural systems increases with rising temperature (*medium confidence*). {WGII SPM [B-1](#)}

**Adaptation can substantially reduce the risks of climate change impacts, but greater rates and magnitude of climate change increase the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits (*high confidence*).** The potential for adaptation, as well as constraints and limits to adaptation, varies among sectors, regions, communities, and ecosystems. The scope for adaptation changes over time, and is closely linked to socioeconomic development pathways and circumstances. See Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3, along with topics 3 and 4. {WGII SPM [B](#), SPM [C](#), TS [B](#), TS [C](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 2.4 HERE]

**Figure 2.4:** Representative key risks for each region, including the potential for risk reduction through adaptation and mitigation, as well as limits to adaptation. Identification of key risks was based on expert judgment using the following specific criteria: large magnitude, high probability or irreversibility of impacts; timing of impacts; persistent vulnerability or exposure contributing to risks; or limited potential to reduce risks through adaptation or mitigation. Risk levels are assessed as very low, low, medium, high, or very high for three timeframes: the present, near term (here, for 2030–2040), and long term (here, for 2080–2100). For the near term, projected levels of global mean temperature increase do not diverge substantially across different emission scenarios. For the long term, risk levels are presented for two possible futures (2 °C and 4 °C global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels). For each time frame, risk levels are indicated for a continuation of current adaptation and assuming high levels of current or future adaptation. Risk levels are not necessarily comparable, especially across regions. {WGII [SPM Assessment Box SPM.2 Table 1](#)}

### 2.3.1 *Ecosystems and their services in the oceans, along coasts, on land and in freshwater*

**Risks of harmful impacts on ecosystems and human systems increase with the rates and magnitudes of warming, ocean acidification, sea-level rise and other dimensions of climate change (*high confidence*).** Future risk is indicated to be high by the observation that natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years on land and in the oceans (*high confidence*). Many plant and animal species will be

unable to adapt locally or move fast enough during the 21st century to track suitable climates under mid- and high-range rates of climate change (RCP4.5, 6.0, and 8.5) (*medium confidence*) (Figure 2.5.A). Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable. {WGII [4.3-4](#), [5.4](#), [6.1](#), [6.3](#), [6.5](#), [25.6](#), [26.4](#), [29.4](#), [Box CC-RF](#), [Box CC-MB](#), [SPMA-1](#), [SPM B-2](#)}

**A large fraction of terrestrial, freshwater and marine species faces increased extinction risk due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century, especially as climate change interacts with other stressors (*high confidence*).** Extinction risk is increased relative to pre-industrial and present periods, under all RCP scenarios, as a result of both the magnitude and rate of climate change (*high confidence*). Extinctions will be driven by several climate-associated drivers (warming, sea-ice loss, variations in precipitation, reduced river flows, ocean acidification and lowered ocean oxygen levels) and the interactions among these drivers and their interaction with simultaneous habitat modification, over-exploitation of stocks, pollution, eutrophication and invasive species (*high confidence*). {WGII [SPM B-2](#), [4.3-4](#), [6.1](#), [6.3](#), [6.5](#), [25.6](#), [26.4](#), [Box CC-RF](#), [Box CC-MB](#)}

**Global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions, under climate change, will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other ecosystem services, especially at low latitudes (*high confidence*).** By the mid-21st century, under 2 °C global warming relative to pre-industrial temperatures, shifts in the geographical range of marine species will cause species richness and fisheries catch potential to increase, on average, at mid and high latitudes (*high confidence*) and to decrease at tropical latitudes and in semi-enclosed seas (Figure 2.6A) (*medium confidence*). The progressive expansion of Oxygen Minimum Zones and anoxic ‘dead zones’ in the oceans will further constrain fish habitats (*medium confidence*). Open-ocean net primary production is projected to redistribute and to decrease globally, by 2100, under all RCP scenarios (*medium confidence*). Climate change adds to the threats of over-fishing and other non-climatic stressors (*high confidence*). {WGII [SPM B-2](#), [6.3-5](#), [7.4](#), [25.6](#), [28.3](#), [29.3](#), [30.6-7](#), [Box CC-MB](#) and [CC-PP](#)}

**Marine ecosystems, especially coral reefs and polar ecosystems, are at risk from ocean acidification (*medium to high confidence*).** Ocean acidification has impacts on the physiology, behaviour and population dynamics of organisms. The impacts on individual species and the number of species affected in species groups increase from RCP4.5 to 8.5. Highly calcified molluscs, echinoderms, and reef-building corals are more sensitive than crustaceans (*high confidence*) and fishes (*low confidence*) (Figure 2.6B). Ocean acidification acts together with other global changes, (e.g., warming, progressively lower oxygen levels) and with local changes (e.g., pollution, eutrophication) (*high confidence*), leading to interactive, complex, and amplified impacts for species and ecosystems (Figure 2.5B). {WGII [SPM B-2](#), WGII [5.4](#), [6.3.2](#), [6.3.5](#), [22.3](#), [25.6](#), [28.3](#), [30.5](#), [Figure 6-10](#), [Figure SPM.6B](#), [Boxes CC-CR](#), [CC-OA](#), and [TS.7](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 2.5 HERE]

**Figure 2.5:** The risks of: (A) disruption of the community composition of terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems due to the rate of warming; (B) marine organisms impacted by ocean acidification (OA) or warming extremes combined with OA; and (C) coastal human and natural systems impacted by sea-level rise. The risk level criteria are consistent with those used in Box 2.4 and their calibration is illustrated by the annotations to each panel. (A) At high rates of warming, major groups of terrestrial and freshwater species are unable to move fast enough to stay within the spatially shifting climate envelopes to which they are adapted. The median observed or modelled speeds at which species populations move (km/decade) are compared against the speed at which climate envelopes move across the landscape, given the projected climate change rates for each RCP over the 2050–2100 period. The results are presented for the average of all landscapes, globally, as well as for flat landscapes, where the climate envelope moves especially fast. (B) Sensitivity to ocean acidification is high in marine organisms building a calcium carbonate shell. The risks from OA increase with warming because OA lowers the tolerated levels of heat exposure, as seen in corals and crustaceans. (C) The height of a 50-year flood event has already increased in many coastal locations. A 10- to more than 100-fold increase in the frequency of floods in many places would result from a 0.5 m rise in sea level in the absence of adaptation. Local adaptation capacity (and, in particular, protection) reaches its limits for ecosystems and human systems in many places under a 1 m sea-level rise. {WGI, [3.7.5](#), [Figure 13.25](#), WGII, [Figure SPM.5](#), [Figure 4-5](#), [Figure 6-10](#), [Box CC-OA](#), [4.4.2.5](#), [5.2](#), [5.3-5](#), [5.4.4](#), [5.5.6](#), [6.3](#).}

[INSERT FIGURE 2.6 HERE]

**Figure 2.6:** Climate change risks for fisheries. (A). Projected global redistribution of maximum catch potential of ~1000 species of exploited fishes and invertebrates, comparing the 10-year averages over 2001–2010 and 2051–2060, using ocean conditions based on a single climate model under a moderate to high warming scenario (2 °C

warming relative to pre-industrial temperatures), without analysis of potential impacts of overfishing or ocean acidification. (B) Marine mollusc and crustacean fisheries (present-day estimated annual catch rates  $\geq 0.005$  tonnes km<sup>2</sup>) and known locations of cold- and warm-water corals, depicted on a global map showing the projected distribution of surface ocean acidification by 2100 under RCP8.5. The bottom panel compares the percentage of species sensitive to ocean acidification for corals, molluscs, and crustaceans, vulnerable animal phyla with socioeconomic relevance (e.g., for coastal protection and fisheries). The number of species analysed across studies is given on top of the bars for each category of elevated CO<sub>2</sub>. For 2100, RCP scenarios falling within each pCO<sub>2</sub> category are as follows: RCP4.5 for 500–650  $\mu$ atm, RCP6.0 for 651–850  $\mu$ atm, and RCP8.5 for 851–1370  $\mu$ atm. By 2150, RCP8.5 falls within the 1371–2900  $\mu$ atm category. The control category corresponds to 380  $\mu$ atm (The unit  $\mu$ atm is approximately equivalent to ppm in the atmosphere). {WGII [SPM B-2](#), [6.1](#), [6.3](#), [30.5](#), [Figures 6-10](#) and [6-14](#), [SPM.6](#); WGI [Figure SPM.8](#), WGI5 [Box SPM.1](#)}

**Carbon stored in the terrestrial biosphere is susceptible to loss to the atmosphere as a result of climate change, deforestation, and ecosystem degradation (*high confidence*).** The aspects of climate change with direct effects on stored terrestrial carbon include high temperatures, drought and windstorms; indirect effects include increased risk of fires, pest and disease outbreaks. Increased tree mortality and associated forest dieback is projected to occur in many regions over the 21st century (*medium confidence*), posing risks for carbon storage, biodiversity, wood production, water quality, amenity, and economic activity. There is a high risk of substantial carbon and methane emissions as a result of permafrost thawing. {WGII [SPM](#), [4.2-3](#), [Figure 4-8](#), [Boxes 4-2](#), [4-3](#), and [4-4](#)}

**Coastal systems and low-lying areas will increasingly experience submergence, flooding and erosion throughout the 21st century and beyond, due to sea-level rise (*very high confidence*).** The population and assets projected to be exposed to coastal risks as well as human pressures on coastal ecosystems will increase significantly in the coming decades due to population growth, economic development, and urbanization (*high confidence*). Climatic and non-climatic drivers affecting coral reefs will erode habitats, increase coastline exposure to waves and storms, and degrade environmental features important to fisheries and tourism (*high confidence*). Some low-lying developing countries and small island states are expected to face very high impacts that could have associated damage and adaptation costs of several percentage points of GDP (Figure 2.5C). {WGII [5.3-5](#), [22.3](#), [24.4](#), [25.6](#), [26.3](#), [26.8](#), [29.4](#), [Table 26-1](#), [Boxes 25-1](#) and [CC-CR](#)}

### 2.3.2 Water, food and urban systems, human health, security and livelihoods

**The fractions of the global population that will experience water scarcity and be affected by major river floods are projected to increase with the level of warming in the 21st century (*robust evidence, high agreement*).** {WGII [3.4-5](#), [26.3](#), [29.4](#), [Table 3-2](#), [Box 25-8](#)}

**Climate change over the 21st century is projected to reduce renewable surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical regions (*robust evidence, high agreement*), intensifying competition for water among sectors (*limited evidence, medium agreement*).** In presently dry regions, the frequency of droughts will *likely* increase by the end of the 21st century under RCP8.5 (*medium confidence*). In contrast, water resources are projected to increase at high latitudes (*robust evidence, high agreement*). The interaction of increased temperature; increased sediment, nutrient, and pollutant loadings from heavy rainfall; increased concentrations of pollutants during droughts; and disruption of treatment facilities during floods will reduce raw water quality and pose risks to drinking water quality (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {WGII [3.2](#), [3.4-6](#), [22.3](#), [23.9](#), [25.5](#), [26.3](#), [Table 3-2](#), [23-3](#), [Boxes 25-2](#), [CC-RF](#), and [CC-WE](#); WGI AR5 [12.4](#)}

**All aspects of food security are potentially affected by climate change, including food production, access, use, and price stability (*high confidence*).** For wheat, rice, and maize in tropical and temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production at local temperature increases of 2 °C or more above late 20th century levels, although individual locations may benefit (*medium confidence*). Projected impacts vary across crops and regions and adaptation scenarios, with about 10% of projections for the 2030–2049 period showing yield gains of more than 10%, and about 10% of projections showing yield losses of more than 25%, compared with the late 20th century. Global temperature increases of ~4 °C or more above late 20th century levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to food security, both globally and regionally (*high confidence*) (Figure 2.4, 2.7) The relationship between global and regional warming is explained in 2.2.1. {WGII [6.3-5](#), [7.4-5](#), [9.3](#), [22.3](#), [24.4](#), [25.7](#), [26.5](#), [Tables 7-2](#) and [7-3](#), [Figures 7-1](#), [7-4](#), [7-5](#), [7-6](#), [7-7](#), and [7-8](#), [Box 7-1](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 2.7 HERE]

**Figure 2.7:** Summary of projected changes in crop yields (mostly wheat, maize, rice, and soy) due to climate change over the 21st century. The figure combines 1090 data points from crop model projections, covering different emission scenarios, tropical and temperate regions, and adaptation and no-adaptation cases. The projections are sorted into the 20-year periods (horizontal axis) during which their midpoint occurs. Changes in crop yields are relative to late 20th century levels, and data for each time period sum to 100%. Relatively few studies have considered impacts on cropping systems for scenarios where global mean temperatures increase by 4 °C or more. {WGII, [Figure SPM.7](#)}

**Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist (*very high confidence*). Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (*high confidence*).** Health impacts include greater likelihood of injury and death due to more intense heat waves and fires, increased risks from foodborne and waterborne diseases, and loss of work capacity and reduced labour productivity in vulnerable populations (*high confidence*). Risks of undernutrition in poor regions will increase (*high confidence*). Risks from vector-borne diseases are projected to generally increase with warming, due to the extension of the infection area and season, despite reductions in some areas that become too hot for disease vectors (*medium confidence*). Globally, the magnitude and severity of negative impacts will increasingly outweigh positive impacts (*high confidence*). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the combination of high temperature and humidity in some areas for parts of the year is expected to compromise common human activities, including growing food and working outdoors (*high confidence*). {WGII, [SPM B-2](#), [8.2](#), [11.3-8](#), [19.3](#), [22.3](#), [25.8](#), [26.6](#), [Figure 25-5](#), [Box CC-HS](#)}

**In urban areas, climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from heat stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea-level rise and storm surges (*very high confidence*).** These risks will be amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed areas. {WGII [3.5](#), [8.2-4](#), [22.3](#), [24.4-5](#), [26.8](#), [Table 8-2](#), [Boxes 25-9](#) and [CC-HS](#)}

**Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, infrastructure, and agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (*high confidence*).** These impacts will disproportionately affect the welfare of the poor in rural areas, such as female-headed households and those with limited access to land, modern agricultural inputs, infrastructure, and education. {WGII [5.4](#), [9.3](#), [25.9](#), [26.8](#), [28.2](#), [28.4](#), [Box 25-5](#)}

**Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature (*limited evidence, high agreement*) but global economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate.** With recognized limitations, the existing incomplete estimates of global annual economic losses for warming of ~2.5 °C above pre-industrial levels are 0.2% to 2.0% of income (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Changes in population, age structure, income, technology, relative prices, lifestyle, regulation, and governance are projected to have relatively larger impacts than climate change, for most economic sectors (*medium evidence, high agreement*). More severe and/or frequent weather hazards are projected to increase disaster-related losses and loss variability, posing challenges for affordable insurance, particularly in developing countries. International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for understanding the risks of climate change at regional scales. {WGII [3.5](#), [10.2](#), [10.7](#), [10.9-10](#), [17.4-5](#), [25.7](#), [26.7-9](#), [Box 3.1](#), [Box 25-7](#)}

**From a poverty perspective, climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security, and prolong existing poverty traps and create new ones, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (*medium confidence*).** Climate change impacts are expected to exacerbate poverty in most developing countries and create new poverty pockets in countries with increasing inequality, in both developed and developing countries (Figure 2.4). {WGII [8.1](#), [8.3-4](#), [9.3](#), [10.9](#), [13.2-4](#), [22.3](#), [26.8](#)}

**Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people (*medium evidence, high agreement*).** Displacement risk increases when populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts. Expanding opportunities for mobility can reduce vulnerability for such populations. Changes in migration patterns can be responses to

both extreme weather events and longer term climate variability and change, and migration can also be an effective adaptation strategy. {WGII [9.3](#), [12.4](#), [19.4](#), [22.3](#), [25.9](#)}

**Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflict by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts, such as poverty and economic shocks (*medium confidence*).** Multiple lines of evidence relate climate variability to these forms of conflict. {WGII [SPM](#), [12.5](#), [13.2](#), [19.4](#)}

**Table 2.3:** Examples of global key risks for different sectors, including the potential for risk reduction through adaptation and mitigation, as well as limits to adaptation. Each key risk is assessed as very low, low, medium, high, or very high. Risk levels are presented for three time frames: present, near term (here, for 2030–2040), and long term (here, for 2080–2100). In the near term, projected levels of global mean temperature increase do not diverge substantially across different emission scenarios. For the long term, risk levels are presented for two possible futures (2 °C and 4 °C global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels). For each time frame, risk levels are indicated for a continuation of current adaptation and assuming high levels of current or future adaptation. Risk levels are not necessarily comparable, especially across regions. Relevant climate variables are indicated by icons. {WGII [Table TS.4](#)}

[INSERT TABLE 2.3 HERE]

#### Box 2.4: Reasons for concern regarding climate change

Five ‘reasons for concern’ have provided a framework for summarizing key risks since the Third Assessment Report. They illustrate the implications of warming and of adaptation limits for people, economies, and ecosystems across sectors and regions. They provide one starting point for evaluating dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. All warming levels in the text of Box 2.4 are relative to the 1986–2005 period. Adding ~0.6°C to these warming levels roughly gives warming relative to the 1850–1900 period, used here as a proxy for pre-industrial times (right-hand scale in figure 1).

The five reasons for concern are:

1. **Unique and threatened systems:** Some ecosystems and cultures are already at risk from climate change (*high confidence*). With additional warming of around 1°C, the number of unique and threatened systems at risk of severe consequences increases. Many systems with limited adaptive capacity, particularly those associated with Arctic sea ice and coral reefs, are subject to very high risks with additional warming of 2 °C. In addition to risks resulting from the *magnitude* of warming, terrestrial species are also sensitive to the *rate* of warming, marine species to the rate and degree of ocean acidification, and coastal systems to sea-level rise (Figure 2.5).
2. **Extreme weather events:** Climate-change-related risks from extreme events, such as heat waves, heavy precipitation and coastal flooding, are already moderate (*high confidence*). With 1 °C additional warming, risks are high (*medium confidence*). Risks associated with some types of extreme events (e.g., extreme heat) increase progressively with further warming (*high confidence*).
3. **Distribution of impacts:** Risks are unevenly distributed between groups of people and between regions; risks are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities everywhere. Risks are already moderate because of regional differences in observed climate change impacts, particularly for crop production (*medium to high confidence*). Based on projected decreases in regional crop yields and water availability, risks of unevenly distributed impacts are high under additional warming of above 2 °C (*medium confidence*).
4. **Global aggregate impacts:** Risks of global aggregate impacts are moderate under additional warming of between 1 and 2 °C, reflecting impacts on both the Earth’s biodiversity and the overall global economy (*medium confidence*). Extensive biodiversity loss, with associated loss of ecosystem goods and services, leads to high risks at around 3 °C additional warming (*high confidence*). Aggregate economic damages accelerate with increasing temperature (*limited evidence, high agreement*), but few quantitative estimates are available for additional warming of above 3 °C.
5. **Large-scale singular events:** With increasing warming, some physical and ecological systems are at risk of abrupt and/or irreversible changes (see Section 2.4). Risks associated with such tipping points are

moderate between 0 and 1°C additional warming, since there are signs that both warm-water coral reefs and Arctic ecosystems are already experiencing irreversible regime shifts (*medium confidence*). Risks increase at a steepening rate under an additional warming of 1 to 2 °C and become high above 3°C, due to the potential for large and irreversible sea-level rise from ice sheet loss. For sustained warming above some threshold greater than ~0.5°C additional warming (*low confidence*) but less than ~3.5°C (*medium confidence*), near-complete loss of the Greenland ice sheet would occur over a millennium or more, eventually contributing up to 7 m to global mean sea-level rise.

[INSERT BOX 2.4, FIGURE 1 HERE]

**Box 2.4, Figure 1:** Risks associated with reasons for concern at a global scale are shown for increasing levels of climate change. The colour shading indicates the additional risk due to climate change when a temperature level is reached and then sustained or exceeded. White indicates no associated impacts are detectable and attributable to climate change. Yellow indicates that associated impacts are both detectable and attributable to climate change with at least *medium confidence*. Red indicates severe and widespread impacts. Purple, introduced in this assessment, shows that very high risk is indicated by all key risk criteria. {WGI [SPM Box 1](#), [Figure 19-4](#)}

## 2.4 Climate change beyond 2100, irreversibility and abrupt changes

**Many aspects of climate change and its impacts will continue for centuries, even if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are stopped. The risks of abrupt or irreversible changes increase as the magnitude of the warming increases.**

**Warming will continue beyond 2100 under all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6.** Surface temperatures will remain approximately constant at elevated levels for many centuries after a complete cessation of net anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (See Section 2.2.5 for the relationship between CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and global temperature change.). A large fraction of anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is irreversible on a multi-century to millennial time scale, except in the case of a large net removal of CO<sub>2</sub> from the atmosphere over a sustained period (Figure 2.8 a,b). {WGI [SPM E.1](#), [SPM E.8](#), [12.5.2](#)}

**Stabilisation of global average surface temperature does not imply stabilization for all aspects of the climate system.** Shifting biomes, re-equilibrating soil carbon, ice sheets, ocean temperatures and associated sea-level rise all have their own intrinsic long timescales that will result in ongoing changes for hundreds to thousands of years after global surface temperature has been stabilized. {WGI [SPM E.8](#) WGI [12.5.2 to 12.5.4](#), [WGII 4.2](#)}

**Ocean acidification will continue for centuries if CO<sub>2</sub> emissions continue, will strongly affect marine ecosystems (*high confidence*), and the impact will be exacerbated by rising temperature extremes (Figure 2.5B).** {WGI [3.8.2](#), [6.4.4](#), [WGII SPM B-2](#), [WGII 6.3.2](#), [6.3.5](#), [WGII 30.5](#), [WGII CC-OA](#)}

**Global mean sea-level rise will continue for many centuries beyond 2100 (*virtually certain*).** The few available analyses that go beyond 2100 indicate sea-level rise to be less than 1 m above the pre-industrial level by 2300 for greenhouse gas concentrations that peak and decline and remain below 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq, as in scenario RCP2.6. For a radiative forcing that corresponds to a CO<sub>2</sub>-eq concentration in 2100 that is above 700 ppm but below 1500 ppm, as in scenario RCP8.5, the projected rise is 1 m to more than 3 m by 2300 (*medium confidence*) (Figure 2.8c). There is *low confidence* in the available models' ability to project solid ice discharge from the Antarctic ice sheet. Hence, these models *likely* underestimate the Antarctica ice sheet contribution, resulting in an underestimation of projected sea-level rise beyond 2100. {WGI [SPM E.8](#), [WGI 13.4.4](#), [13.5.4](#)}

There is little evidence in global climate models of a tipping point or critical threshold in the transition from a perennially ice-covered to a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean, beyond which further sea-ice loss is unstoppable and irreversible. {WGI [12.5.5](#)}

There is *low confidence* in assessing the evolution of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation beyond the 21st century because of the limited number of analyses and equivocal results. However, a collapse beyond the 21st century for large sustained warming cannot be excluded. {WGI [SPM E.4](#), [12.4.7](#), [12.5.5](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 2.8 HERE]

**Figure 2.8:** (a) Atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> and (b) projected global mean surface temperature change as simulated by Earth System Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMICs) for the 4 RCPs up to 2300 (relative to 1986–2005) followed by a constant (year 2300 level) radiative forcing. A 10-year smoothing was applied. The dashed line on (a) indicates the pre-industrial CO<sub>2</sub> concentration. (c) Sea-level change projections grouped into three categories according to the concentration of GHG (in CO<sub>2</sub>eq) in 2100 (low: concentrations that peak and decline and remain below 500 ppm, as in scenario RCP2.6; medium: 500–700 ppm, including RCP4.5; high: concentrations that are above 700 ppm but below 1500 ppm, as in scenario RCP6.0 and RCP8.5). The bars in (c) show the maximum possible spread that can be obtained with the few available model results (and should not be interpreted as uncertainty ranges). These models *likely* underestimate the Antarctica ice sheet contribution, resulting in an underestimation of projected sea-level rise beyond 2100. {WGI Figure [12.43](#) and [13.13](#), Table [13.8](#); WGII [SPM B-2](#)}

**Sustained mass loss by ice sheets would cause larger sea-level rise, and part of the mass loss might be irreversible.** There is *high confidence* that sustained global mean warming greater than a threshold would lead to the near-complete loss of the Greenland ice sheet over a millennium or more, causing a sea-level rise of up to 7 m. Current estimates indicate that the threshold is greater than about 1 °C (*low confidence*) but less than about 4 °C (*medium confidence*) of global warming with respect to pre-industrial temperatures. Abrupt and irreversible ice loss from a potential instability of marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet in response to climate forcing is possible, but current evidence and understanding is insufficient to make a quantitative assessment. {WGI [SPM E.8](#), WGI [5.6.2](#), [5.8.1](#), [13.4.3](#), [13.5.4](#)}

**Within the 21st century, magnitudes and rates of climate change associated with medium to high emission scenarios (RCP4.5, 6.0, and 8.5) pose a high risk of abrupt and irreversible regional-scale change in the composition, structure, and function of marine, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, including wetlands (*medium confidence*), as well as warm water coral reefs (*high confidence*).** Examples that could substantially amplify climate change are the boreal-tundra Arctic system (*medium confidence*) and the Amazon forest (*low confidence*). {WGII [4.3.3.1](#), [Box 4.3](#), [Box 4.4](#), [5.4.2.4](#), [6.3.1-4](#), [6.4.2](#), [30.5.3-6](#), WGII [CC-CR](#), [CC-MB](#)}

**A reduction in permafrost extent is *virtually certain* with continued rise in global temperatures.** Current permafrost areas are projected to become a net emitter of carbon (CO<sub>2</sub> and CH<sub>4</sub>) with a loss of 180 to 920 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (50–250 GtC) under RCP8.5 over the 21st century (*low confidence*). {WGI [TFE.5](#), [6.4.3.4](#), [12.5.5](#), WGII [4.3.3.4](#)}



### Topic 3: Future Pathways for Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development

**Adaptation and mitigation are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate change. Substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades can reduce climate risks in the 21st century and beyond, increase prospects for effective adaptation, reduce the costs and challenges of mitigation in the longer term, and contribute to climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development.***{3.2, 3.3, 3.4}*

Adaptation and mitigation are two complementary strategies for responding to climate change. Adaptation is the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to either lessen or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. Mitigation is the process of reducing emissions or enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases, so as to limit future climate change. Both adaptation and mitigation can reduce and manage the risks of climate change impacts. Yet, adaptation and mitigation can also create other risks, as well as benefits. Strategic responses to climate change involve consideration of climate-related risks along with the risks and co-benefits of adaptation and mitigation actions.

Mitigation, adaptation, and climate impacts can all result in transformations to and changes in systems. Depending on the rate and magnitude of change and the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, climate change will alter ecosystems, food systems, infrastructure, coastal, urban and rural areas, human health and livelihoods. Adaptive responses to a changing climate require actions that range from incremental changes to more fundamental, transformational changes.<sup>15</sup> Mitigation can involve fundamental changes in the way that human societies produce and use energy services and land.

Topic 3 of this report examines the factors that influence the assessment of mitigation and adaptation strategies. It considers the benefits, risks, incremental changes, and potential transformations from different combinations of mitigation, adaptation, and residual climate-related impacts. It considers how responses in the coming decades will influence options for limiting long-term climate change and opportunities for adapting to it. Finally, it considers factors – including uncertainty, ethical considerations, and links to other societal goals – that may influence choices about mitigation and adaptation. Topic 4 then assesses the prospects for mitigation and adaptation on the basis of current knowledge of tools, options and policies.

#### 3.1 Foundations of decision-making about climate change

**Effective decision making to limit climate change and its effects can be informed by a wide range of analytical approaches for evaluating expected risks and benefits, recognizing the importance of governance, ethical dimensions, equity, value judgments, economic assessments and diverse perceptions and responses to risk and uncertainty.***{3.1}*

**Sustainable development and equity provide a basis for assessing climate policies. Limiting the effects of climate change is necessary to achieve sustainable development and equity, including poverty eradication.** Countries' past and future contributions to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere are different, and countries also face varying challenges and circumstances, and have different capacities to address mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation and adaptation raise issues of equity, justice, and fairness, and are necessary to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication. Many of those most vulnerable to climate change have contributed and contribute little to GHG emissions. Delaying mitigation shifts burdens from the present to the future, and insufficient adaptation responses to emerging impacts are already eroding the basis for sustainable development. Both adaptation and mitigation can have distributional effects locally, nationally and internationally, depending on who pays and who benefits. The process of decision-making about climate change, and the degree to which it respects the rights and views of all those affected, is also a

<sup>15</sup> Transformation is used in this report to refer to a change in the fundamental attributes of a system (see Glossary). Transformations can occur at multiple levels; at the national level, transformation is considered most effective when it reflects a country's own visions and approaches to achieving sustainable development in accordance with their national circumstances and priorities. *{WG II SPM .C-2, Chapters 2–13, 20.5; WG III SPM, Chapters 6–12}*

concern of justice. {WG II [2.2](#), [2.3](#), [13.3](#), [13.4](#), [17.3](#), [20.2](#), [20.5](#); WG III [3.3](#), [3.10](#), [4.1.2](#), [4.2](#), [4.3](#), [4.5](#), [4.6](#), [4.8](#), [SPM.2](#)}

**Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independently.** Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action problem at the global scale, because most greenhouse gases (GHGs) accumulate over time and mix globally, and emissions by any agent (e.g., individual, community, company, country) affect other agents. Cooperative responses, including international cooperation, are therefore required to effectively mitigate GHG emissions and address other climate change issues. The effectiveness of adaptation can be enhanced through complementary actions across levels, including international cooperation. The evidence suggests that outcomes seen as equitable can lead to more effective cooperation. {WG II [20.3.1](#); WG III [1.2](#), [2.6](#), [3.2](#), [4.2](#), [13.2](#), [13.3](#), [SPM.2](#), [TS.1](#)}

**Decision-making about climate change involves valuation and mediation among diverse values, and may be aided by the analytic methods of several normative disciplines.** Ethics analyses the different values involved and the relations between them. Recent political philosophy has investigated the question of responsibility for the effects of emissions. Economics and decision analysis provide quantitative methods of valuation, which can be used for estimating the social cost of carbon (see Box 3.1), in cost–benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, for optimization in integrated models, and elsewhere. Economic methods can reflect ethical principles, and take account of non-marketed goods, equity, behavioural biases, ancillary benefits and costs and the differing values of money to different people. They are, however, subject to well-documented limitations. {WG II [2.2](#), [2.3](#); WG III [2.4](#), [2.5](#), [2.6](#), [3.2-6](#), [3.9](#), [3.9.4](#), [Box TS.2](#), [SPM.2](#)}

**Analytical methods of valuation cannot identify a single best balance between mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts.** Important reasons for this are that climate change involves extremely complex natural and social processes, there is extensive disagreement about the values concerned, and climate change impacts and mitigation approaches have important distributional effects. Nevertheless, information on the consequences of emissions pathways to alternative climate goals and risk levels can be a useful input into decision-making processes. Evaluating responses to climate change involves assessment of the widest possible range of impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. {WG II [1.1.4](#), [2.3](#), [2.4](#), [17.3](#), [19.6](#), [19.7](#); WG III [2.5](#), [2.6](#), [3.4](#), [3.7](#), [Box 3-9](#)}

**Effective decision-making and risk management in the complex environment of climate change may be iterative: strategies can often be adjusted as new information and understanding develops during implementation.** However, adaptation and mitigation choices in the near term will affect the risks of climate change throughout the 21st century and beyond, and prospects for climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development depend on what is achieved through mitigation. Opportunities to take advantage of positive synergies between adaptation and mitigation may decrease with time, particularly if mitigation is delayed too long. Decision making about climate change is influenced by how individuals and organizations perceive risks and uncertainties and take them into account. They sometimes use simplified decision rules, overestimate or underestimate risks, and are biased towards the status quo. They differ in their degree of risk aversion and the relative importance placed on near-term versus long-term ramifications of specific actions. Formalized analytical methods for decision-making under uncertainty can account accurately for risk, and focus attention on both short- and long-term consequences. {WG II [2.1-4](#), [3.6](#), [14.1-3](#), [15.2-4](#), [17.1-3](#), [17.5](#), [20.2](#), [20.3](#), [20.6](#), [SPM A-3](#), [SPM C-2](#); WG III [2.4](#), [2.5](#), [5.5](#), [16.4](#), [SPM.2](#)}

### 3.2 Climate change risks reduced by adaptation and mitigation

**Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts globally (*high confidence*). Mitigation involves some level of co-benefits and of risks due to adverse side-effects, but these risks do not involve the same possibility of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts as risks from climate change, increasing the benefits from near-term mitigation efforts. {3.2, 3.4}**

**The risks of climate change, adaptation, and mitigation differ in nature, timescale, magnitude, and persistence (*high confidence*).** Risks from adaptation include maladaptation and negative ancillary impacts. Risks from mitigation include possible adverse side effects of large-scale deployment of low-carbon

technology options and economic costs. Climate change risks may persist for millennia and can involve very high risk of severe impacts and the presence of significant irreversibilities combined with limited adaptive capacity. In contrast, the stringency of climate policies can be adjusted much more quickly in response to observed consequences and costs and create lower risks of irreversible consequences. (3.3, 3.4, 4.3) *{WGI SPM E.8, 12.4, 12.5.2., 13.5; WG II 4.2, 17.2, 19.6; WG III 2.5, 6.6, TS.3.1.4, TS Tables TS.4-TS.8}*

**Mitigation and adaptation are complementary approaches for reducing risks of climate change impacts. They interact with one another and reduce risks over different timescales (*high confidence*).** Benefits from adaptation can already be realized in addressing current risks, and can be realized in the future for addressing emerging risks. Adaptation has the potential to reduce climate change impacts over the next few decades, while mitigation has relatively little influence on climate outcomes over this timescale. Near-term and longer-term mitigation and adaptation, as well as development pathways, will determine the risks of climate change beyond mid-century. The potential for adaptation differs across sectors and will be limited by institutional and capacity constraints, increasing the long-term benefits of mitigation (*high confidence*). The level of mitigation will influence the rate and magnitude of climate change, and greater rates and magnitude of climate change increase the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits (*high confidence*). (3.3) *{WGI 11.3, 12.4, WGII 1.1.4.4., 2.5, 16.3-6, 17.3, 19.2, 20.2.3, 20.3, 20.6, SPM A-3, SPM.B.2, C.2}*

**Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts, globally (*high confidence*)** (Topic 2 and Figure 3.1 panel A). Estimates of warming in 2100 without additional climate mitigation efforts are from 3.7 °C to 4.8 °C compared with pre-industrial levels (median Transient Climate Response (TCR); the range is 2.5 °C to 7.8 °C when using the 5th to 95th percentile range of TCR) (Figure 3.1; figure 3.4; *WGIII SPM.3*). The risks associated with temperatures at or above 4°C include severe and widespread impacts on unique and threatened systems, substantial species extinction, large risks to global and regional food security, consequential constraints on common human activities, increased likelihood of triggering tipping points (critical thresholds), and limited potential for adaptation in some cases (*high confidence*) (Box 3.3). Some risks of climate change, such as risks to unique and threatened systems and risks associated with extreme weather events, are moderate to high at temperatures 1°C to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. *{WG II SPM.B1; WG II SPM.C2}*

**Substantial cuts in greenhouse gas emissions over the next few decades can substantially reduce risks of climate change by limiting warming in the second half of the 21st century and beyond (*high confidence*).** Global mean surface warming is largely determined by cumulative emissions (Figure 3.1, Panel B), which are, in turn, linked to emissions over different timescales. Limiting risks across reasons for concern would imply a limit for cumulative emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>. Such a limit would require that global net emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> eventually decrease to zero (Figure 3.1). (*high confidence*). Reducing risks of climate change through mitigation would involve substantial cuts in GHG emissions over the next few decades (Figure 3.1; Figure 3.4). But some risks from residual damages are unavoidable, even with mitigation and adaptation (*very high confidence*). A subset of relevant climate change risks has been estimated using aggregate economic indicators. Such economic estimates have important limitations and are therefore a useful but insufficient basis for decision-making on long-term mitigation targets (see Box 3.1). *{WG II 19.7.1; WG III SPM.3, Figure 3.1, Panel A}*

**Mitigation involves some levels of co-benefits and risks, but these risks do not involve the same possibility of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts as risks from climate change (*high confidence*).** Scenarios that are *likely* to limit warming to below 2 °C or even 3 °C compared with pre-industrial temperatures involve large-scale changes in energy systems and potentially land-use over the coming decades (3.4). Associated risks include those linked to large-scale deployment of technology options for producing low-carbon energy, the potential for high aggregate economic costs of mitigation, and impacts on vulnerable countries and industries. Other risks and co-benefits are associated with human health, food security, energy security, poverty reduction, biodiversity conservation, water availability, income distribution, efficiency of taxation systems, labour supply and employment, urban sprawl, fossil fuel export revenues, and the economic growth of developing countries (Table 4.5). *{WG III 6.6, SPM.4.1; SPM.4.2; TS.3.1.4, TS Tables TS.4-TS.8}*

**Inertia in the economic and climate systems and the possibility of irreversible impacts from climate change increase the benefits of near-term mitigation efforts (*high confidence*).** The actions taken today affect the options available in the future to reduce emissions, limit temperature change, and adapt to climate change. Near-term choices can create, amplify or limit significant elements of lock-in that are important for decision-making. Lock-ins and irreversibilities occur in the climate system due to large inertia in some of its components such as heat transfer from the ocean surface to depth leading to continued ocean warming for centuries regardless of emission scenario and the irreversibility of a large fraction of anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO<sub>2</sub> emissions on a multi-century to millennial time scale unless CO<sub>2</sub> were to be removed from the atmosphere through large-scale human interventions over a sustained period (see also Box 3.3). Irreversibilities in socio-economic and biological systems also result from infrastructure development and long-lived products and from climate change impacts, such as species extinction. The larger potential for irreversibility and pervasive impacts from climate change risks than from mitigation risks increases the benefit of short-term mitigation efforts. Delays in additional mitigation or constraints on technological options limit the mitigation options and increase the long-term mitigation costs as well as other risks that would be incurred in the medium to long term to hold climate change impacts at a given level ([Table WG III.SPM.2](#), blue segment). {WG I SPM.E.8, WG II 2.1, 19.7, 20.3, Box 20-4, SPM.B.2; WG III SPM.4.2.1, 3.6, 6.9}

[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 HERE]

**Figure 3.1:** The relationship between risks from climate change, temperature change, cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and changes in annual GHG emissions by 2050. Limiting risks across Reasons For Concern (panel A) would imply a limit for cumulative emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> (panel B), which would constrain annual emissions over the next few decades (panel C). **Panel A** reproduces the five Reasons For Concern {Box 2.4}. **Panel B** links temperature changes to cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (in GtCO<sub>2</sub>), from 1870. They are based on CMIP5 simulations (pink plume) and on a simple climate model (median climate response in 2100) for the baselines and five mitigation scenario categories (six ellipses). Details are provided in Figure 2.3. **Panel C** shows the relationship between the cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (in GtCO<sub>2</sub>) of the scenario categories and their associated change in annual GHG emissions by 2050, expressed in percentage change (in percent GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq per year) relative to 2010. The ellipses correspond to the same scenario categories as in Panel B, and are built with a similar method (see details in Figure 2.3).

### Box 3.1: The limits of the economic assessment of climate change risks

**A subset of climate change risks and impacts are often measured using aggregate economic indicators, such as GDP or aggregate income. Estimates, however, are partial and affected by important conceptual and empirical limitations.** These incomplete estimates of global annual economic losses for temperature increases of ~2.5 °C above pre-industrial levels are between 0.2 and 2.0% of income) (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Losses are *more likely than not* to be greater, rather than smaller, than this range (*limited evidence, high agreement*). Estimates of the incremental aggregate economic impact of emitting one more tonne of carbon dioxide (the social cost of carbon) are derived from these studies and lie between a few dollars and several hundreds of dollars per tonne of carbon in 2000 to 2015 (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). These impact estimates are incomplete and depend on a large number of assumptions, many of which are disputable. Many estimates do not account for the possibility of large-scale singular events and irreversibility, tipping points, and other important factors, especially those that are difficult to monetize, such as loss of biodiversity. Estimates of aggregate costs mask significant differences in impacts across sectors, regions, countries and communities, and they therefore depend on ethical considerations, especially on the aggregation of losses across and within countries (*high confidence*). Estimates of global aggregate economic losses exist only for limited warming levels. These levels are exceeded in scenarios for the 21st century unless additional mitigation action is implemented, leading to additional economic costs. The total economic effects at different temperature levels would include mitigation costs, co-benefits of mitigation, adverse side-effects of mitigation, adaptation costs and climate damages. As a result, mitigation cost and climate damage estimates at any given temperature level cannot be compared to evaluate the costs and benefits of mitigation. Very little is known about the economic cost of warming above 3 °C relative to the current temperature level. Accurately estimating climate change risks (and thus the benefits of mitigation) takes into account the full range of possible impacts of climate change, including those with high consequences but a low probability of occurrence. The benefits of mitigation may otherwise be underestimated (*high confidence*). Some limitations of current estimates may be unavoidable, even with more knowledge, such as issues with aggregating impacts over time and across individuals when values are heterogeneous. In view of these limitations, it is outside the scope of science to identify a single best climate

change target and climate policy (3.1, 3.4). {WG II [10.9.2](#), [10.9.4](#), [13.2](#), [17.2-3](#), [18.4](#), [19.6](#), [SPM B-2](#); WG III [3.6](#)}

### 3.3 Characteristics of adaptation pathways

**Adaptation can reduce the risks of climate change impacts, but there are limits to its effectiveness, especially with greater magnitudes and rates of climate change. Taking a longer-term perspective, in the context of sustainable development, increases the likelihood that more immediate adaptation actions will also enhance future options and preparedness.**{3.3}

**Adaptation can contribute to the well-being of current and future populations, the security of assets and the maintenance of ecosystem goods, functions and services now and in the future. Adaptation is place- and context-specific, with no single approach for reducing risks appropriate across all settings (*high confidence*).** Effective risk reduction and adaptation strategies consider vulnerability and exposure and their linkages with socioeconomic processes, sustainable development, and climate change. Adaptation research since the AR4 has evolved from a dominant consideration of engineering and technological adaptation pathways to include more ecosystem-based, institutional, and social measures. A previous focus on cost-benefit analysis, optimization, and efficiency approaches has broadened with the development of multi-metric evaluations that include risk and uncertainty dimensions integrated within wider policy and ethical frameworks to assess trade-offs and constraints. The range of specific adaptation measures has also expanded (4.2, 4.4.2.1), as have the links to sustainable development (3.5). There are many studies on local and sectoral adaptation costs and benefits, but few global analyses and *very low confidence* in their results. {WG II [14.1](#), [14.ES](#), [15.2](#), [15.5](#), [17.2](#), [17.ES](#), [SPM.C-1](#), [Table SPM.1](#)}

**Adaptation planning and implementation at all levels of governance are contingent on societal values, objectives, and risk perceptions (*high confidence*).** Recognition of diverse interests, circumstances, social-cultural contexts, and expectations can benefit decision-making processes. Indigenous, local, and traditional knowledge systems and practices, including indigenous peoples' holistic view of community and environment, are a major resource for adapting to climate change, but these have not been used consistently in existing adaptation efforts. Integrating such forms of knowledge into practices increases the effectiveness of adaptation as do effective decision support, engagement and policy processes (4.4.2). {WG II [SPM.C-1](#)}

**Adaptation planning and implementation can be enhanced through complementary actions across levels, from individuals to governments (*high confidence*).** National governments can coordinate adaptation efforts of local and subnational governments, for example by protecting vulnerable groups, by supporting economic diversification, and by providing information, policy and legal frameworks, and financial support (robust evidence, high agreement). Local government and the private sector are increasingly recognized as critical to progress in adaptation, given their roles in scaling up adaptation of communities, households, and civil society and in managing risk information and financing (medium evidence, high agreement). {WG II [SPM.C-1](#)}

**A first step towards adaptation to future climate change is reducing vulnerability and exposure to present climate variability (*high confidence*), but some near-term responses to climate change may also limit future choices.** Integration of adaptation into planning, including policy design, and decision making can promote synergies with development and disaster risk reduction. However, poor planning or implementation, overemphasizing short-term outcomes, or failing to sufficiently anticipate consequences, can result in maladaptation, increasing the vulnerability or exposure of the target group in the future, or the vulnerability of other people, places, or sectors (*medium evidence, high agreement*). For example, enhanced protection of exposed assets can lock in dependence on further protection measures. Appropriate adaptation options can be better assessed by including co-benefits and mitigation implications (3.5 and 4.2). {WG II [SPM.C-1](#)}

**Numerous interacting constraints can impede adaptation planning and implementation (*high confidence*).** Common constraints on implementation arise from the following: limited financial and human resources; limited integration or coordination of governance; uncertainties about projected impacts; different perceptions of risks; competing values; absence of key adaptation leaders and advocates; and limited tools to

monitor adaptation effectiveness. Other constraints include insufficient research, monitoring, and observation and the financial and other resources to maintain them. Underestimating the complexity of adaptation as a social process can create unrealistic expectations about achieving intended adaptation outcomes (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2 for details in relation to implementation). [{WG II SPM.C-1}](#)

**Greater rates and magnitude of climate change increase the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits (*high confidence*).** Limits to adaptation occur when adaptive actions to avoid intolerable risks for an actor's objectives or for the needs of a system are not possible or are not currently available. Value-based judgments of what constitutes an intolerable risk may differ. Limits to adaptation emerge from the interaction among climate change and biophysical and/or socioeconomic constraints. Opportunities to take advantage of positive synergies between adaptation and mitigation may decrease with time, particularly if limits to adaptation are exceeded. In some parts of the world, insufficient responses to emerging impacts are already eroding the basis for sustainable development. For most regions and sectors, empirical evidence is not sufficient to quantify magnitudes of climate change that would constitute a future adaptation limit. Furthermore, economic development, technology, and cultural norms and values can change over time to enhance or reduce the capacity of systems to avoid limits. As a consequence, some limits are 'soft' in that they may be alleviated over time. Other limits are 'hard' in that there are no reasonable prospects for avoiding intolerable risks. [{WG II SPM.C-2; WG II TS}](#)

**Transformations in economic, social, technological, and political decisions and actions can enhance adaptation and promote sustainable development (*high confidence*).** Restricting adaptation responses to incremental changes to existing systems and structures without considering transformational change, may increase costs and losses, and miss opportunities. For example, enhancing infrastructure to protect other built assets can be expensive and ultimately not defray increasing costs and risks, whereas options such as relocation or using ecosystem services to adapt may provide a range of benefits now and in the future. Transformational adaptation can include introduction of new technologies or practices, formation of new financial structures or systems of governance, adaptation at greater scales or magnitudes, and shifts in the location of activities. Planning and implementation of transformational adaptation could reflect strengthened, altered or aligned paradigms and consequently may place new and increased demands on governance structures to reconcile different goals and visions for the future and to address possible equity and ethical implications: Transformational adaptation pathways are enhanced by iterative learning, deliberative processes, and innovation. At the national level, transformation is considered most effective when it reflects a country's own visions and approaches to achieving sustainable development in accordance with its national circumstances and priorities. [{WG II 1.1, 2.5, 5.5, 8.4, 14.1, 14.3, Table 14.4, 16.2-7, Table 16-3, Box 16.1, Box 16.4, 20.3.3, 20.5, 25.10, Box 25.1, SPM C-2}](#)

**Building adaptive capacity is crucial for effective selection and implementation of adaptation options (*high agreement, robust evidence*).** Successful adaptation requires not only identifying adaptation options and assessing their costs and benefits, but also increasing the adaptive capacity of human and natural systems (*high agreement, medium evidence*). This can involve complex governance challenges and new institutions and institutional arrangements. (4.2) [{WG II 8.1, 12.3, 14.1-3, 16.2, 16.3, 16.5, 16.8}](#)

**Significant co-benefits, synergies, and trade-offs exist between mitigation and adaptation and among different adaptation responses; interactions occur both within and across regions (*very high confidence*).** Increasing efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change imply an increasing complexity of interactions, particularly at the intersections among water, energy, land use, and biodiversity, but tools to understand and manage these interactions remain limited. Examples of actions with co-benefits include (i) improved energy efficiency and cleaner energy sources, leading to reduced emissions of health-damaging climate-altering air pollutants; (ii) reduced energy and water consumption in urban areas through greening cities and recycling water; (iii) sustainable agriculture and forestry; and (iv) protection of ecosystems for carbon storage and other ecosystem services. [{WG II SPM. C-1}](#)

### 3.4 Characteristics of mitigation pathways

**There are multiple mitigation pathways that are *likely* to limit warming to below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. Limiting warming to 2.5 °C or 3 °C involves similar challenges, but less quickly. These pathways would require substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades, and near**

**zero emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> and other long-lived GHGs over by the end of the century. Implementing such reductions poses substantial technological, economic, social, and institutional challenges, which increase with delays in additional mitigation and if key technologies are not available. Limiting warming to lower or higher levels involves similar challenges, but on different timescales. {3.4}**

**Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today, global emission growth is expected to persist driven by growth in global population and economic activities (Figure 3.1) (*high confidence*).** Global GHG emissions under most scenarios without additional mitigation (baseline scenarios) are between about 75 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr and almost 140 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr in 2100<sup>16</sup>, which is approximately between the 2100 emission levels in the RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5 pathways (Figure 3.2)<sup>17</sup>. Baseline scenarios exceed 450 parts per million (ppm) CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2030 and reach CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentration levels between about 750 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq and more than 1300 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100. Global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 range from about 3.7°C to 4.8 °C above the average for 1850-1900 for a median climate response. They range from 2.5 °C to 7.8 °C when including climate uncertainty (5th to 95th percentile range)<sup>18</sup>. The future scenarios do not account for possible changes in natural forcings in the climate system (see Box 1.1). {WG III SPM.SPM.3, SPM4.1, TS.2.2, TS.3.1, 6.3, Box TS.6}

**Many different combinations of technological, behavioural, and policy options can be used to reduce emissions and limit temperature change (*high confidence*).** To evaluate possible pathways to long-term climate goals, about 900 mitigation scenarios were collected for this assessment, each of which describes different technological, socioeconomic, and institutional changes. Emission reductions under these scenarios lead to concentrations in 2100 from 430 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq to above 720ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq, which is comparable to the 2100 forcing levels between RCP 2.6 and RCP 6.0. Scenarios with concentration levels of below 430 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100 were also assessed. {WG III SPM.4.1, TS3.1, WG III Chapter 6, Annex II}

**Scenarios leading to CO<sub>2</sub>-eq concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm or lower are likely to maintain warming below 2°C over the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels (*high confidence*).** Mitigation scenarios reaching concentration levels of about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100 are *more likely than not* to limit warming to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels, unless concentration levels temporarily exceed roughly 530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq before 2100. In this case, warming is *about as likely as not* to remain below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. Scenarios that exceed about 650 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100 are *unlikely* to limit warming to below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. Mitigation scenarios in which warming is *more likely than not* to be less than 1.5 °C relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100 are characterized by concentration levels by 2100 of below 430 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq. In these scenarios, temperature peaks during the century and subsequently decline. {WG III SPM.4.1, TS.3.1, 6.3, Box TS.6, Table SPM.1}

**Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq in 2100 (consistent with a *likely* chance to keep warming below 2°C relative to pre-industrial level) typically involve temporary overshoot<sup>19</sup> of atmospheric concentrations, as do many scenarios reaching about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq to about 550 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100. (Table 3.1). Depending on the level of overshoot, overshoot scenarios typically rely on the availability and widespread deployment of bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage**

<sup>16</sup> Unless otherwise noted, scenario ranges cited in Topic 3 and Topic 4 refer to the 10th to 90th percentile ranges (see Table 3.1).

<sup>17</sup> For a discussion on CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent (CO<sub>2</sub>eq) emissions and concentrations, see Box 3.2 on greenhouse gas metrics and mitigation pathways and the Glossary.

<sup>18</sup> The range quoted here is based on the warming results of a simple climate model for the emissions of around 300 baseline scenarios, expressed compared to the 1850-1900 period. The warming results quoted in Topic 2.2 are obtained by prescribing future concentrations of greenhouse gases in CMIP5 Earth System Models. This results in a mean warming of 1.0 oC (5th to 95th percentile range: 0.3-1.7oC) for RCP2.6, and a mean warming of 3.7oC (2.6-4.8oC) for RCP8.5 relative to the period 1986-2005. For the same concentration-driven experiments, the simple climate model approach gives consistent results. The median warming is 0.9oC (0.5-1.6 oC) for RCP 2.6 and 3.7oC (2.5-5.9oC) for RCP8.5 relative to the period 1986-2005. However, the high-end of the CMIP5 ESMs range is more constrained. In addition, the baseline temperature increase quoted here is wider than that of the concentration-driven RCP8.5 experiments mentioned above as it is based on a wider set of scenarios, includes carbon cycle response uncertainty and uses a different base year {2.2, 3.4}.

<sup>19</sup> In concentration ‘overshoot’ scenarios, concentrations peak during the century and then decline.

**(BECCS) and afforestation in the second half of the century (*high confidence*).** The availability and scale of these and other Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies and methods are uncertain, and CDR technologies and methods are, to varying degrees, associated with challenges and risks (see Box 3.3).<sup>20</sup> CDR is also prevalent in many scenarios without overshoot to compensate for residual emissions from sectors where mitigation is more expensive. {WG III [SPM.4.1](#), [TS.3.1](#), [6.3](#), [6.9.1](#), [Figure 6.7](#), [7.11](#), [11.13](#), [Table SPM.1](#)}

**Limiting warming with a *likely* chance to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels would require substantial cuts in anthropogenic GHG emissions<sup>21</sup> by mid-century through large-scale changes in energy systems and possibly land use. Limiting warming to higher levels would require similar changes, but less quickly. Limiting warming to lower levels would require these changes more quickly (*high confidence*).** Scenarios that are *likely* to maintain warming at below 2 °C are characterized by a 40% to 70% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050, relative to 2010 levels, and emissions level near zero or below in 2100 (Figure 3.2, Table 3.1). Scenarios with higher emissions in 2050 are characterized by a greater reliance on Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies beyond mid-century, and vice versa. Scenarios that are *likely* to maintain warming at below 2 °C include more rapid improvements in energy efficiency and a tripling to nearly a quadrupling of the share of zero- and low-carbon energy supply from renewable energy, nuclear energy and fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), or bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) by the year 2050 (Figure 3.2, lower panel). The scenarios describe a wide range of changes in land use, reflecting different assumptions about the scale of bioenergy production, afforestation, and reduced deforestation. Scenarios leading to concentrations of 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq by 2100 are characterized by a 25% to 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050, relative to 2010 levels. Scenarios that are likely to limit warming to 3 °C relative to pre-industrial levels reduce emissions less rapidly than those limiting warming to 2 °C. Only a limited number of studies provide scenarios that are more likely than not to limit warming to 1.5 °C by 2100; these scenarios are characterized by concentrations below 430 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq by 2100 and 2050 emission reduction between 70 and 95% below 2010. For a comprehensive overview of the characteristics of emissions scenarios, their GHG concentrations, and their likelihood to keep warming to below a range of temperature levels, see Table 3.1. {WG III [SPM.4.1](#), [TS.3.1](#), [6.3](#), [7.11](#)}

**Table 3.1:** Key characteristics of the scenarios collected and assessed for WGIII AR5. For all parameters, the 10th to 90th percentile of the scenarios is shown<sup>1</sup>. { [Table 3.1](#) }

[INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 3.2 HERE]

**Figure 3.2:** Global GHG emissions (GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr) in baseline and mitigation scenarios for different long-term concentration levels (upper panel) and associated scale-up requirements of low-carbon energy (% of primary energy) for 2030, 2050 and 2100, compared to 2010 levels, in mitigation scenarios (lower panel). {WG III [SPM.4](#), [Figure 6.7](#), [Figure 7.16](#)} [Note: CO<sub>2</sub>eq emissions include the basket of Kyoto gases (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O as well as F-gases) calculated based on GWP<sub>100</sub> values from the Second Assessment Report].

**Reducing emissions of non-CO<sub>2</sub> climate forcing agents can be an important element of mitigation strategies.** Emissions of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases (methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases) contributed about 27% to the total emissions of Kyoto gases in 2010. For most non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases, near-term, low-cost options are available to reduce their emissions. However, some sources of these non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases are difficult to mitigate, such as N<sub>2</sub>O emissions from fertilizer use and methane emissions from livestock. As a result, emissions of most non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases will not be reduced to zero, even under stringent mitigation scenarios (see figure 4.1). The differences in radiative properties and lifetimes of CO<sub>2</sub> and non-CO<sub>2</sub> climate forcing agents have important implications for mitigation strategies (see also Box 3.2). {[WG III 6.3.2](#)}

<sup>20</sup> CDR methods have biogeochemical and technological limitations to their potential on the global scale. There is insufficient knowledge to quantify how much CO<sub>2</sub> emissions could be partially offset by CDR on a century timescale. CDR methods may carry side-effects and long-term consequences on a global scale.

<sup>21</sup> This range differs from the range provided for a similar concentration category in AR4 (50% to 85% lower than in 2000 for CO<sub>2</sub> only). Reasons for this difference include that this report has assessed a substantially larger number of scenarios than in AR4 and looks at all GHGs. In addition, a large proportion of the new scenarios include CDR technologies. Other factors include the use of 2100 concentration levels instead of stabilization levels and the shift in reference year from 2000 to 2010. Scenarios with higher emission levels by 2050 are characterized by a greater reliance on CDR technologies beyond mid-century.



**All current GHG emissions and other climate forcing agents affect the rate and magnitude of climate change over the next few decades.** Reducing the emissions of certain short-lived climate forcing agents can reduce the rate of warming in the short term, but will have only a limited effect on long-term warming, which is driven mainly by CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. There are large uncertainties related to the climate impacts of some of the short-lived climate forcing agents. Although the effects of CH<sub>4</sub> emissions are well understood, there are large uncertainties related to the effects of black carbon. Co-emitted components with cooling effects may further complicate and reduce the climate impacts of emission reductions. Reducing emissions of SO<sub>2</sub> would cause warming. Near-term reductions in short-lived climate forcing agents can have a relatively fast impact on climate change and possible co-benefits for air pollution. {WG I [8.2.3](#), [8.3.2](#), [8.3.4](#), [8.5.1](#), [8.7.2](#), [FAQ 8.2](#), [12.5](#); WG III [6.6.2.1](#)}

**Delaying additional mitigation to 2030 will substantially increase the challenges associated with limiting warming over the 21st century to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels (high confidence).** GHG emissions in 2030 lie between about 30 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr and 50 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr in cost-effective scenarios that are *likely to about as likely as not* to limit warming to less than 2 °C this century relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq to about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq) (Figure 3.3, left panel). Scenarios with GHG emission levels of above 55 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr require substantially higher rates of emissions reductions between 2030 and 2050 (median estimate of 6%/yr as compared to 3%/yr in cost-effective scenarios; Figure 3.3, middle panel); much more rapid scale-up of zero and low-carbon energy over this period ( more than a tripling compared to a doubling of the low-carbon energy share relative to 2010; Figure 3.3, right panel); a larger reliance on CDR technologies in the long term; and higher transitional and long-term economic impacts (Table 3.2). (3.5, 4.3). {WG III [SPM.4.1](#), [TS.3.1](#), [6.3](#), [6.6](#)}

**Estimated global emission levels by 2020 based on the Cancún Pledges are not consistent with cost-effective long-term mitigation trajectories that are at least *about as likely as not* to limit warming to below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 concentration levels of about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq or below), but they do not preclude the option to meet this goal (high confidence).** The Cancún Pledges are broadly consistent with cost-effective scenarios that are *likely* to limit temperature change to below 3 °C relative to pre-industrial levels.

[INSERT FIGURE 3.3 HERE]

**Figure 3.3** The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels for the rate of CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions and low-carbon energy upscaling in mitigation scenarios that are at least *about as likely as not* to keep warming throughout the 21st century below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentrations 430ppm - 530ppm). The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (coloured in different shades of green). The left panel shows the pathways of GHG emissions (GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr) leading to these 2030 levels. Black dot with whiskers gives historic GHG emission levels and associated uncertainties in 2010 as reported in Figure 1.6. The black bar shows the estimated uncertainty range of GHG emissions implied by the Cancún Pledges. The middle panel denotes the average annual CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction rates for the 2030–2050 period. It compares the median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodel comparisons with explicit 2030 interim goals to the range of scenarios in the Scenario Database for WGIII AR5. Annual rates of historical emission changes (sustained over a period of 20 years) are shown as well. The arrows in the right panel show the magnitude of zero and low-carbon energy supply up-scaling from between 2030 and 2050, subject to different 2030 GHG emission levels. Zero- and low-carbon energy supply includes renewable energy, nuclear energy, and fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), or bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Only scenarios that apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with large net negative global emissions (>20 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr), scenarios with exogenous carbon price assumptions, and scenarios with 2010 emission levels that are significantly outside the historical range are excluded. {WG III [Figure SPM.5](#), [Figure 6.32](#), [Figure 7.16](#)}

**Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary widely depending on methodologies and assumptions, but increase with the stringency of mitigation (high confidence).** Scenarios in which all countries of the world begin mitigation immediately, in which there is a single global carbon price, and in which all key technologies are available, have been used as a cost-effective benchmark for estimating macroeconomic mitigation costs. (Figure 3.4). Under these assumptions, mitigation scenarios that are likely to limit warming to below 2 °C through the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels entail losses in global consumption —not including benefits of reduced climate change (3.2) as well as co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation (3.5, 4.3) — of 1% to 4% (median: 1.7%) in 2030, 2% to 6% (median: 3.4%) in 2050, and 3% to 11% (median: 4.8%) in 2100, relative to consumption in baseline scenarios that

grows anywhere from 300% to more than 900% over the century<sup>22</sup>. These numbers correspond to an annualized reduction of consumption growth by 0.04 to 0.14 (median: 0.06) percentage points over the century relative to annualized consumption growth in the baseline that is between 1.6% and 3% per year (Figure 3.3).

In the absence or under limited availability of mitigation technologies (such as bioenergy, CCS, and their combination BECCS, nuclear, wind and solar), mitigation costs can increase substantially depending on the technology considered. (Table 3.2). Delaying additional mitigation reduces near-term costs, but increases mitigation costs in the medium- to long-term (Table 3.2). Many models could not limit likely warming to below 2 °C over the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels, if additional mitigation is considerably delayed, or if availability of key technologies, such as bioenergy, CCS, and their combination (BECCS) are limited (*high confidence*) (Table 3.2). {WG III SPM.4.1, TS.3.1, [6.3](#), [6.6](#)}

**Mitigation efforts and associated cost are expected to vary across countries. The distribution of costs can differ from the distribution of the actions themselves (*high confidence*).** In globally cost-effective scenarios, the majority of mitigation efforts takes place in countries with the highest future GHG emissions in baseline scenarios. Some studies exploring particular effort-sharing frameworks, under the assumption of a global carbon market, have estimated substantial global financial flows associated with mitigation in scenarios that are *likely to more unlikely than likely* to limit warming during the 21st century to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. {WG III [6.3](#), [13.2.2](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 3.4 HERE]

Figure 3.4: Global mitigation costs in cost-effective scenarios at different atmospheric concentrations levels in 2100 (right panel) and growth in economic consumption in the corresponding baseline scenarios (those without additional mitigation) (left panel). The table at the top shows percentage points of annualized consumption growth reductions relative to consumption growth in the baseline of 1.6% to 3% per year (e.g., if the reduction is 0.06 percentage points per year due to mitigation, and baseline growth is 2.0% per year, then the growth rate with mitigation would be 1.94% per year). Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and they impose no additional limitations on technology relative to the models' default technology assumptions. Consumption losses are shown relative to a baseline development without climate policy. Cost estimates shown in this table do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change nor co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation. Estimates at the high end of these cost ranges are from models that are relatively inflexible to achieve the deep emissions reductions that would be required in the long run to meet these goals and / or include assumptions about market imperfections that would raise costs. {WGIII Figures [TS.12](#), [6.23](#), [Table SPM.2](#)}

**Table 3.2:** Increase in global mitigation costs due to either limited availability of specific technologies or delays in additional mitigation<sup>1</sup> relative to cost-effective scenarios.<sup>2</sup> The increase in costs is given for the median estimate and the 16th to 84th percentile range of the scenarios (in parentheses). The sample size of each scenario set is provided in the coloured symbols.<sup>3</sup> The colours of the symbols indicate the fraction of models from systematic model comparison exercises that could successfully reach the targeted concentration level. {WGIII [Table SPM. 2](#), Figures [TS.13](#), [6.24](#), [6.25](#)}

[INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE]

### Box 3.2: Greenhouse gas metrics and mitigation pathways

This box focuses on emission-based metrics that are used for calculating *CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions* for the formulation and evaluation of mitigation strategies. These emission metrics are distinct from the concentration-based metric used in SYR (*'CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent concentration'*). For an explanation of CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emissions and CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentrations, see Glossary.

**Emission metrics facilitate multi-component climate policies by allowing emissions of different GHGs and other climate forcing agents to be expressed in a common unit (so-called 'CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions').** The Global Warming Potential (GWP) was introduced in the IPCC First Assessment Report, where it was also used to illustrate the difficulties in comparing components with differing physical properties using a single metric. The 100-year GWP was adopted by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol

<sup>22</sup> Mitigation cost ranges cited here refer to the 16th to 84th percentile of the underlying sample (see Figure 3.4).

and is now used widely as the default metric. It is only one of several possible emission metrics and time horizons. {[WGI 8.7](#); [WG III 3.9](#)}

**The choice of emission metric and time horizon depends on type of application and policy context; hence, no single metric is optimal for all policy goals.** All metrics have shortcomings, and choices contain value judgments, such as the climate effect considered and the weighting of effects over time (which explicitly or implicitly discounts impacts over time), the climate policy goal, and the degree to which metrics incorporate economic or only physical considerations. There are significant uncertainties related to metrics, and the magnitudes of the uncertainties differ across metric type and time horizon. In general, the uncertainty increases for metrics along the cause–effect chain from emission to effects {[WGI 8.7](#); [WGIII 3.9](#)}

**The weight assigned to non-CO<sub>2</sub> climate forcing agents relative to CO<sub>2</sub> depends strongly on the choice of metric and time horizon (*high agreement, robust evidence*).** GWP compares components based on radiative forcing, integrated up to a chosen time horizon. Global Temperature change Potential (GTP; see Glossary), is based on the temperature response at a specific point in time with no weight on temperature response before or after the chosen point in time. Adoption of a fixed horizon of e.g., 20, 100 or 500 years for these metrics will inevitably put no weight on climate outcomes beyond the time horizon; which is significant for CO<sub>2</sub> as well as other long-lived gases. The choice of time horizon markedly affects the weighting especially of short-lived climate forcing agents, such as CH<sub>4</sub> (see Box 3.2 Table 1; Box 3.2 Figure 1 Panel A). For some metrics (e.g., the dynamic GTP; see Glossary), the weighting changes over time as a chosen target year is approached. {[WGI 8.7](#); [WG III 3.9](#)}

**Box 3.2, Table 1:** Examples of emission metric values from AR5 WGI\*  
[INSERT BOX 3.2, TABLE 1 HERE]

**The choice of emission metric affects the timing and emphasis placed on abating short- and long-lived climate forcing agents. For most metrics, global cost differences are small under scenarios of global participation and cost-minimizing mitigation pathways, but implications for some individual countries and sectors could be more significant (*high agreement, medium evidence*).** Different metrics and time horizons significantly affect the contributions from various sources/sectors and components; particularly short-lived climate forcing agents (Box 3.2, Figure 1, Panel B). A fixed time independent metric that gives less weight to short-lived agents such as methane (e.g., using GTP<sub>100</sub> instead of GWP<sub>100</sub>) would require earlier and more stringent CO<sub>2</sub> abatement to achieve the same climate outcome for 2100. Using a time-dependent metric, such as a dynamic GTP, leads to less CH<sub>4</sub> mitigation in the near-term, but to more in the long-term as the target date is being approached. This implies that for some (short-lived) agents, the metric choice influences the choice of policies and the timing of mitigation (especially for sectors and countries with high non-CO<sub>2</sub> emission levels). { [WG I 8.7](#); [WG III 6.3](#)}

[INSERT BOX 3.2, Figure 1 HERE]

**Box 3.2, Figure 1:** Implications of metric choices on the weighting of greenhouse gas emissions and contributions by sectors for illustrative time horizons. Upper panel (A): integrated radiative forcing (left panel) and warming resulting at a given future point in time (right panel) from global net emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O in the year 2010 (and no emissions thereafter), for time horizons of up to 200 years. Integrated radiative forcing is used in the calculation of Global Warming Potentials (GWP), while the warming at a future point in time is used in the calculation of Global Temperature change Potentials (GTP). Radiative forcing and warming were calculated based on global 2010 emission data from WGIII 5.2 and absolute Global Warming Potentials and absolute Global Temperature change Potentials from [WGI 8.7](#), normalized to the integrated radiative forcing and warming, respectively, after 100 years, due to 2010 net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Lower panel (B): Illustrative examples showing contributions from different sectors to total metric weighted global greenhouse gas emissions in the year 2010, calculated using 100-year GWP (left), 20-year GWP (middle) or 100-year GTP (right) and the WGIII 2010 emissions database. {[WG III 5.2](#)} Note that percentages differ slightly for the GWP<sub>100</sub> case if values from the Second Assessment Report are used; see Topic 1, Figure 1.7. See WGIII for details of activities resulting in emissions in each sector.

### **Box 3.3: Carbon Dioxide Removal and Solar Radiation Management geoengineering technologies – possible roles, options, risks and status**

Geoengineering refers to a broad set of methods and technologies operating on a large scale that aim to deliberately alter the climate system in order to alleviate the impacts of climate change. Most methods seek

to either reduce the amount of absorbed solar energy in the climate system (Solar Radiation Management, SRM) or increase the removal of CO<sub>2</sub> from the atmosphere by sinks to alter climate (Carbon Dioxide Removal, CDR). (see Glossary). Limited evidence precludes a comprehensive assessment of feasibility, cost, side-effects and environmental impacts of either CDR or SRM. {WG I [SPM E.8 6.5, 7.7](#); WG II [6.4, Table 6-5, Box 20-4](#); WG III [6.9, TS.3.1.3](#)}

**CDR plays a major role in many mitigation scenarios.** BECCS and afforestation are the only CDR methods included in these scenarios. CDR technologies are particularly important in scenarios that temporarily overshoot atmospheric concentrations, but they are also prevalent in many scenarios without overshoot to compensate for residual emissions from sectors where mitigation is more expensive. Similar to mitigation, CDR would need to be deployed on a large scale and over a long time period to be able to significantly reduce CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations. (see Section 3.1). {WG II [6.4](#); WG III [6.9, TS.3.1.3](#)}

**Several CDR techniques could potentially reduce atmospheric GHG levels. However, there are biogeochemical, technical and societal limitations that, to varying degrees, make it difficult to provide quantitative estimates of the potential for CDR.** The emission mitigation from CDR is less than the removed CO<sub>2</sub>, as some CO<sub>2</sub> is released from that previously stored in oceans and terrestrial carbon reservoirs. Sub-sea geologic storage has been implemented on a regional scale, with no evidence to date of ocean impact from leakage. The climatic and environmental side effects of CDR depend on technology and scale. Examples are associated with altered surface reflectance from afforestation and ocean de-oxygenation from ocean fertilization. Most terrestrial CDR techniques would involve competing demands for land and could involve local and regional risks, while maritime CDR techniques may involve significant risks for ocean ecosystems, so that their deployment could pose additional challenges for cooperation between countries. {WG I [6.5](#); [FAQ 7.3](#); WG II [6.4, Table 6.5](#), WGIII [6.9](#)}

**SRM is untested, and is not included in any of the mitigation scenarios, but, if realisable, could to some degree offset global temperature rise and some of its effects. It could possibly provide rapid cooling in comparison to CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation.** There is *medium confidence* that SRM through stratospheric aerosol injection is scalable to counter radiative forcing (RF) from a twofold increase in CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations and some of the climate responses associated with warming. Due to insufficient understanding there is no consensus on whether a similarly large negative counter RF could be achieved from cloud brightening. Land albedo change does not appear to be able to produce a large counter RF. Even if SRM could counter the global mean warming, differences in spatial patterns would remain. The scarcity of literature on other SRM techniques precludes their assessment. {WG I [7.7](#), WG III [6.9, TS.3.1.3](#)}

**If it were deployed, SRM would entail numerous uncertainties, side effects, risks and shortcomings.** Several lines of evidence indicate that SRM would itself produce a small but significant decrease in global precipitation (with larger differences on regional scales). Stratospheric aerosol SRM is *likely* to modestly increase ozone losses in the polar stratosphere. SRM would not prevent the CO<sub>2</sub> effects on ecosystems and ocean acidification that are unrelated to warming. There could also be other unanticipated consequences. For all future scenarios considered in AR5, SRM would need to increase commensurately, to counter the global mean warming, which would exacerbate side effects. Additionally, if SRM were increased to substantial levels and then terminated, there is *high confidence* that surface temperatures would rise very rapidly (within a decade or two). This would stress systems that are sensitive to the rate of warming. {WG I [7.6-7, FAQ 7.3](#); WG II [19.5](#); WG III [6.9](#)}

**SRM technologies raise questions about costs, risks, governance, and ethical implications of development and deployment. There are special challenges emerging for international institutions and mechanisms that could coordinate research and possibly restrain testing and deployment.** Even if SRM would reduce human-made global temperature increase, it would imply spatial and temporal redistributions of risks. SRM thus introduces important questions of intragenerational and intergenerational justice. Research on SRM, as well as its eventual deployment, has been subject to ethical objections. In spite of the estimated low potential costs of some SRM deployment technologies, they will not necessarily pass a benefit–cost test that takes account of the range of risks and side effects. The governance implications of SRM are particularly challenging, especially as unilateral action might lead to significant effects and costs for others. {WG III [1.4, 3.3, 6.9, 13.4, TS.3.1.3](#)}

### 3.5 Interaction among mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development

**Climate change is a threat to equitable and sustainable development. Adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development are closely related, with potential for synergies and trade-offs.**

**Climate change poses an increasing threat to equitable and sustainable development (*high confidence*).** Some climate-related impacts on development are already being observed. Climate change is a threat multiplier. It exacerbates other threats to social and natural systems, placing additional burdens particularly on the poor and constraining possible development paths for all. Development along current global pathways can contribute to climate risk and vulnerability, further eroding the basis for sustainable development. {WG II 2.5, 10.9, 13.1-3, 20.1, 20.2, 20.6, SPM B-2; WG III 4.2, SPM.2}

**Aligning climate policy with sustainable development requires attention to both adaptation and mitigation (*high confidence*).** Interaction among adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development occurs both within and across regions and scales, often in the context of multiple stressors. Some options for responding to climate change could impose risks of other environmental and social costs, have adverse distributional effects, and draw resources away from other development priorities, including poverty eradication. {WG II 2.5, 8.4, 9.3, 13.3-4, 20.2-4, 21.4, 25.9, 26.8; WG III 4.8, 6.6, SPM.2}

**Both adaptation and mitigation can bring substantial co-benefits (*medium confidence*).** Examples of actions with co-benefits include (i) improved air quality (see Figure 3.5); (ii) enhanced energy security, (iii) reduced energy and water consumption in urban areas through greening cities and recycling water; (iv) sustainable agriculture and forestry; and (v) protection of ecosystems for carbon storage and other ecosystem services. {WG II SPM C-1; WG III SPM.4.1}

[INSERT Figure 3.5 HERE]

**Figure 3.5:** Air pollutant emission levels of black carbon (BC) and sulfur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>) by 2050, relative to 2005 (0=2005 levels). Baseline scenarios without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today are compared to scenarios with stringent mitigation policies, which are consistent with reaching about 450 to about 500 (430–530) ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentration levels by 2100. {WG III SPM.6, TS.14, Figure 6.33}

**Strategies and actions can be pursued now that will move towards climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development, while at the same time helping to improve livelihoods, social and economic well-being, and effective environmental management (*high confidence*).** Prospects for climate-resilient pathways are related fundamentally to what the world accomplishes with climate-change mitigation (*high confidence*). Since mitigation reduces the rate as well as the magnitude of warming, it also increases the time available for adaptation to a particular level of climate change, potentially by several decades. Delaying mitigation actions may reduce options for climate-resilient pathways in the future. {WG II 20.2, 20.6.2, SPM C-2}

#### Box 3.4: Co-benefits and adverse side effects

**A government policy or a measure intended to achieve one objective often affects other objectives, either positively or negatively.** For example, mitigation policies can influence local air quality (see Box 3.1, Figure 1 for urban air pollution levels). When the effects are positive they are called ‘co-benefits’, also referred to as ‘ancillary benefits’. Negative effects are referred to as ‘adverse side effects’. Some measures are labelled ‘no or low regret’ when their co-benefits are sufficient to justify their implementation, even in the absence of immediate direct benefits. Co-benefits and adverse side effects can be measured in monetary or non-monetary units. The effect of co-benefits and adverse side-effects from climate policies on overall social welfare has not yet been quantitatively examined, with the exception of a few recent multi-objective studies. Many of these have not been well quantified, and effects can be case and site-specific as they will depend on local circumstances. {WG II, 11.9, 16.3.1, 17.2, 20.4.1; WG III 3.6, 5.7, Box TS.11}

Co-benefits of mitigation could affect achievement of other objectives, such as those related to energy security, air quality, efforts to address ecosystem impacts, income distribution, labour supply and employment, and urban sprawl (see Table 4.2 and Table 4.5). In the absence of complementary policies, however, some mitigation measures may have adverse side effects (at least in the short term), for example on

biodiversity, food security, energy access, economic growth, and income distribution. The co-benefits of adaptation policies may include improved access to infrastructure and services, extended education and health systems, reduced disaster losses, better governance, and others. {[WG II 4.4.4](#), [15.2](#), [11.9](#), [17.2](#), [20.3.3](#), [20.4.1](#); [WG III 6.6](#), [Box TS.11](#)}

**Comprehensive strategies in response to climate change that are consistent with sustainable development take into account the co-benefits, adverse side-effects and risks that may arise from both adaptation and mitigation options.** The assessment of overall social welfare impacts is complicated by this interaction between climate change response options and pre-existing non-climate policies. For example, in terms of air quality, the value of the extra tonne of SO<sub>2</sub> reduction that occurs with climate change mitigation through reduced fossil fuel combustion depends greatly on the stringency of SO<sub>2</sub> control policies. If SO<sub>2</sub> policy is weak, the value of SO<sub>2</sub> reductions may be large, but if SO<sub>2</sub> policy is stringent, it may be near zero. Similarly, in terms of adaptation and disaster risk management, weak policies can lead to an adaptation deficit that increases human and economic losses from natural climate variability. The lack of capacity to manage adverse impacts of current climate variability is often referred to as the ‘adaptation deficit’. An existing adaptation deficit increases the benefits of adaptation policies that improve the management of climate variability and change. {[WG II 20.4.1](#); [WG III 6.3](#), [Box TS.11](#)}

## Topic 4: Adaptation and Mitigation

**Many adaptation and mitigation options can help address climate change, but no single option is sufficient by itself. Effective implementation depends on policies and cooperation at all scales, and can be enhanced through integrated responses that link mitigation and adaptation with other societal objectives.**

Topic 3 demonstrates the need and strategic considerations for both adaptation and global-scale mitigation to manage risks from climate change. Building on these insights, Topic 4 presents near-term response options that could help achieve such strategic goals. Near-term adaptation and mitigation actions will differ across sectors and regions, reflecting development status, response capacities, and near- and long-term aspirations with regard to both climate and non-climate outcomes. Because adaptation and mitigation inevitably take place in the context of multiple objectives, particular attention is given to the ability to develop and implement integrated approaches that can build on co-benefits and manage trade-offs.

### 4.1 Common enabling factors and constraints for adaptation and mitigation responses

**Adaptation and mitigation responses are underpinned by common enabling factors. These include effective institutions and governance, innovation and investments in environmentally sound technologies and infrastructure, sustainable livelihoods, and behavioural and lifestyle choices.**

**Innovation and investments in environmentally sound infrastructure and technologies can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance resilience to climate change (*very high confidence*).** Innovation and change can expand the availability and/or effectiveness of adaptation and mitigation options. For example, investments in low-carbon and carbon-neutral energy technologies can reduce the energy intensity of economic development, the carbon intensity of energy, greenhouse gas emissions, and the long-term costs of mitigation. Similarly, new technologies and infrastructure can increase the resilience of human systems while reducing adverse impacts on natural systems. Investments in technology and infrastructure rely on an enabling policy environment, access to finance and technology, and broader economic development that builds capacity (Table 4.1, and Section 4.4). [{WGII SPM.C-2, Tables SPM.1, TS.8; WGIII SPM.4.1, Table SPM.2, TS.3.1.1, TS 3.1.2, TS.3.2.1}](#)

**Adaptation and mitigation are constrained by the inertia of global and regional trends in economic development, greenhouse gas emissions, resource consumption, infrastructure and settlement patterns, institutional behaviour, and technology (*high agreement, medium evidence*).** Such inertia may limit the capacity to reduce GHG emissions, remain below particular climate thresholds, or avoid adverse impacts (Table 4.1). Some constraints may be overcome through new technologies, financial resources, increased institutional effectiveness and governance, or changes in social and cultural attitudes and behaviours. [{WGII SPM.C-1; WGIII SPM.3, SPM.4.2, Table SPM.2}](#)

**Vulnerability to climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, and the capacity for adaptation and mitigation are strongly influenced by livelihoods, lifestyles, behaviour and culture (*medium agreement, medium evidence*; Table 4.1).** Shifts toward more energy-intensive lifestyles can contribute to higher energy and resource consumption, driving greater energy production and GHG emissions and increasing mitigation costs. In contrast, emissions can be substantially lowered through changes in consumption patterns (see 4.3 for details). The social acceptability and/or effectiveness of climate policies are influenced by the extent to which they incentivize or depend on regionally appropriate changes in lifestyles or behaviours. Similarly, livelihoods that depend on climate-sensitive sectors or resources may be particularly vulnerable to climate change and climate change policies. Economic development and urbanization of landscapes exposed to climate hazards may increase the exposure of human settlements and reduce the resilience of natural systems. [{WGII 16.3.2.7, SPM.A-2, SPM.B-2, Table SPM.1, TS.A-1, TS.A-2, TS.C-1, TS.C-2; WGIII SPM.4.2, 4.2, TS.2.2}](#)

**For many regions and sectors, enhanced capacities to mitigate and adapt are part of the foundation essential for managing climate change risks (*high confidence*).** Such capacities are place and context-specific and therefore there is no single approach for reducing risk that is appropriate across all settings. For

example, developing nations with low income levels have the lowest financial, technological, and institutional capacities to pursue low-carbon, climate-resilient development pathways. Although developed nations generally have greater relative capacity to manage the risks of climate change, such capacity does not necessarily translate into the implementation of adaptation and mitigation options. [\[WGII 16.3.1.1, 16.3.2, 16.5, SPM.B-1, SPM.B-2, TS.B-1, TS.B-2; WGIII 4.6, SPM.5.1, TS.4.3, TS.4.5\]](#)

**Improving institutions as well as enhancing coordination and cooperation in governance can help overcome regional constraints associated with mitigation, adaptation, and disaster risk reduction (*very high confidence*).** Despite the presence of a wide array of multilateral, national, and sub-national institutions focused on adaptation and mitigation, global GHG emissions continue to increase and identified adaptation needs have not been adequately addressed. The implementation of effective adaptation and mitigation options may necessitate new institutions and institutional arrangements that span multiple scales (*medium confidence*; Table 4.1). [\[WGII 16.3.2.4, 16.8, SPM.B-2, TS.C-1; WGIII SPM.4.2.5, SPM.5.1, SPM.5.2, TS.1, TS.3.1.3, TS.4.1, TS.4.2, TS.4.4\]](#)

**Table 4.1.** Common factors that constrain the implementation of adaptation and mitigation options  
[INSERT TABLE 4.1 HERE]

## 4.2 Response Options for Adaptation

**Adaptation options exist in all sectors, but their context for implementation and potential to reduce climate-related risks differs across sectors and regions. Some adaptation responses involve significant co-benefits, synergies and trade-offs. Increasing climate change will increase challenges for many adaptation options.**

**People, governments and the private sector are starting to adapt to a changing climate. Since the AR4, understanding of response options has increased, with improved knowledge of their benefits, costs, and links to sustainable development.** Adaptation can take a variety of approaches depending on its context in vulnerability reduction, disaster risk management or proactive adaptation planning. These include (see Table 4.2 for examples and details):

- Social, ecological asset and infrastructure development
- Technological process optimization
- Integrated natural resources management
- Institutional, educational and behavioural change or reinforcement
- Financial services, including risk transfer
- Information systems to support early warning and proactive planning

There is increasing recognition of the value of social (including local and indigenous), institutional, and ecosystem-based measures and of the extent of constraints to adaptation. Effective strategies and actions consider the potential for co-benefits and opportunities within wider strategic goals and development plans. [\[WGII SPM.A-2, SPM.C.1, TS.A-2, 6.4, 8.3, 9.4, 15.3\]](#)

**Table 4.2:** Approaches for managing the risks of climate change through adaptation. These approaches should be considered overlapping rather than discrete, and they are often pursued simultaneously. Examples are presented in no specific order and can be relevant to more than one category. [\[WGII Table SPM.1\]](#)  
[INSERT TABLE 4.2 HERE]

**Opportunities to enable adaptation planning and implementation exist in all sectors and regions, with diverse potential and approaches depending on context. The need for adaptation along with associated challenges are expected to increase with climate change (*very high confidence*).** Examples of key adaptation approaches for particular sectors, including constraints and limits, are summarized below. [\[WGII SPM.B, SPM.C, 16.4, 16.6, 17.2, 19.6, 19.7, Table 16-3\]](#)

*Freshwater resources:* **Adaptive water management techniques, including scenario planning, learning-based approaches, and flexible and low-regret solutions, can help adjust to uncertain hydrological changes due to climate change and their impacts (*limited evidence, high agreement*).** Strategies include adopting integrated water management; augmenting supply; reducing the mismatch between water supply and demand; reducing non-climate stressors; strengthening institutional capacities; and adopting more water-



efficient technologies and water-saving strategies. {[WGII SPM.B-2](#), *Assessment Box SPM.2 Table 1*, [SPM.B-3](#), [3.6](#), [22.3-4](#), [23.4](#), [23.7](#), [24.4](#), [27.2-3](#), [Box 25-2](#)}

*Terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems:* **Management actions can reduce but not eliminate risks of impacts to terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems due to climate change (*high confidence*).** Actions include maintenance of genetic diversity, assisted species migration and dispersal, manipulation of disturbance regimes (e.g., fires, floods), and reduction of other stressors. Management options that reduce non-climatic stressors, such as habitat modification, overexploitation, pollution and invasive species, increase the inherent capacity of ecosystems and their species to adapt to a changing climate. Other options include improving early warning systems and associated response systems. Enhanced connectivity of vulnerable ecosystems may also assist autonomous adaptation. Translocation of species is controversial and is expected to become less feasible where whole ecosystems are at risk. {[WGII SPM.B-2](#), [SPM.B-3](#), [Table TS.8](#), [4.4](#), [25.6](#), [26.4](#), [Box CC-RF](#), [Figure SPM.5](#)}

*Coastal systems and low-lying areas:* **Increasingly, coastal adaptation options include those based on integrated coastal zone management, local community participation, ecosystems-based approaches and disaster risk reduction, mainstreamed into relevant strategies and management plans (*high confidence*).** The analysis and implementation of coastal adaptation has progressed more significantly in developed countries than in developing countries (*high confidence*). The relative costs of coastal adaptation are expected to vary strongly among and within regions and countries. {[WGII SPM.B-2](#), [SPM.B-3](#), [5.5](#), [8.3](#), [22.3](#), [24.4](#), [26.8](#), [Box 25-1](#)}

*Marine systems and oceans:* **Marine forecasting and early warning systems as well as reducing non-climatic stressors have the potential to reduce risks for some fisheries and aquaculture industries, but options for unique ecosystems such as coral reefs are limited (*high confidence*).** Fisheries and some aquaculture industries with high-technology and/or large investments have high capacities for adaptation due to greater development of environmental monitoring, modelling, and resource assessments. Adaptation options include large-scale translocation of industrial fishing activities and flexible management that can react to variability and change. For smaller-scale fisheries and nations with limited adaptive capacities, building social resilience, alternative livelihoods, and occupational flexibility are important strategies. Adaptation options for coral reef systems are generally limited to reducing other stressors, mainly by enhancing water quality and limiting pressures from tourism and fishing, but their efficacy will be severely reduced as thermal stress and ocean acidification increase. {[WGII SPM.B-2](#), [TS B-2](#), [5.5](#), [6.4](#), [7.5](#), [25.6.2](#), [29.4](#), [30.6-7](#), [Box CC-MB](#), [Box CC-CR](#), [SPM Assessment Box SPM.2 Table 1](#)}

*Food production system/Rural areas:* **Adaptation options for agriculture include technological responses, enhancing smallholder access to credit and other critical production resources, strengthening institutions at local to regional levels, and improving market access through trade reform (*medium confidence*).** Responses to decreased food production and quality include developing new crop varieties adapted to changes in CO<sub>2</sub>, temperature, and drought; enhancing the capacity for climate risk management; and offsetting economic impacts of land-use change. Improving financial support and investing in the production of small-scale farms can also provide benefits. Expanding agricultural markets and improving the predictability and reliability of the world trading system could result in reduced market volatility and help manage food supply shortages caused by climate change. {[WGII SPM.B-2](#), [SPM.B-3](#), [7.5](#), [9.3](#), [22.4](#), [22.6](#), [25.9](#), [27.3](#)}

*Urban areas, key economic sectors and services:* **Urban adaptation benefits from effective multi-level governance, alignment of policies and incentives, strengthened local government and community adaptation capacity, synergies with the private sector, and appropriate financing and institutional development (*medium confidence*).** Enhancing the capacity of low-income groups and vulnerable communities and their partnerships with local governments can also be an effective urban climate adaptation strategy. Examples of adaptation mechanisms include large-scale public-private risk reduction initiatives and economic diversification, and government insurance for the non-diversifiable portion of risk. In some locations, especially at the upper end of projected climate changes, responses could also require transformational changes such as managed retreat. {[WGII SPM.B-2](#), [8.3-4](#), [24.4](#), [24.5](#), [26.8](#), [Box 25-9](#)}

**Human health, security and livelihoods: Adaptation options that focus on strengthening existing delivery systems and institutions, as well as insurance and social protection strategies, can improve health, security and livelihoods in the near term (*high confidence*).** The most effective vulnerability reduction measures for health in the near-term are programs that implement and improve basic public health measures such as provision of clean water and sanitation, secure essential health care including vaccination and child health services, increase capacity for disaster preparedness and response, and alleviate poverty (*very high confidence*). Options to address heat related mortality include health warning systems linked to response strategies, urban planning and improvements to the built environment to reduce heat stress. Robust institutions can manage many transboundary impacts of climate change to reduce risk of conflicts over shared natural resources. Insurance programs, social protection measures, and disaster risk management may enhance long-term livelihood and resilience among the poor and marginalized people, if policies address multi-dimensional poverty. {[WGII SPM.B-2](#), [SPM.B-3](#), [8.2](#), [10.8](#), [11.7-8](#), [12.5-6](#), [22.3](#), [23.9](#), [25.8](#), [26.6](#), [Box CC-HS](#)}

**Significant co-benefits, synergies, and trade-offs exist between adaptation and mitigation and among different adaptation responses; interactions occur both within and across regions and sectors (*very high confidence*).** For example, investments in crop varieties adapted to climate change can increase the capacity to cope with drought, and public health measures to address vector-borne diseases can enhance the capacity of health systems to address other challenges. Similarly, locating infrastructure away from low-lying coastal areas helps settlements and ecosystems adapt to sea-level rise while also protecting against tsunamis. However, some adaptation options may have adverse side effects that imply real or perceived trade-offs with other adaptation objectives (see Table 4.3 for examples), mitigation objectives, or broader development goals. For example, while protection of ecosystems can assist adaptation to climate change and enhance carbon storage, increased use of air conditioning to maintain thermal comfort in buildings, or the use of desalination to enhance water resource security, can increase energy demand and therefore greenhouse gas emissions. {[WGII SPM.B-2](#), [SPM.C-1](#), [5.4.2](#), [16.3.2.9](#), [17.2.3.1](#), [Table 16-2](#)}

**Table 4.3:** Examples of potential trade-offs associated with an illustrative set of adaptation options that could be implemented by actors to achieve specific management objectives. {[WGII Table 16-2](#)  
[INSERT TABLE 4.3 HERE]}

### 4.3 Response options for mitigation

**Mitigation options are available in every major sector. Mitigation can be more cost-effective if using an integrated approach that combines measures to reduce energy use and the greenhouse gas intensity of end-use sectors, decarbonize energy supply, reduce net emissions and enhance carbon sinks in land-based sectors.**

**A broad range of sectoral mitigation options is available that can reduce GHG emission intensity, improve energy intensity through enhancements of technology, behaviour, production and resource efficiency, and enable structural changes or changes in activity.** In addition, direct options in AFOLU involve reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by reducing deforestation, forest degradation and forest fires; storing carbon in terrestrial systems (for example, through afforestation); and providing bioenergy feedstocks. Options to reduce non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions exist across all sectors, but most notably in agriculture, energy supply, and industry. An overview of sectoral mitigation options and potentials is provided in Table 4.4. {[WGIII TS 3.2.1](#)}

**Well-designed systemic and cross-sectoral mitigation strategies are more cost-effective in cutting emissions than a focus on individual technologies and sectors; with efforts in one sector affecting the need for mitigation in others (*medium confidence*).** In baseline scenarios without new mitigation policies, GHG emissions are projected to grow in all sectors, except for net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the AFOLU sector (Figure 4.1, left panel). Mitigation scenarios reaching around 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq<sup>23</sup> concentration by 2100<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> See glossary for definition of CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentrations and emissions; also Box 3.2 for metrics to calculate the ‘CO<sub>2</sub> equivalence’ of non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and their influence on sectoral abatement strategies.

<sup>24</sup> For comparison, the CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentration in 2011 is estimated to be 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 – 520 ppm).

(likely to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) show large-scale global changes in the energy supply sector (Figure 4.1, middle and right panel). While rapid decarbonization of energy supply generally entails more flexibility for end-use and AFOLU sectors, stronger demand reductions lessen the mitigation challenge for the supply side of the energy system (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). There are thus strong interdependencies across sectors and the resulting distribution of the mitigation effort is strongly influenced by the availability and performance of future technologies, particularly BECCS and large scale afforestation (Figure 4.1, middle and right panel). The next two decades present a window of opportunity for mitigation in urban areas, as a large portion of the world’s urban areas will be developed during this period. {[WGIII SPM.4.2](#), [TS.3.2](#)}

**Decarbonizing (i.e. reducing the carbon intensity of) electricity generation is a key component of cost-effective mitigation strategies in achieving low stabilization levels (of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq, at least as likely as not to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) (medium evidence, high agreement).** In most integrated modelling scenarios, decarbonization happens more rapidly in electricity generation than in the industry, buildings, and transport sectors. In scenarios reaching 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentrations by 2100, global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the energy supply sector are projected to decline over the next decade and are characterized by reductions of 90% or more below 2010 levels between 2040 and 2070. {[WGIII SPM.4.2](#), [6.8](#), [7.11](#)}

**Efficiency enhancements and behavioural changes, in order to reduce energy demand compared to baseline scenarios without compromising development, are a key mitigation strategy in scenarios reaching atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentrations of about 450 to about 500 ppm by 2100 (robust evidence, high agreement).** Near-term reductions in energy demand are an important element of cost-effective mitigation strategies, provide more flexibility for reducing carbon intensity in the energy supply sector, hedge against related supply-side risks, avoid lock-in to carbon-intensive infrastructures, and are associated with important co-benefits (Figure 4.2, Table 4.4). Emissions can be substantially lowered through changes in consumption patterns (e. g. mobility demand and mode, energy use in households, choice of longer-lasting products) and dietary change and reduction in food wastes. A number of options including monetary and non-monetary incentives as well as information measures may facilitate behavioural changes. {[WGIII SPM.4.2](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 4.1 HERE]

**Figure 4.1:** CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by sector and total non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHG emissions (Kyoto gases) across sectors in baseline (left panel) and mitigation scenarios that reach about 450 (430 – 480) ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq (likely to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) with CCS (middle panel) and without CCS (right panel). Light yellow background denotes direct CO<sub>2</sub> and non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHG emissions for both the baseline and mitigation scenarios. In addition, for the baseline scenarios, the sum of direct and indirect emissions from the energy end-use sectors (transport, buildings, and industry) is also shown (dark yellow background). Mitigation scenarios show direct emissions only. However, mitigation in the end-use sectors leads also to indirect emissions reductions in the upstream energy supply sector. Direct emissions of the end-use sectors thus do not include the emission reduction potential at the supply-side due to, e.g., reduced electricity demand. Note that for calculating the indirect emissions only electricity emissions are allocated from energy supply to end-use sectors. The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the range, which differs across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. Note that many models cannot reach concentrations of about 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100 in the absence of CCS, resulting in a low number of scenarios for the right panel. Negative emissions in the electricity sector are due to the application of BECCS. ‘Net’ AFOLU emissions consider afforestation, reforestation as well as deforestation activities. {[Figure WGIII SPM.7](#), [Figure WGIII TS.15](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 4.2 HERE]

**Figure 4.2:** Influence of energy demand on the deployment of energy supply technologies in 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentrations by 2100 (at least as likely as not to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels). Blue bars for ‘low energy demand’ show the deployment range of scenarios with limited growth in final energy demand of <20% in 2050 compared to 2010. Red bars show the deployment range of technologies in a case of ‘high energy demand’ (>20% growth in 2050 compared to 2010). For each technology, the median, interquartile, and full deployment range is displayed. Notes: Scenarios assuming technology restrictions are excluded. Ranges include results from many different integrated models. Multiple scenario results from the same model were averaged to avoid sampling biases. {[WGIII Figure TS.16](#)}

**Table 4.4:** Sectoral CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, associated energy system changes, and examples of mitigation measures (including for non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases; see Box 3.2 for metrics regarding the weighting and abatement of non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions). {[WGIII 7.11.3](#), [7.13](#), [7.14](#), [Table TS.2](#), [Figures SPM.8](#), [SPM.7](#)}  
[INSERT TABLE 4.4 HERE]

**Decarbonization of the energy supply sector (i.e. reducing the carbon intensity) requires upscaling of low- and zero-carbon electricity generation technologies (*high confidence*).** In the majority of low-concentration stabilization scenarios (about 450 to about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq, at least *as likely as not* to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels), the share of low-carbon electricity supply (comprising renewable energy (RE), nuclear and CCS, including BECCS) increases from the current share of approximately 30% to more than 80% by 2050 and 90% by 2100, and fossil fuel power generation without CCS is phased out almost entirely by 2100. Among these low-carbon technologies, a growing number of RE technologies have achieved a level of maturity to enable deployment at significant scale since AR4 (robust evidence, high agreement) and nuclear energy is a mature low-GHG emission source of baseload power, but its share of global electricity generation has been declining (since 1993). GHG emissions from energy supply can be reduced significantly by replacing current world average coal-fired power plants with modern, highly efficient natural gas combined-cycle power plants or combined heat and power plants, provided that natural gas is available and the fugitive emissions associated with extraction and supply are low or mitigated. {[WGIII SPM.4.2](#)}

**Behaviour, lifestyle and culture have a considerable influence on energy use and associated emissions, with high mitigation potential in some sectors, in particular when complementing technological and structural change (*medium evidence, medium agreement*).** In the transport sector, technical and behavioural mitigation measures for all modes, plus new infrastructure and urban redevelopment investments, could reduce final energy demand significantly below baseline levels (*robust evidence, medium agreement*) (Table 4.4). While opportunities for switching to low-carbon fuels exist, the rate of decarbonization in the transport sector might be constrained by challenges associated with energy storage and the relatively low energy density of low-carbon transport fuels (*medium confidence*). In the building sector, recent advances in technologies, know-how and policies provide opportunities to stabilize or reduce global energy use to about current levels by mid-century. In addition, recent improvements in performance and costs make very low energy construction and retrofits of buildings economically attractive, sometimes even at net negative costs (*robust evidence, high agreement*). In the industry sector, improvements in GHG emission efficiency and in the efficiency of material use, recycling and reuse of materials and products, and overall reductions in product demand (e.g., through a more intensive use of products) and service demand could, in addition to energy efficiency, help reduce GHG emissions below the baseline level. Prevalent approaches for promoting energy efficiency in industry include information programmes followed by economic instruments, regulatory approaches and voluntary actions. Important options for mitigation in waste management are waste reduction, followed by re-use, recycling and energy recovery (*robust evidence, high agreement*). {[WGIII SPM.4.2](#), [Box TS.12](#), [TS.3.2](#)}

**The most cost-effective mitigation options in forestry are afforestation, sustainable forest management and reducing deforestation, with large differences in their relative importance across regions. In agriculture, the most cost-effective mitigation options are cropland management, grazing land management, and restoration of organic soils (*medium evidence, high agreement*).** About a third of mitigation potential in forestry can be achieved at a cost <20 USD/tCO<sub>2</sub>eq emission. Demand-side measures, such as changes in diet and reductions of losses in the food supply chain, have a significant, but uncertain, potential to reduce GHG emissions from food production (*medium evidence, medium agreement*).

**Bioenergy can play a critical role for mitigation, but there are issues to consider, such as the sustainability of practices and the efficiency of bioenergy systems (*robust evidence, medium confidence*).** Evidence suggests that bioenergy options with low lifecycle emissions, some already available, can reduce GHG emissions; outcomes are site-specific and rely on efficient integrated ‘biomass-to-bioenergy systems’, and sustainable land-use management and governance. Barriers to large-scale deployment of bioenergy include concerns about GHG emissions from land, food security, water resources, biodiversity conservation and livelihoods. {[WGIII SPM.4.2](#)}

**Mitigation measures intersect with other societal goals creating the possibility of co-benefits or adverse side-effects. These intersections, if well-managed, can strengthen the basis for undertaking climate mitigation actions (robust evidence, medium agreement).** Mitigation can positively or negatively influence the achievement of other societal goals, such as those related to human health, food security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods, and equitable sustainable development (see also Section 4.5). On the other hand, policies towards other societal goals can influence the achievement of mitigation and adaptation objectives. These influences can be substantial, although sometimes difficult to quantify, especially in welfare terms. This multi-objective perspective is important in part because it helps to identify areas where support for policies that advance multiple goals will be robust. Potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects of the main sectoral mitigation measures are summarized in Table 4.5. Overall, the potential for co-benefits for energy end-use measures outweigh the potential for adverse side-effects, whereas the evidence suggests this may not be the case for all energy supply and AFOLU measures. {[WGIII SPM.2](#)}

**Table 4.5.** Potential co-benefits (blue text) and adverse side-effects (red text) of the main sectoral mitigation measures. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects, and their overall positive or negative effect, all depend on local circumstances as well as on the implementation practice, pace and scale. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies, see Section 3.4. The uncertainty qualifiers between brackets denote the level of evidence and agreement on the respective effect. Abbreviations for evidence: l=limited, m=medium, r=robust; for agreement: l=low, m=medium, h=high. {[WGIII Table 6.7](#), [Tables TS.3](#), [TS.4](#), [TS.5](#), [TS.6](#), [TS.7](#)}  
[INSERT TABLE 4.5 HERE]

#### 4.4 Policy approaches for adaptation and mitigation, technology and finance

**Effective adaptation and mitigation responses will depend on policies and measures across multiple scales: international, regional, national and sub-national. Policies across all scales supporting technology development, diffusion and transfer, as well as finance for responses to climate change, can complement and enhance the effectiveness of policies that directly promote adaptation and mitigation.**

##### 4.4.1 International and Regional Cooperation on Adaptation and Mitigation

Because climate change has the characteristics of a collective action problem at the global scale (see 3.1), effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independently, even though mitigation can also have local co-benefits. Cooperative responses, including international cooperation, are therefore required to effectively mitigate GHG emissions and address other climate change issues. While adaptation focuses primarily on local to national scale outcomes, its effectiveness can be enhanced through coordination across governance scales, including international cooperation. In fact, international cooperation has helped to facilitate the creation of adaptation strategies, plans, and actions at national, sub-national, and local levels. A variety of climate policy instruments have been employed, and even more could be employed, at international and regional levels to address mitigation and to support and promote adaptation at national and sub-national scales. Evidence suggests that outcomes seen as equitable can lead to more effective cooperation. {[SREX SPM](#), [7.ES](#); [WGII SPM.C-1](#), [2.2](#), [15.2](#); [WGIII 13.ES](#), [14.3](#), [15.8](#)}

**The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main multilateral forum focused on addressing climate change, with nearly universal participation.** UNFCCC activities since 2007, which include the 2010 Cancun Agreements and the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, have sought to enhance actions under the Convention, and have led to an increasing number of institutions and other arrangements for international climate change cooperation. Other institutions organized at different levels of governance have resulted in diversifying international climate change cooperation. {[WGIII SPM.5.2](#), [13.5](#)}

**Existing and proposed international climate change cooperation arrangements vary in their focus and degree of centralization and coordination.** They span: multilateral agreements, harmonized national policies and decentralized but coordinated national policies, as well as regional and regionally-coordinated policies (see Figure 4.3). {[WGIII SPM.5.2](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 4.3 HERE]

Legend: Loose coordination of policies: examples include transnational city networks and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs); R&D technology cooperation: examples include the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), Global Methane Initiative (GMI), Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP); Other international organization (IO) GHG regulation: examples include the Montreal Protocol, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO); see WGIII Figure 13.1 for details of these examples.

**Figure 4.3:** Alternative forms of international cooperation. The figure represents a compilation of existing and possible forms of international cooperation, based upon a survey of published research, but is not intended to be exhaustive of existing or potential policy architectures, nor is it intended to be prescriptive. Examples in orange are existing agreements. Examples in blue are structures for agreements proposed in the literature. The width of individual boxes indicates the range of possible degrees of centralization for a particular agreement. The degree of centralization indicates the authority an agreement confers on an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agreement. {[WGIII Figure 13.2](#)}

**While a number of new institutions are focused on adaptation funding and coordination, adaptation has historically received less attention than mitigation in international climate policy (*robust evidence, medium agreement*).** Inclusion of adaptation is increasingly important to reduce the risk from climate change impacts and may engage a greater number of countries. {[WGIII 13.2](#), [13.3.3](#), [13.5.1.1](#), [13.14](#)}

**The Kyoto Protocol offers lessons towards achieving the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, particularly with respect to participation, implementation, flexibility mechanisms, and environmental effectiveness (*medium evidence, low agreement*).** The Protocol was the first binding step toward implementing the principles and goals provided by the UNFCCC. According to national greenhouse gas inventories through 2012 submitted to the UNFCCC by October 2013, Annex B Parties with quantified emission limitations (and reduction obligations) in aggregate may have bettered their collective emission reduction target in the first commitment period,<sup>25</sup> but some emissions reductions that would have occurred even in its absence were also counted. The Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) created a market for emissions offsets from developing countries, the purpose being two-fold: to help Annex I countries fulfill their commitments, and to assist non-Annex I countries achieve sustainable development. The CDM generated Certified Emission Reductions (offsets) equivalent to emissions of over 1.4 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>eq<sup>23</sup> by October 2013, led to significant project investments, and generated investment flows for a variety of functions, including the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund. However, its environmental effectiveness has been questioned by some, particularly in regard to its early years, due to concerns about the additionality of projects (that is, whether projects bring about emissions that are different from BAU circumstances), the validity of baselines, and the possibility of emissions leakage (*medium evidence; medium agreement*). Such concerns about additionality are common to any emission-reduction-credit (offset) program, and are not specific to the CDM. Due to market forces, the majority of single CDM projects have been concentrated in a limited number of countries, while Programmes of Activities, though less frequent, have been more evenly distributed. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol created two other 'flexibility mechanisms': Joint Implementation and International Emissions Trading. {[WGIII SPM.5.2](#), [13.7](#), [13.13.1.1](#), [14.3](#), [Table TS.9](#)}

**Several conceptual models for effort-sharing have been identified in research.** However, realized distributional impacts from actual international cooperative agreements depend not only on the approach taken, but also on criteria applied to operationalize equity, and the manner in which developing countries' emissions reduction plans are financed. {[WGIII 4.6](#), [13.4](#)}

**Policy linkages among regional, national, and sub-national climate policies offer potential climate change mitigation benefits (*medium evidence, medium agreement*).** Linkages have been established between carbon markets, and in principle could also be established between and among a heterogeneous set of policy instruments including non-market-based policies, such as performance standards. Potential advantages include lower mitigation costs, decreased emission leakage, and increased market liquidity. {[WGIII SPM.5.2](#), [13.3](#), [13.5](#), [13.6](#), [13.7](#), [14.5](#)}

<sup>25</sup> The final conclusion regarding compliance of Annex B Parties remains subject to the review process under the Kyoto Protocol as of October 2014.

**Regional initiatives between national and global scales are being developed and implemented, but their impact on global mitigation has been limited to date (*medium confidence*).** Some climate policies could be more environmentally and economically effective if implemented across broad regions, such as by embodying mitigation objectives in trade agreements or jointly constructing infrastructures that facilitate reduction in carbon emissions. {[WGIII Table TS.9](#), [13.13](#), [14.4](#), [14.5](#)}

**International cooperation for supporting adaptation planning and implementation has assisted in the creation of adaptation strategies, plans, and actions at national, sub-national, and local levels (*high confidence*).** For example, a range of multilateral and regionally targeted funding mechanisms have been established for adaptation; UN agencies, international development organizations and NGOs have provided information, methodologies and guidelines; and global and regional initiatives supported and promoted the creation of national adaptation strategies in both developing and developed countries. Closer integration of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation at the international level, and the mainstreaming of both into international development assistance, may foster greater efficiency in the use of resources and capacity. However, stronger efforts at the international level do not necessarily lead to substantive and rapid results at the local level. {[WGII 15.2](#), [15.3](#); [SREX SPM](#), [7.4](#), [8.2](#), [8.5](#)}

#### 4.4.2 National and Sub-National Policies

##### 4.4.2.1 Adaptation

**Adaptation experience is accumulating across regions in the public and private sector and within communities (*high confidence*).** Adaptation options adopted to date (see Table 4.6) emphasize incremental adjustments and co-benefits and are starting to emphasize flexibility and learning (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Most assessments of adaptation have been restricted to impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation planning, with very few assessing the processes of implementation or the effects of adaptation actions (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {[WGII SPM.A-2](#), [TS.A-2](#)}

**Table 4.6:** Recent adaptation actions in the public and private sector across regions. {[WGII SPM A-2](#)}  
[INSERT TABLE 4.6 HERE]

**National governments play key roles in adaptation planning and implementation (*high agreement, robust evidence*).** There has been substantial progress since the AR4 in the development of national adaptation strategies and plans. This includes National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) by least developed countries, the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process, and strategic frameworks for national adaptation in OECD countries. National governments can coordinate adaptation efforts of local and subnational governments, for example by protecting vulnerable groups, by supporting economic diversification, and by providing information, policy and legal frameworks, and financial support. {[WGII SPM.C-1](#), [15.2](#)}

**While local government and the private sector have different functions, which vary regionally, they are increasingly recognized as critical to progress in adaptation, given their roles in scaling up adaptation of communities, households, and civil society and in managing risk information and financing (*medium evidence, high agreement*).** There is a significant increase in the number of planned adaptation responses at the local level in rural and urban communities of developed and developing countries since the AR4. However, local councils and planners are often confronted by the complexity of adaptation without adequate access to guiding information or data on local vulnerabilities and potential impacts. Steps for mainstreaming adaptation into local decision-making have been identified but challenges remain in their implementation. Hence, scholars stress the important role of linkages with national and subnational levels of government as well as partnerships among public, civic, and private sectors in implementing local adaptation responses. {[WGII SPM.A-2](#), [SPM.C-1](#), [14.2](#), [15.2](#)}

**Institutional dimensions of adaptation governance, including the integration of adaptation into planning and decision making, play a key role in promoting the transition from planning to implementation of adaptation (*high agreement, robust evidence*).** The most commonly emphasized institutional barriers or enablers for adaptation planning and implementation are: 1) multilevel institutional co-ordination between different political and administrative levels in society; 2) key actors, advocates and

champions initiating, mainstreaming and sustaining momentum for climate adaptation; 3) horizontal interplay between sectors, actors and policies operating at similar administrative levels; 4) political dimensions in planning and implementation; and 5) coordination between formal governmental, administrative agencies and private sectors and stakeholders to increase efficiency, representation and support for climate adaptation measures. [{WGII 15.2, 15.5, 16.3, Box 15-1}](#)

**Existing and emerging economic instruments can foster adaptation by providing incentives for anticipating and reducing impacts (*medium confidence*).** Instruments include public-private finance partnerships, loans, payments for environmental services, improved resource pricing, charges and subsidies, norms and regulations, and risk sharing and transfer mechanisms. Risk financing mechanisms in the public and private sector, such as insurance and risk pools, can contribute to increasing resilience, but without attention to major design challenges, they can also provide disincentives, cause market failure, and decrease equity. Governments often play key roles as regulators, providers, or insurers of last resort. [{WGII SPM.C-1}](#)

#### 4.4.2.2 Mitigation

**There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-national mitigation plans and strategies since AR4.** In 2012, 67% of global GHG emissions<sup>23</sup> were subject to national legislation or strategies versus 45% in 2007. However, there has not yet been a substantial deviation in global emissions from the past trend. These plans and strategies are in their early stages of development and implementation in many countries, making it difficult to assess their aggregate impact on future global emissions (*medium evidence, high agreement*). [{WGIII SPM.5.1}](#)

**Since AR4, there has been an increased focus on policies designed to integrate multiple objectives, increase co-benefits and reduce adverse side-effects (*high confidence*).** Governments often explicitly reference co-benefits in climate and sectoral plans and strategies. [{WGIII SPM.5.1}](#)

**Sector-specific policies have been more widely used than economy-wide policies (see Table 4.7; *medium evidence, high agreement*).** Although most economic theory suggests that economy-wide policies for mitigation would be more cost-effective than sector-specific policies, administrative and political barriers may make economy-wide policies harder to design and implement than sector-specific policies. The latter may be better suited to address barriers or market failures specific to certain sectors, and may be bundled in packages of complementary policies [{WGIII SPM.5.1}](#)

**In principle, mechanisms that set a carbon price, including cap and trade systems and carbon taxes, can achieve mitigation in a cost-effective way, but have been implemented with diverse effects due in part to national circumstances as well as policy design.** The short-run environmental effects of cap and trade systems have been limited as a result of loose caps or caps that have not proved to be constraining (*limited evidence, medium agreement*). In some countries, tax-based policies specifically aimed at reducing GHG emissions – alongside technology and other policies – have helped to weaken the link between GHG emissions and GDP (*high confidence*). In addition, in a large group of countries, fuel taxes (although not necessarily designed for the purpose of mitigation) have had effects that are akin to sectoral carbon taxes (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). Revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned emission allowances are used in some countries to reduce other taxes and/or to provide transfers to low-income groups. This illustrates the general principle that mitigation policies that raise government revenue generally have lower social costs than approaches which do not. [{WGIII SPM.5.1}](#)

**Table 4.7:** Sectoral Policy Instruments. [{WGIII Table 15.2}](#)

[INSERT TABLE 4.7 HERE]

**Economic instruments in the form of subsidies may be applied across sectors, and include a variety of policy designs, such as tax rebates or exemptions, grants, loans and credit lines.** An increasing number and variety of RE policies including subsidies – motivated by many factors - have driven escalated growth of RE technologies in recent years. Government policies play a crucial role in accelerating the deployment of RE technologies. Energy access and social and economic development have been the primary drivers in most developing countries whereas secure energy supply and environmental concerns have been most important in



developed countries. The focus of policies is broadening from a concentration primarily on RE electricity to include RE heating and cooling and transportation. {SRREN SPM.7}

**The reduction of subsidies for GHG-related activities in various sectors can achieve emission reductions, depending on the social and economic context (*high confidence*).** While subsidies can affect emissions in many sectors, most of the recent literature has focused on subsidies for fossil fuels. Since AR4 a small but growing literature based on economy-wide models has projected that complete removal of subsidies to fossil fuels in all countries could result in reductions in global aggregate emissions by mid-century (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Studies vary in methodology, the type and definition of subsidies and the time frame for phase out considered. In particular, the studies assess the impacts of complete removal of all fossil fuel subsidies without seeking to assess which subsidies are wasteful and inefficient, keeping in mind national circumstances. {[WGIII SPM.5.1](#)}

**Regulatory approaches and information measures are widely used and are often environmentally effective (*medium evidence, medium agreement*).** Examples of regulatory approaches include energy efficiency standards; examples of information programs include labelling programs that can help consumers make better-informed decisions. {[WGIII SPM.5.1](#)}

**Mitigation policy could devalue fossil fuel assets and reduce revenues for fossil fuel exporters, but differences between regions and fuels exist (*high confidence*).** Most mitigation scenarios are associated with reduced revenues from coal and oil trade for major exporters. The effect on natural gas export revenues is more uncertain. The availability of CCS would reduce the adverse effect of mitigation on the value of fossil fuel assets (*medium confidence*). {[WGIII SPM.5.1](#)}

**Interactions between or among mitigation policies may be synergistic or may have no additive effect on reducing emissions (*medium evidence, high agreement*).** For instance, a carbon tax can have an additive environmental effect to policies such as subsidies for the supply of RE. By contrast, if a cap and trade system has a sufficiently stringent cap to affect emission-related decisions, then other policies have no further impact on reducing emissions (although they may affect costs and possibly the viability of more stringent future targets) (*medium evidence, high agreement*). In either case, additional policies may be needed to address market failures relating to innovation and technology diffusion. {[WGIII SPM.5.1](#)}

**Sub-national climate policies are increasingly prevalent, both in countries with national policies and in those without.** These policies include state and provincial climate plans combining market, regulatory and information instruments, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems. In addition, transnational cooperation has arisen among sub-national actors, notably among institutional investors, NGOs seeking to govern carbon offset markets, and networks of cities seeking to collaborate in generating low-carbon urban development. {[13.5.2](#), [15.2.4](#), [15.8](#)}

**Co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation could affect achievement of other objectives such as those related to human health, food security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods, and equitable sustainable development.** {[WGIII SPM.2](#)}

- Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 or 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent by 2100 show reduced costs for achieving air quality and energy security objectives, with significant co-benefits for human health, ecosystem impacts, and sufficiency of resources and resilience of the energy system. {[WGIII SPM4.1](#)}
- Some mitigation policies raise the prices for some energy services and could hamper the ability of societies to expand access to modern energy services to underserved populations (*low confidence*). These potential adverse side-effects can be avoided with the adoption of complementary policies such as income tax rebates or other benefit transfer mechanisms (*medium confidence*). The costs of achieving nearly universal access to electricity and clean fuels for cooking and heating are projected to be between USD 72 to 95 billion per year until 2030 with minimal effects on GHG emissions (*limited evidence, medium agreement*) and multiple benefits in health and air pollutant reduction (*high confidence*). {[WGIII SPM.5.1](#)}

Whether or not side-effects materialize, and to what extent side-effects materialize, will be case- and site-specific, and depend on local circumstances and the scale, scope, and pace of implementation. Many co-benefits and adverse side-effects have not been well-quantified. {[SPM.4.1](#)}

#### 4.4.3 *Technology development and transfer*

**Technology policy (development, diffusion and transfer) complements other mitigation policies across all scales from international to sub-national, but worldwide investment in research in support of GHG mitigation is small relative to overall public research spending (*high confidence*).** Technology policy includes technology-push (e.g. publicly-funded R&D) and demand-pull (e.g. governmental procurement programs). Such policies address a pervasive market failure because, in the absence of government policy such as patent protection, the invention of new technologies and practices from R&D efforts has aspects of a public good and thus tends to be under-provided by market forces alone. Technology support policies have promoted substantial innovation and diffusion of new technologies, but the cost-effectiveness of such policies is often difficult to assess. Technology policy can increase incentives for participation and compliance with international cooperative efforts, particularly in the long run. [{WGIII SPM.5.1, 2.6.5, 3.11, 13.9, 13.12, 15.6.5}](#)

**Many adaptation efforts also critically rely on diffusion and transfer of technologies and management practices, but their effective use depends on a suitable institutional, regulatory, social and cultural context (*high confidence*).** Adaptation technologies are often familiar and already applied elsewhere. However, the success of technology transfer may involve not only the provision of finance and information, but also strengthening of policy and regulatory environments, and capacities to absorb, employ and improve technologies appropriate to local circumstances. [{WGII 15.4}](#)

#### 4.4.4 *Investment and finance*

**Substantial reductions in emissions would require large changes in investment patterns (*high confidence*).** Mitigation scenarios in which policies stabilize atmospheric concentrations (without overshoot) in the range from 430 to 530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100<sup>26</sup> lead to substantial shifts in annual investment flows during the period 2010-2029 compared to baseline scenarios. Over the next two decades (2010-2029), annual investments in conventional fossil fuel technologies associated with the electricity supply sector is projected to decline in the scenarios by about USD 30 (2-166) billion (median: -20% compared to 2010) while annual investment in low carbon electricity supply (i.e. renewables, nuclear, and electricity with CCS) is projected to rise in the scenarios by about USD 147 (31-360) billion (median: +100% compared to 2010) (*limited evidence, medium agreement*). In addition, annual incremental energy efficiency investments in transport, industry and buildings is projected to rise in the scenarios by about USD 336 (1-641) billion. Global total annual investment in the energy system is presently about USD 1,200 billion. This number includes only energy supply of electricity and heat and respective upstream and downstream activities. Energy efficiency investment or underlying sector investment is not included (Figure 4.4). [{WGIII SPM.5.1, 16.2}](#)

[INSERT FIGURE 4.4 HERE]

**Figure 4.4:** Change in annual investment flows from the average baseline level over the next two decades (2010 to 2029) for mitigation scenarios that stabilize concentrations (without overshoot) within the range of approximately 430-530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100. Total electricity generation (leftmost column) is the sum of renewable and nuclear energy, power plants with CCS, and fossil-fuel power plants without CCS. The vertical bars indicate the range between the minimum and maximum estimate; the horizontal bar indicates the median. The numbers in the bottom row show the total number of studies in the literature used in the assessment. Individual technologies shown are found to be used in different model scenarios in either a complementary or a synergistic way, depending largely on technology-specific assumptions and the timing and ambition level of the phase-in of global climate policies. [{WGIII Figure SPM 9}](#)

**There is no widely agreed definition of what constitutes climate finance, but estimates of the financial flows associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation are available.** See figure 4.5 for an overview of climate finance flows. Published assessments of all current annual financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce net GHG emissions and / or to enhance resilience to climate change and climate variability show USD 343-385 billion per year globally (medium confidence). Out of this, total public

<sup>26</sup> This range comprises scenarios that reach 430-480 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100 (*likely* to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) and scenarios that reach 480-530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100 (without overshoot: *more likely than not* to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels).

climate finance that flowed to developing countries is estimated to be between USD 35 and 49 billion/yr in 2011 and 2012 (*medium confidence*). Estimates of international private climate finance flowing to developing countries range from USD 10 to 72 billion/yr including foreign direct investment as equity and loans in the range of USD 10 to 37 billion/yr over the period of 2008-2011 (*medium confidence*). {[WGIII SPM.5.1](#)}

[INSERT FIGURE 4.5 HERE]

**Figure 4.5:** Overview of climate finance flows. Note: Capital should be understood to include all relevant financial flows. The size of the boxes is not related to the magnitude of the financial flow. {[WGIII Figure TS.40](#)}

**In many countries, the private sector plays central roles in the processes that lead to emissions as well as to mitigation and adaptation. Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sector, along with the public sector, can play an important role in financing mitigation and adaptation (medium evidence, high agreement).** The share of total mitigation finance from the private sector, acknowledging data limitations, is estimated to be on average between two-thirds and three-fourths on the global level (2010-2012) (*limited evidence, medium agreement*). In many countries, public finance interventions by governments and international development banks encourage climate investments by the private sector and provide finance where private sector investment is limited. The quality of a country's enabling environment includes the effectiveness of its institutions, regulations and guidelines regarding the private sector, security of property rights, credibility of policies and other factors that have a substantial impact on whether private firms invest in new technologies and infrastructures. Dedicated policy instruments and financial arrangements, for example, credit insurance, feed-in tariffs, concessional finance or rebates provide an incentive for mitigation investment by improving the return adjusted for the risk for private actors. Public-private risk reduction initiatives (such as in the context of insurance systems) and economic diversification are examples of adaptation action enabling and relying on private sector participation. {[WGII SPM B-2, SPM.C-1](#); [WGIII SPM.5.1](#)}

**Financial resources for adaptation have become available more slowly than for mitigation in both developed and developing countries. Limited evidence indicates that there is a gap between global adaptation needs and the funds available for adaptation (medium confidence).** Potential synergies between international finance for disaster risk management and adaptation to climate change have not yet been fully realized (*high confidence*). There is a need for better assessment of global adaptation costs, funding and investment. Studies estimating the global cost of adaptation are characterized by shortcomings in data, methods and coverage (*high confidence*). {[WGII SPM.C-1, 14.2](#); [SREX SPM](#)}

#### 4.5 Trade-offs, synergies, and integrated responses

**There are many opportunities to link mitigation, adaptation and the pursuit of other societal objectives through integrated responses (high confidence). Successful implementation relies on relevant tools, suitable governance structures, and enhanced capacity to respond (medium confidence).**

A growing evidence base indicates close links between adaptation and mitigation, their co-benefits and adverse side-effects, and recognizes sustainable development as the overarching context for climate policy (see Sections 3.5, 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). Developing tools to address these linkages is critical to the success of climate policy in the context of sustainable development (see also Sections 4.4 and 3.5). This section presents examples of integrated responses in specific policy arenas, as well as some of the factors that promote or impede policies aimed at multiple objectives.

**Increasing efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change imply an increasing complexity of interactions, encompassing connections among human health, water, energy, land use, and biodiversity (very high confidence).** Mitigation can support the achievement of other societal goals, such as those related to human health, food security, environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods, and sustainable development, although there can also be negative effects. Adaptation measures also have the potential to deliver mitigation co-benefits, and vice versa, and support other societal goals, though trade-offs can also arise. {[WGII SPM.C-1, SPM.C-2, 9.3-4, 8.4, 11.9, Box CC-WE](#); [WGIII Tables TS.3-TS.7](#)}

**Integration of adaptation and mitigation into planning and decision-making can create synergies with sustainable development (*high confidence*).** Synergies and trade-offs among mitigation and adaptation policies and policies advancing other societal goals can be substantial, although sometimes difficult to quantify especially in welfare terms (see also 3.5). A multi-objective approach to policy-making can help manage these synergies and trade-offs. Policies advancing multiple goals may also attract greater support. [{WGII SPM.C-1, SPM.C-2, 20.3; WGIII 1.2.1, 3.6.3, 4.3, 4.6, 4.8, 6.6.1}](#)

**Effective integrated responses depend on suitable tools and governance structures, as well as adequate capacity (*medium confidence*).** Managing trade-offs and synergies is challenging and requires tools to help understand interactions and support decision-making at local and regional scales. Integrated responses also depend on governance that enables coordination across scales and sectors, supported by appropriate institutions. Developing and implementing suitable tools and governance structures often requires upgrading the human and institutional capacity to design and deploy integrated responses. [{WGII SPM.C-1, SPM.C-2, 2.2, 2.4, 15.4, 15.5, 16.3, Table 14-1, Table 16-1; WGIII TS.1, TS.3, 15.2}](#)

**An integrated approach to energy planning and implementation that explicitly assesses the potential for co-benefits and the presence of adverse side-effects can capture complementarities across multiple climate, social and environmental objectives (*medium confidence*).** There are strong interactive effects across various energy policy objectives, such as energy security, air quality, health and energy access (see Figure 3.5) and between a range of social and environmental objectives and climate mitigation objectives (see Table 4.5). An integrated approach can be assisted by tools such as cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, multi-criteria analysis and expected utility theory. It also requires appropriate coordinating institutions. [{WGIII Figure SPM.6, TS.1, TS.3}](#)

**Explicit consideration of interactions among water, food, energy, and biological carbon sequestration plays an important role in supporting effective decisions for climate resilient pathways (*medium evidence, high agreement*).** Both biofuel-based power generation and large-scale afforestation designed to mitigate climate change can reduce catchment run-off, which may conflict with alternative water uses for food production, human consumption, or the maintenance of ecosystem function and services (see also Box 3.4). Conversely, irrigation can increase the climate resilience of food and fibre production but reduces water availability for other uses. [{WGII Box CC-WE, Box TS.9}](#)

**An integrated response to urbanization provides substantial opportunities for enhanced resilience, reduced emissions, and more sustainable development (*medium confidence*).** Urban areas account for more than half of global primary energy use and energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (*high agreement, medium evidence*), and contain a high proportion of the population and economic activities at risk from climate change. In rapidly growing and urbanizing regions, mitigation strategies based on spatial planning and efficient infrastructure supply can avoid the lock-in of high emission patterns. Mixed-use zoning, transport-oriented development, increased density, and co-located jobs and homes can reduce direct and indirect energy use across sectors. Compact development of urban spaces and intelligent densification can preserve land carbon stocks and land for agriculture and bioenergy. Reduced energy and water consumption in urban areas through greening cities and recycling water are examples of mitigation actions with adaptation benefits. Building resilient infrastructure systems can reduce vulnerability of urban settlements and cities to coastal flooding, sea-level rise and other climate-induced stresses. [{WGII SPM.B-2, SPM.C-1, TS.B-2, TS.C-1, TS.C-2; WGIII SPM.4.2.5, TS.3}](#)

**Table 2.1 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

		2046–2065		2081–2100	
	Scenario	Mean	Likely range <sub>c</sub>	Mean	Likely range <sub>c</sub>
<b>Global Mean Surface Temperature Change (°C)<sup>a</sup></b>	RCP2.6	1.0	0.4 to 1.6	1.0	0.3 to 1.7
	RCP4.5	1.4	0.9 to 2.0	1.8	1.1 to 2.6
	RCP6.0	1.3	0.8 to 1.8	2.2	1.4 to 3.1
	RCP8.5	2.0	1.4 to 2.6	3.7	2.6 to 4.8
	Scenario	Mean	Likely range <sub>d</sub>	Mean	Likely range <sub>d</sub>
<b>Global Mean Sea-level Rise (m)<sup>b</sup></b>	RCP2.6	0.24	0.17 to 0.32	0.40	0.26 to 0.55
	RCP4.5	0.26	0.19 to 0.33	0.47	0.32 to 0.63
	RCP6.0	0.25	0.18 to 0.32	0.48	0.33 to 0.63
	RCP8.5	0.30	0.22 to 0.38	0.63	0.45 to 0.82

Notes:

<sup>a</sup> Based on the CMIP5 ensemble; changes calculated with respect to the 1986–2005 period. Using HadCRUT4 and its uncertainty estimate (5% to 95% confidence interval), the observed warming from 1850–1900 to the reference period 1986–2005 is 0.61 [0.55 to 0.67] °C. *Likely* ranges have not been assessed here with respect to earlier reference periods because methods are not generally available in the literature for combining the uncertainties in models and observations. Adding projected and observed changes does not account for potential effects of model biases compared to observations, and for natural internal variability during the observational reference period. {WGI 2.4.3; 11.2.2, 12.4.1; Tables 12.2 and 12.3}

<sup>b</sup> Based on 21 CMIP5 models; changes calculated with respect to the 1986–2005 period. Based on current understanding (from observations, physical understanding and modelling), only the collapse of marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, if initiated, could cause global mean sea level to rise substantially above the *likely* range during the 21st century. There is *medium confidence* that this additional contribution would not exceed several tenths of a metre of sea-level rise during the 21st century.

<sup>c</sup> Calculated from projections as 5% to 95% model ranges. These ranges are then assessed to be *likely* ranges after accounting for additional uncertainties or different levels of confidence in models. For projections of global mean surface temperature change in 2046–2065, *confidence* is *medium*, because the relative importance of natural internal variability, and uncertainty in non-greenhouse gas forcing and response, are larger than for the 2081–2100 period. The *likely* ranges for 2046–2065 do not take into account the possible influence of factors that lead to the assessed range for near-term (2016–2035) change in global mean surface temperature that is lower than the 5% to 95% model range, because the influence of these factors on longer term projections has not been quantified due to insufficient scientific understanding. {WGI 11.3.1}

<sup>d</sup> Calculated from projections as 5% to 95% model ranges. These ranges are then assessed to be *likely* ranges after accounting for additional uncertainties or different levels of confidence in models. For projections of global mean sea-level rise *confidence* is *medium* for both time horizons.

**Table 2.2 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

<b>Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 1870 in GtCO<sub>2</sub></b>									
<b>Net anthropogenic warming<sup>a</sup></b>	<1.5 °C			<2 °C			<3 °C		
	66%	50%	33%	66%	50%	33%	66%	50%	33%
<b>Fraction of simulations meeting goal<sup>b</sup></b>	66%	50%	33%	66%	50%	33%	66%	50%	33%
<b>Complex models, RCP scenarios only<sup>c</sup></b>	2250	2250	2550	2900	3000	3300	4200	4500	4850
<b>Simple model, WGIII scenarios<sup>d</sup></b>	No data	2300–2350	2400–2950	2550–3150	2900–3200	2950–3800	n.a. <sup>e</sup>	4150–5750	5250–6000
<b>Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 2011 in GtCO<sub>2</sub></b>									
<b>Complex models, RCP scenarios only<sup>c</sup></b>	400	550	850	1000	1300	1500	2400	2800	3250
<b>Simple model, WGIII scenarios<sup>d</sup></b>	No data	550–600	600–1150	750–1400	1150–1400	1150–2050	n.a. <sup>e</sup>	2350–4000	3500–4250
<b>Total fossil carbon available in 2011<sup>f</sup>: 3670–7100 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (reserves) &amp; 31300–50050 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (resources)</b>									

<sup>a</sup> Warming due to CO<sub>2</sub> and non-CO<sub>2</sub> drivers. Temperature values are given relative to the 1861–1880 base period.

<sup>b</sup> Note that the 66% range in this table should not be equated to the likelihood statements in Table SPM.1 and Table 3.1 and IPCC AR5 WG3 Table SPM.1. The assessment in these latter tables is not only based on the probabilities calculated for the full ensemble of scenarios in WG3 using a single climate model, but also the assessment in WGI of the uncertainty of the temperature projections not covered by climate models.


















<sup>c</sup> Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions at the time the temperature threshold is exceeded that are required for 66%, 50% or 33% of the CMIP5 complex models ESM and EMIC simulations, assuming non-CO<sub>2</sub> forcing follows the RCP8.5 scenario. Similar cumulative emissions are implied by other RCP scenarios. For most scenario–threshold combinations, emissions and warming continue after the threshold is exceeded. Nevertheless, because of the cumulative nature of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, these figures provide an indication of the cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions implied by the CMIP5 model simulations under RCP-like scenarios. Values are rounded to the nearest 50.

<sup>d</sup> Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions at the time of peak warming from WGIII scenarios for which a fraction of greater than 66% (66–100%), greater than 50% (50–66%) or greater than 33% (33–50%) of climate simulations keep global mean temperature increase to below the stated threshold. Ranges indicate the variation in cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions arising from differences in non-CO<sub>2</sub> drivers across the WGIII scenarios. The fraction of climate simulations for each scenario is derived from a 600-member parameter ensemble of a simple carbon-cycle climate model (MAGICC6) in a probabilistic mode. Parameter and scenario uncertainty are explored in this ensemble. Structural uncertainties cannot be explored with a single model set-up. Ranges show the impact of scenario uncertainty, with 80% of scenarios giving cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions within the stated range for the given fraction of simulations. Simple model estimates are constrained by observed changes over the past century, do not account for uncertainty in model structure and may omit some feedback processes: they are hence slightly higher than the CMIP5 complex models estimates. Values are rounded to the nearest 50.

<sup>e</sup> The numerical results for the cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for staying below 3°C with greater than 66% (66–100%) is greatly influenced by a large number of scenarios that would also meet the 2°C objective and therefore not comparable with numbers provided for the other temperature threshold.

<sup>f</sup> Reserves are quantities able to be recovered under existing economic and operating conditions; resources are those where economic extraction is potentially feasible. {WGIII [Table 7.2](#)}

**Table 2.3 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

Climate-related drivers of impacts									Level of risk & potential for adaptation																
																									
Global Risks																									
Key risk	Adaptation issues & prospects			Climatic drivers	Timeframe	Risk & potential for adaptation																			
<p>Reduction in terrestrial carbon sink: Carbon stored in terrestrial ecosystems is vulnerable to loss back into the atmosphere, resulting from increased fire frequency due to climate change and the sensitivity of ecosystem respiration to rising temperatures (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[4.2, 4.3]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation options include managing land use (including deforestation), fire and other disturbances, and non-climatic stressors.</li> </ul>				<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Very low</td> <td>Medium</td> <td>Very high</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Present</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Near term (2030–2040)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Long term (2080–2100)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>2°C</td> <td></td> <td>4°C</td> </tr> </table>		Very low	Medium	Very high	Present	[Risk level bar]			Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level bar]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level bar]				2°C		4°C
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<p>Boreal tipping point: Arctic ecosystems are vulnerable to abrupt change related to the thawing of permafrost, spread of shrubs in tundra, and increase in pests and fires in boreal forests (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[4.3, Box 4-4]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There are few adaptation options in the Arctic.</li> </ul>				<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Very low</td> <td>Medium</td> <td>Very high</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Present</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Near term (2030–2040)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Long-term (2080–2100)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>2°C</td> <td></td> <td>4°C</td> </tr> </table>		Very low	Medium	Very high	Present	[Risk level bar]			Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level bar]			Long-term (2080–2100)	[Risk level bar]				2°C		4°C
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<p>Amazon tipping point: Moist Amazon forests could change abruptly to less-carbon-dense, drought- and fire-adapted ecosystems (<i>low confidence</i>)</p> <p>[4.3, Box 4-3]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy and market measures can reduce deforestation and fire.</li> </ul>				<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Very low</td> <td>Medium</td> <td>Very high</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Present</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Near term (2030–2040)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Long term (2080–2100)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>2°C</td> <td></td> <td>4°C</td> </tr> </table>		Very low	Medium	Very high	Present	[Risk level bar]			Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level bar]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level bar]				2°C		4°C
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<p>Increased risk of species extinction: A large fraction of the species assessed is vulnerable to extinction due to climate change, often in interaction with other threats. Species with an intrinsically low dispersal rate, especially when occupying flat landscapes where the projected climate velocity is high, and species in isolated habitats such as mountaintops, islands, or small protected areas are especially at risk. Cascading effects through organism interactions, especially those vulnerable to phenological changes, amplify risk (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>[4.3, 4.4]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation options include reduction of habitat modification and fragmentation, pollution, over-exploitation, and invasive species; protected area expansion; assisted dispersal; and <i>ex situ</i> conservation.</li> </ul>				<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Very low</td> <td>Medium</td> <td>Very high</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Present</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Near term (2030–2040)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Long term (2080–2100)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>2°C</td> <td></td> <td>4°C</td> </tr> </table>		Very low	Medium	Very high	Present	[Risk level bar]			Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level bar]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level bar]				2°C		4°C
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<p>Global redistribution and decrease of low-latitude fisheries yields, paralleled by a global trend to catches having smaller fishes (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[6.3 to 6.5, 30.5, 30.6]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increasing coastal poverty at low latitudes as fisheries become smaller – partially compensated by the growth of aquaculture and marine spatial planning, as well as enhanced industrialized fishing efforts</li> </ul>				<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Very low</td> <td>Medium</td> <td>Very high</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Present</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Near term (2030–2040)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Long term (2080–2100)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>2°C</td> <td></td> <td>4°C</td> </tr> </table>		Very low	Medium	Very high	Present	[Risk level bar]			Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level bar]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level bar]				2°C		4°C
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<p>Reduced growth and survival of commercially valuable shellfish and other calcifiers (e.g., reef building corals, calcareous red algae) due to ocean acidification (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>[5.3, 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 30.3, Box CC-OA]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence for differential resistance and evolutionary adaptation of some species exists but is <i>likely</i> to be limited at higher CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations and temperatures.</li> <li>Adaptation options include exploiting more resilient species or protecting habitats with low natural CO<sub>2</sub> levels, as well as reducing other stresses, mainly pollution, and limiting pressures from tourism and fishing.</li> </ul>				<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Very low</td> <td>Medium</td> <td>Very high</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Present</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Near term (2030–2040)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Long term (2080–2100)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>2°C</td> <td></td> <td>4°C</td> </tr> </table>		Very low	Medium	Very high	Present	[Risk level bar]			Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level bar]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level bar]				2°C		4°C
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<p>Marine biodiversity loss with high rate of climate change (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[6.3, 6.4, Table 30-4, Box CC-MB]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation options are limited to reducing other stresses, mainly pollution, and limiting pressures from coastal human activities such as tourism and fishing.</li> </ul>				<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Very low</td> <td>Medium</td> <td>Very high</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Present</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Near term (2030–2040)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Long term (2080–2100)</td> <td colspan="3">[Risk level bar]</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>2°C</td> <td></td> <td>4°C</td> </tr> </table>		Very low	Medium	Very high	Present	[Risk level bar]			Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level bar]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level bar]				2°C		4°C
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Global Risks																				
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Negative impacts on average crop yields and increases in yield variability due to climate change ( <i>high confidence</i> ) [7.2 to 7.5, Figure 7-5, Box 7-1]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Projected impacts vary across crops and regions and adaptation scenarios, with about 10% of projections for the period 2030–2049 showing yield gains of more than 10%, and about 10% of projections showing yield losses of more than 25%, compared to the late 20th century. After 2050 the risk of more severe yield impacts increases and depends on the level of warming.</li> </ul>		<table border="1"> <tr><td>Present</td><td>Very low</td><td>Medium</td><td>Very high</td></tr> <tr><td>Near term (2030–2040)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td>Long term (2080–2100)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>2°C</td><td></td><td>4°C</td></tr> </table>	Present	Very low	Medium	Very high	Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]				2°C		4°C	
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Urban risks associated with water supply systems ( <i>high confidence</i> ) [8.2, 8.3]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation options include changes to network infrastructure as well as demand-side management to ensure sufficient water supplies and quality, increased capacities to manage reduced freshwater availability, and flood risk reduction.</li> </ul>		<table border="1"> <tr><td>Present</td><td>Very low</td><td>Medium</td><td>Very high</td></tr> <tr><td>Near term (2030–2040)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td>Long term (2080–2100)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>2°C</td><td></td><td>4°C</td></tr> </table>	Present	Very low	Medium	Very high	Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]				2°C		4°C	
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Urban risks associated with energy systems ( <i>high confidence</i> ) [8.2, 8.4]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most urban centers are energy intensive, with energy-related climate policies focused only on mitigation measures. A few cities have adaptation initiatives underway for critical energy systems. There is potential for non-adapted, centralized energy systems to magnify impacts, leading to national and transboundary consequences from localized extreme events.</li> </ul>		<table border="1"> <tr><td>Present</td><td>Very low</td><td>Medium</td><td>Very high</td></tr> <tr><td>Near term (2030–2040)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td>Long-term (2080–2100)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>2°C</td><td></td><td>4°C</td></tr> </table>	Present	Very low	Medium	Very high	Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]			Long-term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]				2°C		4°C	
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Urban risks associated with housing ( <i>high confidence</i> ) [8.3]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poor quality, inappropriately located housing is often most vulnerable to extreme events. Adaptation options include enforcement of building regulations and upgrading. Some city studies show the potential to adapt housing and promote mitigation, adaptation, and development goals simultaneously. Rapidly growing cities, or those rebuilding after a disaster, especially have opportunities to increase resilience, but this is rarely realized. Without adaptation, risks of economic losses from extreme events are substantial in cities with high-value infrastructure and housing assets, with broader economic effects possible.</li> </ul>		<table border="1"> <tr><td>Present</td><td>Very low</td><td>Medium</td><td>Very high</td></tr> <tr><td>Near term (2030–2040)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td>Long term (2080–2100)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>2°C</td><td></td><td>4°C</td></tr> </table>	Present	Very low	Medium	Very high	Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]				2°C		4°C	
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Displacement associated with extreme events ( <i>high confidence</i> ) [12.4]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation to extreme events is well understood, but poorly implemented even under present climate conditions. Displacement and involuntary migration are often temporary. With increasing climate risks, displacement is more likely to involve permanent migration.</li> </ul>		<table border="1"> <tr><td>Present</td><td>Very low</td><td>Medium</td><td>Very high</td></tr> <tr><td>Near term (2030–2040)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td>Long term (2080–2100)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>2°C</td><td></td><td>4°C</td></tr> </table>	Present	Very low	Medium	Very high	Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]				2°C		4°C	
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Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]																			
	2°C		4°C																	
Violent conflict arising from deterioration in resource-dependent livelihoods such as agriculture and pastoralism ( <i>high confidence</i> ) [12.5]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation options:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Buffering rural incomes against climate shocks, for example through livelihood diversification, income transfers, and social safety net provision</li> <li>Early warning mechanisms to promote effective risk reduction</li> <li>Well-established strategies for managing violent conflict that are effective but require significant resources, investment, and political will</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		<table border="1"> <tr><td>Present</td><td>Very low</td><td>Medium</td><td>Very high</td></tr> <tr><td>Near term (2030–2040)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td>Long term (2080–2100)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>2°C</td><td></td><td>4°C</td></tr> </table>	Present	Very low	Medium	Very high	Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]				2°C		4°C	
Present	Very low	Medium	Very high																	
Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]																			
Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]																			
	2°C		4°C																	
Declining work productivity, increasing morbidity (e.g., dehydration, heat stroke, and heat exhaustion), and mortality from exposure to heat waves. Particularly at risk are agricultural and construction workers as well as children, homeless people, the elderly, and women who have to walk long hours to collect water ( <i>high confidence</i> ) [13.2, Box 13-1]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation options are limited for people who are dependent on agriculture and cannot afford agricultural machinery.</li> <li>Adaptation options are limited in the construction sector where many poor people work under insecure arrangements.</li> <li>Adaptation limits may be exceeded in certain areas in a +4°C world.</li> </ul>		<table border="1"> <tr><td>Present</td><td>Very low</td><td>Medium</td><td>Very high</td></tr> <tr><td>Near term (2030–2040)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td>Long term (2080–2100)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>2°C</td><td></td><td>4°C</td></tr> </table>	Present	Very low	Medium	Very high	Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]				2°C		4°C	
Present	Very low	Medium	Very high																	
Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]																			
Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]																			
	2°C		4°C																	
Reduced access to water for rural and urban poor people due to water scarcity and increasing competition for water ( <i>high confidence</i> ) [13.2, Box 13-1]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation through reducing water use is not an option for the many people already lacking adequate access to safe water. Access to water is subject to various forms of discrimination, for instance due to gender and location. Poor and marginalized water users are unable to compete with water extraction by industries, large-scale agriculture, and other powerful users.</li> </ul>		<table border="1"> <tr><td>Present</td><td>Very low</td><td>Medium</td><td>Very high</td></tr> <tr><td>Near term (2030–2040)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td>Long term (2080–2100)</td><td colspan="3">[Risk level indicator]</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>2°C</td><td></td><td>4°C</td></tr> </table>	Present	Very low	Medium	Very high	Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]			Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]				2°C		4°C	
Present	Very low	Medium	Very high																	
Near term (2030–2040)	[Risk level indicator]																			
Long term (2080–2100)	[Risk level indicator]																			
	2°C		4°C																	



**Table 3.1 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

CO <sub>2</sub> eq Concentrations in 2100 (CO <sub>2</sub> eq) <sup>6</sup>	Subcategories	Relative position of the RCPs <sup>4</sup>	Change in CO <sub>2</sub> eq emissions compared to 2010 (in %) <sup>3</sup>		Likelihood of staying below a specific temperature level over the 21st century (relative to 1850-1900) <sup>4,5</sup>			
			2050	2100	1.5°C	2°C	3°C	4°C
< 430	<i>Only a limited number of individual model studies have explored levels below 430 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq<sup>10</sup></i>							
450 (430 – 480)	Total range <sup>1,7</sup>	RCP2.6	-72 to -41	-118 to -78	<i>More unlikely than likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>
500 (480 – 530)	No overshoot of 530 ppm CO <sub>2</sub> eq		-57 to -42	-107 to -73	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>More likely than not</i>		
	Overshoot of 530 ppm CO <sub>2</sub> eq		-55 to -25	-114 to -90		<i>About as likely as not</i>		
550 (530 – 580)	No overshoot of 580 ppm CO <sub>2</sub> eq		-47 to -19	-81 to -59		<i>More unlikely than likely<sup>9</sup></i>		
	Overshoot of 580 ppm CO <sub>2</sub> eq		-16 to 7	-183 to -86				
(580 – 650)	Total range	RCP4.5	-38 to 24	-134 to -50		<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	
(650 – 720)	Total range		-11 to 17	-54 to -21	<i>More likely than not</i>			
(720 – 1000) <sup>2</sup>	Total range	RCP6.0	18 to 54	-7 to 72	<i>Unlikely<sup>8</sup></i>	<i>More unlikely than likely</i>		
>1000 <sup>2</sup>	Total range	RCP8.5	52 to 95	74 to 178		<i>Unlikely<sup>8</sup></i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>More unlikely than likely</i>

<sup>1</sup> The 'total range' for the 430 to 480 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq concentrations scenarios corresponds to the range of the 10th to 90th percentile of the subcategory of these scenarios shown in Table 6.3 of the Working Group 3 report.

<sup>2</sup> Baseline scenarios fall into the >1000 and 720–1000 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq categories. The latter category includes also mitigation scenarios. The baseline scenarios in the latter category reach a temperature change of 2.5–5.8 °C above the average for 1850-1900 in 2100. Together with the baseline scenarios in the >1000 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq category, this leads to an overall 2100 temperature range of 2.5–7.8 °C (range based on median transient climate response: 3.7–4.8 °C) for baseline scenarios across both concentration categories.

<sup>3</sup> The global 2010 emissions are 31% above the 1990 emissions (consistent with the historic GHG emission estimates presented in this report). CO<sub>2</sub>-eq emissions include the basket of Kyoto gases (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O as well as F-gases).

<sup>4</sup> The assessment here involves a large number of scenarios published in the scientific literature and is thus not limited to the RCPs. To evaluate the CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentration and climate implications of these scenarios, the MAGICC model was used in a probabilistic mode. For a comparison between MAGICC model results and the outcomes of the models used in WGI, see Section WGI 12.4.1.2 and WGI 12.4.8 and 6.3.2.6.

<sup>5</sup> The assessment in this table is based on the probabilities calculated for the full ensemble of scenarios in WGIII using MAGICC and the assessment in WGI of the uncertainty of the temperature projections not covered by climate models. The statements are therefore consistent with the statements in WGI, which are based on the CMIP5 runs of the RCPs and the assessed uncertainties. Hence, the likelihood statements reflect different lines of evidence from both WGs. This WGI method was also applied for scenarios with intermediate concentration levels where no CMIP5 runs are available. The likelihood statements are indicative only {WGIII 6.3} and follow broadly the terms used by the WGI SPM for temperature projections: likely 66-100%, more likely than not >50-100%, about as likely as not 33-66%, and unlikely 0-33%. In addition the term more unlikely than likely 0-<50% is used.

<sup>6</sup> The CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentration (see Glossary) is calculated on the basis of the total forcing from a simple carbon cycle/climate model, MAGICC. The CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent concentration in 2011 is estimated to be 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 – 520 ppm). This is based on the assessment of total anthropogenic radiative forcing for 2011 relative to 1750 in WGI, i. e. 2.3 W m<sup>-2</sup>, uncertainty range 1.1 to 3.3 W m<sup>-2</sup>.











<sup>7</sup> The vast majority of scenarios in this category overshoot the category boundary of 480 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq concentration.

<sup>8</sup> For scenarios in this category, no CMIP5 run or MAGICC realization stays below the respective temperature level. Still, an ‘unlikely’ assignment is given to reflect uncertainties that may not be reflected by the current climate models.





<sup>9</sup> Scenarios in the 580–650 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq category include both overshoot scenarios and scenarios that do not exceed the concentration level at the high end of the category (e.g. RCP4.5). The latter type of scenarios, in general, have an assessed probability of more unlikely than likely to stay below the 2 °C temperature level, while the former are mostly assessed to have an unlikely probability of staying below this level.

<sup>10</sup> In these scenarios, global CO<sub>2</sub>eq emissions in 2050 are between 70–95% below 2010 emissions, and they are between 110–120% below 2010 emissions in 2100.

**Table 3.2 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

2100 concentration s (ppm CO <sub>2</sub> eq)	Mitigation cost increases in scenarios with limited availability of technologies <sup>4</sup> [%increase in total discounted <sup>5</sup> mitigation costs (2015-2100) relative to default technology assumptions]				Mitigation cost increases due to delayed additional mitigation until 2030 [% increase in mitigation costs relative to immediate mitigation]	
	no CCS	nuclear phase out	limited solar/wind	limited bioenergy	medium term costs (2030-2050)	long term costs (2050-2100)
450 (430-480)	138 % (29-297%) 	7 % (4-18%) 	6 % (2-29%) 	64 % (44-78%) 	44 % (2-78%) 	37 % (16-82%) 
500 (480-530)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
550 (530-580)	39 % (18-78%) 	13 % (2-23%) 	8 % (5-15%) 	18 % (4-66%) 	15 % (3-32%)	16 % (5-24%)
580-650	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		

**Symbol legend – fraction of models successful in producing scenarios (numbers indicate the number of successful models)**

-  : all models successful
-  : between 50 and 80% of models successful
-  : between 80 and 100% of models successful
-  : less than 50% of models successful

<sup>1</sup> Delayed mitigation scenarios are associated with GHG emission of more than 55 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq in 2030, and the increase in mitigation costs is measured relative to cost-effective mitigation scenarios for the same long-term concentration level.

<sup>2</sup> Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and impose no additional limitations on technology relative to the models' default technology assumptions.

<sup>3</sup> Only scenarios with a time horizon until 2100 are included. Some models that are included in the cost ranges for concentration levels above 530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq in 2100 could not produce associated scenarios for concentration levels below 530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq in 2100 with assumptions about limited availability of technologies and/or delayed additional mitigation.

<sup>4</sup> No CCS: CCS is not included in these scenarios. Nuclear phase out: No addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction, and operation of existing plants until the end of their lifetime. Limited Solar/Wind: a maximum of 20% global electricity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios. Limited Bioenergy: a maximum of 100 EJ/yr modern bioenergy supply globally (modern bioenergy used for heat, power, combinations, and industry was around 18 EJ/yr in 2008).

<sup>5</sup> Percentage increase of net present value of consumption losses in percent of baseline consumption (for scenarios from general equilibrium models) and abatement costs in percent of baseline GDP (for scenarios from partial equilibrium models) for the period 2015–2100, discounted at 5% per year.

**Box 3.2, Table 1 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

		<b>GWP</b>		<b>GTP</b>	
	lifetime (yrs)	<b>Cumulative forcing over 20 years</b>	<b>Cumulative forcing over 100 years</b>	<b>Temperature change after 20 years</b>	<b>Temperature change after 100 years</b>
<b>CO<sub>2</sub></b>	**	1	1	1	1
<b>CH<sub>4</sub></b>	12.4	84	28	67	4
<b>N<sub>2</sub>O</b>	121.0	264	265	277	234
<b>CF<sub>4</sub></b>	50,000.0	4880	6630	5270	8040
<b>HCF-152a</b>	1.5	506	138	174	19

\* GWP values have been updated in successive IPCC reports; the AR5 GWP<sub>100</sub> values are different from those adopted for the Kyoto Protocol's First Commitment Period, which are from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). Note that for consistency, equivalent CO<sub>2</sub> emissions given elsewhere in this Synthesis Report are also based on SAR, not AR5 values (for a comparison of emissions using SAR and AR5 GWP<sub>100</sub> values for 2010 emissions, see Figure 1.6).

\*\* No single lifetime can be given for CO<sub>2</sub>. ([Box 6.1](#), [6.1.1](#), [8.7](#))

**Table 4.1 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

<b>Constraining Factor</b>	<b>Potential Implications for Adaptation</b>	<b>Potential Implications for Mitigation</b>
<b>Adverse externalities of population growth and urbanization</b>	Increase exposure of human populations to climate variability and change as well as demands for, and pressures on, natural resources and ecosystem services { <a href="#">WGII 16.3.2.3</a> ; <a href="#">Box 16-3</a> }	Drive economic growth, energy demand and energy consumption, resulting in increases in greenhouse gas emissions { <a href="#">WGIII SPM.3</a> }
<b>Deficits of knowledge, education, and human capital</b>	Reduce national, institutional, and individual perceptions of the risks posed by climate change as well as the costs and benefits of different adaptation options { <a href="#">WGII 16.3.2.1</a> }	Reduce national, institutional, and individual risk perception, willingness to change behavioural patterns and practices, and to adopt social and technological innovations to reduce emissions { <a href="#">WGIII 2.4.1</a> , <a href="#">3.10.1.5</a> , <a href="#">4.3.5</a> , <a href="#">9.8</a> , <a href="#">11.8.1</a> , <a href="#">SPM.3</a> , <a href="#">SPM.5.1</a> }
<b>Divergences in social and cultural attitudes, values, and behaviours</b>	Reduce societal consensus regarding climate risk and therefore demand for specific adaptation policies and measures { <a href="#">WGII 16.3.2.7</a> }	Influence emission patterns; societal perceptions of the utility of mitigation policies and technologies; and willingness to pursue sustainable behaviours and technologies { <a href="#">WGIII 2.4.5</a> , <a href="#">2.6.6.1</a> , <a href="#">3.7.2.2</a> , <a href="#">3.9.2</a> , <a href="#">4.3.4</a> , <a href="#">5.5.1</a> , <a href="#">SPM.2</a> }
<b>Challenges in governance and institutional arrangements</b>	Reduce the ability to coordinate adaptation policies and measures and to deliver capacity to actors to plan and implement adaptation { <a href="#">WGII 16.3.2.8</a> }	Undermine policies, incentives, and cooperation regarding the development of mitigation policies and the implementation of efficient, carbon neutral, and renewable energy technologies { <a href="#">WGIII 4.3.2</a> , <a href="#">6.4.3</a> , <a href="#">14.1.3.1</a> , <a href="#">14.3.2.2</a> , <a href="#">15.12.2</a> , <a href="#">16.5.3</a> , <a href="#">SPM.3</a> , <a href="#">SPM.5.2</a> , }
<b>Lack of access to national and international climate finance</b>	Reduces the scale of investment in adaptation policies and measures and therefore their effectiveness { <a href="#">WGII 16.3.2.5</a> }	Reduces the capacity of developed and, particularly, developing nations to pursue policies and technologies that reduce emissions. { <a href="#">WGIII 12.6.2</a> , <a href="#">16.2.2.2</a> , <a href="#">TS.4.3</a> , }
<b>Inadequate technology</b>	Reduces the range of available adaptation options as well as their effectiveness in reducing or avoiding risk from increasing rates or magnitudes of climate change { <a href="#">WGII 16.3.2.1</a> }	Slows the rate at which society can reduce the carbon intensity of energy services and transition toward low-carbon and carbon-neutral technologies { <a href="#">WGIII 4.3.6</a> , <a href="#">6.3.2.2</a> , <a href="#">11.8.4</a> , <a href="#">TS.3.1.3</a> }
<b>Insufficient quality and/or quantity of natural resources</b>	Reduce the coping range of actors, vulnerability to non-climatic factors, and potential competition for resources that enhances vulnerability { <a href="#">WGII 16.3.2.3</a> }	Reduce the long-term sustainability of different energy technologies { <a href="#">WGIII 4.3.7</a> , <a href="#">4.4.1</a> , <a href="#">11.8.3</a> }

Constraining Factor	Potential Implications for Adaptation	Potential Implications for Mitigation
<b>Adaptation and development deficits</b>	Increase vulnerability to current climate variability as well as future climate change <a href="#">{WGII 16.3.2.4, TS.A-1, Table TS.5}</a>	Reduce mitigative capacity and undermine international cooperative efforts on climate owing to a contentious legacy of cooperation on development <a href="#">{WGIII 4.3.1, 4.6.1, }</a>
<b>Inequality</b>	Places the impacts of climate change and the burden of adaptation disproportionately on the most vulnerable and/or transfers them to future generations <a href="#">{WGII Box 13-1, 16.7, TS B-2, Box TS.4}</a>	Constrains the ability for developing nations with low income levels, or different communities or sectors within nations, to contribute to GHG mitigation <a href="#">{WGIII 4.6.2.1}</a>

**Table 4.2 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

Overlapping Approaches	Category	Examples	WGII Chapter References
Vulnerability & Exposure Reduction through development, planning, & practices including many low-regrets measures Adaptation including incremental & transformational adjustments Transformation	Human development	Improved access to education, nutrition, health facilities, energy, safe housing & settlement structures, & social support structures; Reduced gender inequality & marginalization in other forms.	8.3, 9.3, 13.1-3, 14.2-3, 22.4
	Poverty alleviation	Improved access to & control of local resources; Land tenure; Disaster risk reduction; Social safety nets & social protection; Insurance schemes.	8.3-4, 9.3, 13.1-3
	Livelihood security	Income, asset, & livelihood diversification; Improved infrastructure; Access to technology & decision-making fora; Increased decision-making power; Changed cropping, livestock, & aquaculture practices; Reliance on social networks.	7.5, 9.4, 13.1-3, 22.3-4, 23.4, 26.5, 27.3, 29.6, Table SM24-7
	Disaster risk management	Early warning systems; Hazard & vulnerability mapping; Diversifying water resources; Improved drainage; Flood & cyclone shelters; Building codes & practices; Storm & wastewater management; Transport & road infrastructure improvements.	8.2-4, 11.7, 14.3, 15.4, 22.4, 24.4, 26.6, 28.4, Box 25-1, Table 3-3
	Ecosystem management	Maintaining wetlands & urban green spaces; Coastal afforestation; Watershed & reservoir management; Reduction of other stressors on ecosystems & of habitat fragmentation; Maintenance of genetic diversity; Manipulation of disturbance regimes; Community-based natural resource management.	4.3-4, 8.3, 22.4, Table 3-3, Boxes 4-3, 8-2, 15-1, 25-8, 25-9, & CC-EA
	Spatial or land-use planning	Provisioning of adequate housing, infrastructure, & services; Managing development in flood prone & other high risk areas; Urban planning & upgrading programs; Land zoning laws; Easements; Protected areas.	4.4, 8.1-4, 22.4, 23.7-8, 27.3, Box 25-8
	Structural /physical	<p><b>Engineered &amp; built-environment options:</b> Sea walls &amp; coastal protection structures; Flood levees; Water storage; Improved drainage; Flood &amp; cyclone shelters; Building codes &amp; practices; Storm &amp; wastewater management; Transport &amp; road infrastructure improvements; Floating houses; Power plant &amp; electricity grid adjustments.</p> <p><b>Technological options:</b> New crop &amp; animal varieties; Indigenous, traditional, &amp; local knowledge, technologies, &amp; methods; Efficient irrigation; Water-saving technologies; Desalinization; Conservation agriculture; Food storage &amp; preservation facilities; Hazard &amp; vulnerability mapping &amp; monitoring; Early warning systems; Building insulation; Mechanical &amp; passive cooling; Technology development, transfer, &amp; diffusion.</p>	<p>3.5-6, 5.5, 8.2-3, 10.2, 11.7, 23.3, 24.4, 25.7, 26.3, 26.8, Boxes 15-1, 25-1, 25-2, &amp; 25-8</p> <p>7.5, 8.3, 9.4, 10.3, 15.4, 22.4, 24.4, 26.3, 26.5, 27.3, 28.2, 28.4, 29.6-7, Boxes 20-5 &amp; 25-2, Tables 3-3 &amp; 15-1</p>

				<p><b>Ecosystem-based options:</b> Ecological restoration; Soil conservation; Afforestation &amp; reforestation; Mangrove conservation &amp; replanting; Green infrastructure (e.g., shade trees, green roofs); Controlling overfishing; Fisheries co-management; Assisted species migration &amp; dispersal; Ecological corridors; Seed banks, gene banks, &amp; other <i>ex situ</i> conservation; Community-based natural resource management.</p>	<p>4.4, 5.5, 6.4, 8.3, 9.4, 11.7, 15.4, 22.4, 23.6-7, 24.4, 25.6, 27.3, 28.2, 29.7, 30.6, Boxes 15-1, 22-2, 25-9, 26-2, &amp; CC-EA</p>
				<p><b>Services:</b> Social safety nets &amp; social protection; Food banks &amp; distribution of food surplus; Municipal services including water &amp; sanitation; Vaccination programs; Essential public health services; Enhanced emergency medical services.</p>	<p>3.5-6, 8.3, 9.3, 11.7, 11.9, 22.4, 29.6, Box 13-2</p>
			Institutional	<p><b>Economic options:</b> Financial incentives; Insurance; Catastrophe bonds; Payments for ecosystem services; Pricing water to encourage universal provision and careful use; Microfinance; Disaster contingency funds; Cash transfers; Public-private partnerships.</p>	<p>8.3-4, 9.4, 10.7, 11.7, 13.3, 15.4, 17.5, 22.4, 26.7, 27.6, 29.6, Box 25-7</p>
				<p><b>Laws &amp; regulations:</b> Land zoning laws; Building standards &amp; practices; Easements; Water regulations &amp; agreements; Laws to support disaster risk reduction; Laws to encourage insurance purchasing; Defined property rights &amp; land tenure security; Protected areas; Fishing quotas; Patent pools &amp; technology transfer.</p>	<p>4.4, 8.3, 9.3, 10.5, 10.7, 15.2, 15.4, 17.5, 22.4, 23.4, 23.7, 24.4, 25.4, 26.3, 27.3, 30.6, Table 25-2, Box CC-CR</p>
				<p><b>National &amp; government policies &amp; programs:</b> National &amp; regional adaptation plans including mainstreaming; Sub-national &amp; local adaptation plans; Economic diversification; Urban upgrading programs; Municipal water management programs; Disaster planning &amp; preparedness; Integrated water resource management; Integrated coastal zone management; Ecosystem-based management; Community-based adaptation.</p>	<p>2.4, 3.6, 4.4, 5.5, 6.4, 7.5, 8.3, 11.7, 15.2-5, 22.4, 23.7, 25.4, 25.8, 26.8-9, 27.3-4, 29.6, Boxes 25-1, 25-2, &amp; 25-9, Tables 9-2 &amp; 17-1</p>
			Social	<p><b>Educational options:</b> Awareness raising &amp; integrating into education; Gender equity in education; Extension services; Sharing indigenous, traditional, &amp; local knowledge; Participatory action research &amp; social learning; Knowledge-sharing &amp; learning platforms.</p>	<p>8.3-4, 9.4, 11.7, 12.3, 15.2-4, 22.4, 25.4, 28.4, 29.6, Tables 15-1 &amp; 25-2</p>
				<p><b>Informational options:</b> Hazard &amp; vulnerability mapping; Early warning &amp; response systems; Systematic monitoring &amp; remote sensing; Climate services; Use of indigenous climate observations; Participatory scenario development; Integrated assessments.</p>	<p>2.4, 5.5, 8.3-4, 9.4, 11.7, 15.2-4, 22.4, 23.5, 24.4, 25.8, 26.6, 26.8, 27.3, 28.2, 28.5, 30.6, Table 25-2, Box 26-3</p>
				<p><b>Behavioral options:</b> Household preparation &amp; evacuation planning; Migration; Soil &amp; water conservation; Storm drain clearance; Livelihood</p>	<p>5.5, 7.5, 9.4, 12.4, 22.3-4, 23.4, 23.7, 25.7,</p>



				diversification; Changed cropping, livestock, & aquaculture practices; Reliance on social networks.	26.5, 27.3, 29.6, Table SM24-7, Box 25-5
			Spheres of change	<b>Practical:</b> Social & technical innovations, behavioral shifts, or institutional & managerial changes that produce substantial shifts in outcomes.	8.3, 17.3, 20.5, Box 25-5
				<b>Political:</b> Political, social, cultural, & ecological decisions & actions consistent with reducing vulnerability & risk & supporting adaptation, mitigation, & sustainable development.	14.2-3, 20.5, 25.4, 30.7, Table 14-1
				<b>Personal:</b> Individual & collective assumptions, beliefs, values, & worldviews influencing climate-change responses.	14.2-3, 20.5, 25.4, Table 14-1

**Table 4.3 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Actor's adaptation objective</b>	<b>Adaptation option</b>	<b>Real or perceived trade-off</b>
<b>Agriculture</b>	Enhance drought and pest resistance; enhance yields	Biotechnology and genetically modified crops	Perceived risk to public health and safety; ecological risks associated with introduction of new genetic variants to natural environments
	Provide financial safety net for farmers to ensure continuation of farming enterprises	Subsidized drought assistance; crop insurance	Creates moral hazard and distributional inequalities if not appropriately administered
	Maintain or enhance crop yields; suppress opportunistic agricultural pests and invasive species	Increased use of chemical fertilizer and pesticides	Increased discharge of nutrients and chemical pollution to the environment; adverse impacts of pesticide use on non-target species; increased emissions of greenhouse gases; increased human exposure to pollutants
<b>Biodiversity</b>	Enhance capacity for natural adaptation and migration to changing climatic conditions	Migration corridors; expansion of conservation areas	Unknown efficacy; concerns over property rights regarding land acquisition; governance challenges
	Enhance regulatory protections for species potentially at risk due to climate and non-climatic changes	Protection of critical habitat for vulnerable species	Addresses secondary rather than primary pressures on species; concerns over property rights; regulatory barriers to regional economic development
	Facilitate conservation of valued species by shifting populations to alternative areas as the climate changes	Assisted migration	Difficult to predict ultimate success of assisted migration; possible adverse impacts on indigenous flora and fauna from introduction of species into new ecological regions
<b>Coasts</b>	Provide near-term protection to financial assets from inundation and/or erosion	Sea walls	High direct and opportunity costs; equity concerns; ecological impacts to coastal wetlands
	Allow natural coastal and ecological processes to proceed; reduce long-term risk to property and assets	Managed retreat	Undermines private property rights; significant governance challenges associated with implementation
	Preserve public health and safety; minimize property damage and risk of stranded assets	Migration out of low-lying areas	Loss of sense of place and cultural identity; erosion of kinship and familial ties; impacts to receiving communities
<b>Water resources management</b>	Increase water resource reliability and drought resilience	Desalination	Ecological risk of saline discharge; high energy demand and associated carbon emissions; creates disincentives for conservation
	Maximize efficiency of water management and use; increase flexibility	Water trading	Undermines public good/social aspects of water
	Enhance efficiency of available water resources	Water recycling/reuse	Perceived risk to public health and safety

**Table 4.4 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

Sectoral CO <sub>2</sub> emissions and related energy system changes				Examples for sectoral mitigation measures		
Sector	CO <sub>2</sub> emission (GtCO <sub>2</sub> , 2050)	Low carbon fuel share (% 2050)	Final energy demand (EJ, 2050)	Key low carbon energy options	Key energy saving options	Other options
<b>Energy supply<sup>1</sup></b>				<p>Renewables (wind, solar, bioenergy, geothermal, hydro, etc.), Nuclear, CCS, BECS, fossil fuel switching</p>	<p>Energy efficiency improvements of energy supply technologies, improved transmission and distribution, CHP and cogeneration</p>	<p>Fugitive CH<sub>4</sub> emissions control</p>
<b>Transport</b>				<p>Fuel switching to low carbon fuels (eg., hydrogen/electricity from low-carbon sources), biofuels</p>	<p>Efficiency improvements (engines, vehicle design, appliances, lighter materials), Modal shift (eg, from LDVs to public transport or from aviation to HDVs to rail), eco-driving, improved freight logistics, journey avoidance, higher occupancy rates</p>	<p>Transport (infrastructure) planning, urban planning</p>
<b>Building</b>				<p>Building integrated RES, fuel switching to low carbon fuels (eg, electricity from low-carbon sources, biofuels)</p>	<p>Device efficiency (heating/cooling systems, water heating, cooking, lighting, appliances), Systemic efficiency (integrated design, low/zero energy buildings, district heating/cooling, CHP, smart meters/grids), behavioral and lifestyle changes (eg, appliance use, thermostat setting, dwelling size)</p>	<p>Urban planning, building lifetime, durability of building components and appliances, low energy/GHG intensive construction and materials</p>
<b>Industry</b>				<p>Process emissions reductions, use of waste and CCS in industry, fuel switching among fossil fuels and switch to low-carbon energy (eg, electricity) or biomass</p>	<p>Energy efficiency and BAT (eg, furnace/boilers, steam systems, electric motors and control systems, (waste) heat exchanges, recycling), reduction of demand for goods, more intensive use of goods (eg, improve durability or car sharing)</p>	<p>HFC replacement and leak repair, Material efficiency (eg, process innovation, re-using old materials, product design, etc)</p>
<b>AFOLU</b>				<p><b>Emissions reduction measures:</b> Methane (eg, livestock management), nitrous oxide (eg, fertilizer use), conservation of existing carbon pools (sustainable forest management, reduced deforestation and forest degradation, fire prevention, agroforestry), reduction in emissions intensity</p>	<p><b>Sequestration options:</b> Increasing existing carbon pools (eg, afforestation, reforestation, integrated systems, carbon sequestration in soils)</p>	<p><b>Substitution options:</b> Use of biological products instead of fossil/GHG intensive products (eg bioenergy, insulation products).</p> <p><b>Demand-side measures:</b> Reduction of loss and waste of food, changes in human diets, use of long-lived wood products</p>

<sup>1</sup> CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, low carbon fuel shares, and final energy demand are shown for electricity generation only

**Table 4.5 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

Sectoral mitigation measures	Effect on additional objectives/concerns		
	Economic	Social	Environmental
<b>Energy Supply</b>	<i>For possible upstream effects of biomass supply for bioenergy, see AFOLU.</i>		
Nuclear replacing coal power (and other fossil fuels)	Energy security (reduced exposure to fuel price volatility) (m/m); local employment impact (but uncertain net effect) (l/m); legacy/cost of waste and abandoned reactors (m/h)	Mixed health impact via reduced air pollution and coal mining accidents (m/h), nuclear accidents and waste treatment, uranium mining and milling (m/l); safety and waste concerns (r/h); proliferation risk (m/m)	Mixed ecosystem impact via reduced air pollution (m/h) and coal mining (l/h), nuclear accidents (m/m)
Renewable Energy (wind, PV, CSP, hydro, geothermal, bioenergy) replacing coal	Energy security (r/m); local employment (but uncertain net effect) (m/m); water management (for some hydro energy) (m/h); extra measures to match demand (for PV, wind, some CSP) (r/h); higher use of critical metals for PV and direct drive wind turbines (r/m)	Reduced health impact via reduced air pollution (except bioenergy) (r/h) and coal mining accidents (m/h); contribution to (off-grid) energy access (m/l); threat of displacement (for large hydro installations) (m/h)	Mixed ecosystem impact via reduced air pollution (except bioenergy) (m/h) and coal mining (l/h), habitat impact (for some hydro energy) (m/m), landscape and wildlife impact (m/m); lower/higher water use (for wind, PV (m/m); bioenergy CSP, geothermal and reservoir hydro (m/h))
Fossil energy with CCS replacing coal	Preservation vs lock-in of human and physical capital in the fossil industry (m/m); long-term monitoring of CO <sub>2</sub> storage (m/h)	Health impact via risk of CO <sub>2</sub> leakage (m/m), upstream supply-chain activities (m/h); safety concerns (CO <sub>2</sub> storage and transport) (m/h)	Ecosystem impact via additional upstream supply-chain activities (m/m), higher water use (m/h)
CH <sub>4</sub> leakage prevention, capture or treatment	Energy security (potential to use gas in some cases) (l/h)	Reduced health impact via reduced air pollution (m/m); occupational safety at coal mines (m/m)	Reduced ecosystem impact via reduced air pollution (l/m)
<b>Transport</b>	<i>For possible upstream effects of low-carbon electricity, see Energy Supply. For biomass supply, see AFOLU.</i>		
Reduction of carbon intensity of fuel	Energy security (diversification, reduced oil dependence and exposure to oil price volatility) (m/m); technological spillovers (l/l)	Mixed health impact via increased/reduced urban air pollution by electricity and hydrogen (r/h), diesel (l/m), noise (l/m); road safety (silent electric LDVs) (l/l)	Ecosystem impact of electricity and hydrogen via urban air pollution (m/m), material use (unsustainable mining) (l/l)
Reduction of energy intensity	Energy security (reduced oil dependence and exposure to oil price volatility) (m/m)	Reduced health impact via reduced urban air pollution (r/h); road safety (crash-worthiness depending on the design of the standards) (m/m)	Reduced ecosystem and biodiversity impact via reduced urban air pollution (m/h)

Sectoral mitigation measures	Effect on additional objectives/concerns		
	Economic	Social	Environmental
Compact urban form + improved transport infrastructure Modal shift	Energy security (reduced oil dependence and exposure to oil price volatility) (m/m); productivity (reduced urban congestion and travel times, affordable and accessible transport)(m/h)	Mixed health impact for non-motorized modes via increased physical activity (r/h), potentially higher exposure to air pollution (r/h), reduced noise (via modal shift and travel reduction)(r/h); equitable mobility access to employment opportunities (r/h); road safety (via modal shift (r/h))	Reduced ecosystem impact via reduced urban air pollution (r/h); land-use competition (m/m)
Journey reduction and avoidance	Energy security (reduced oil dependence and exposure to oil price volatility) (r/h); productivity (reduced urban congestion/travel times, walking) (r/h)	Reduced health impact (for non-motorized transport modes) (r/h)	Mixed ecosystem impact via reduced urban air pollution (r/h), new/shorter shipping routes (r/h); reduced land-use competition (transport infrastructure)(r/h)
<b>Buildings</b>	<i>For possible upstream effects of fuel switching and RES, see Energy Supply.</i>		
Reduction of emissions intensity (e.g. fuel switching, RES incorporation, green roofs)	Energy security (m/h); employment impact (m/m); lower need for energy subsidies (l/l); asset values of buildings (l/m)	Fuel poverty alleviation via reduced energy demand (m/h); energy access (for higher energy cost) (l/m); productive time for women/children (for replaced traditional cookstoves) (m/h)	Reduced health impact in residential buildings and ecosystem impact (via reduced fuel poverty (r/h), indoor/ outdoor air pollution (r/h), and UHI effect (l/m)); urban biodiversity (for green roofs)(m/m)
Retrofits of existing buildings Exemplary new buildings Efficient equipment	Energy security (m/h); employment impact (m/m); productivity (for commercial buildings) (m/h); less need for energy subsidies (l/l); asset value of buildings (l/m); disaster resilience (l/m)	Fuel poverty alleviation via reduced energy demand (for retrofits, efficient equipment) (m/h); energy access (higher housing cost)(l/m); thermal comfort (m/h); productive time for women and children (for replaced traditional cookstoves) (m/h)	Reduced health and ecosystem impact (e.g. via reduced fuel poverty (r/h), indoor/outdoor air pollution (r/h) and UHI effect (l/m), improved indoor environmental conditions (m/h)); health risk via insufficient ventilation (m/m); reduced water consumption and sewage production (l/l)
Behavioural changes reducing energy demand	Energy security (m/h); less need for energy subsidies (l/l)		Reduced health and ecosystem impact (e.g. via improved indoor environmental conditions (m/h) and less outdoor air pollution (r/h))
<b>Industry</b>	<i>For possible upstream effects of low-carbon energy supply (incl. CCS), see Energy Supply and of biomass supply, see AFOLU.</i>		
Reduction of CO <sub>2</sub> /non-CO <sub>2</sub> emission intensity	Competitiveness and productivity (m/h)	Reduced health impact via reduced local air pollution and better working conditions (PFC from aluminium) (m/m)	Reduced ecosystem impact (via reduced local air and water pollution) (m/m); water conservation (l/m)

Sectoral mitigation measures	Effect on additional objectives/concerns		
	Economic	Social	Environmental
Energy efficiency improvements via new processes/technologies	Energy security (via lower energy intensity) (m/m); employment impact (l/l); competitiveness and productivity (m/h); technological spillovers in DCs (l/l)	Reduced health impact via reduced local pollution (l/m); new business opportunities (m/m); water availability and quality (l/l); safety, working conditions and job satisfaction (m/m)	Reduced ecosystem impact via fossil fuel extraction (l/l), reduced local pollution and waste (m/m)
Material efficiency of goods, recycling	National sales tax revenue (medium term) (l/l); employment impact (waste recycling) (l/l); competitiveness in manufacturing (l/l); new infrastructure for industrial clusters (l/l)	Reduced health impacts and safety concerns (l/m); new business opportunities (m/m); local conflicts (reduced resource extraction)(l/m)	Reduced ecosystem impact via reduced local air and water pollution and waste material disposal (m/m); reduced use of raw/virgin materials and natural resources implying reduced unsustainable resource mining (l/l)
Product demand reductions	National sales tax revenue (medium term) (l/l)	Local conflicts (reduced inequity in consumption) (l/l); new diverse lifestyle concept (l/l)	Post-consumption waste (l/l)
<b>AFOLU</b>	<i>Note: co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on the development context and the scale of the intervention (size).</i>		
<p><u>Supply side:</u> forestry, land-based agriculture, livestock, integrated systems and bioenergy</p> <p><u>Demand side:</u> reduced losses in the food supply chain, changes in human diets and in demand for wood and forestry products</p>	<p>Mixed employment impact via <b>entrepreneurship development (m/h)</b>, <b>use of less labour-intensive technologies in agriculture (m/m)</b>; <b>diversification of income sources and access to markets (r/h)</b>; <b>additional income to sustainable landscape management (m/h)</b>; <b>income concentration (m/m)</b>; <b>energy security (resource sufficiency) (m/h)</b>; Innovative financing mechanisms for sustainable resource management (m/h); technology innovation and transfer (m/m)</p>	<p><b>Food-crops production through integrated systems and sustainable agriculture intensification (r/m)</b>; <b>food production (locally) due to large-scale monocultures of non-food crops (r/l)</b>; cultural habitats and recreational areas via (sustainable) forest management and conservation (m/m); <b>human health and animal welfare e.g. through less use of pesticides, reduced burning practices, and agroforestry &amp; silvo-pastoral systems (m/h)</b>; <b>human health related to burning practices (in agriculture or bioenergy) (m/m)</b>; mixed impacts on gender, intra- and inter-generational equity via <b>participation and fair benefit sharing (r/h)</b> and <b>concentration of benefits (m/m)</b></p>	<p>Mixed impact on ecosystem services via <b>large-scale monocultures (r/h)</b>, ecosystem conservation, sustainable management as well as sustainable agriculture (r/h); <b>land-use competition (r/m)</b>; soil quality (r/h); erosion (r/h); ecosystem resilience (m/h); albedo and evaporation (r/h)</p> <p>Mixed impact on <b>tenure and use rights at the local level (for indigenous people and local communities)(r/h)</b> and on access to participative mechanisms for land management decisions (r/h); <b>enforcement of existing policies for sustainable resource management (r/h)</b></p>
<b>Human Settlements and Infrastructure</b>	<i>For compact urban form and improved transport infrastructure, see also Transport.</i>		
Compact development and infrastructure	Innovation and efficient resource use (r/h); higher rents and property values (m/m)	Health from physical activity: <i>see Transport</i>	Preservation of open space (m/m)

Sectoral mitigation measures	Effect on additional objectives/concerns		
	Economic	Social	Environmental
Increased accessibility	Commute savings (r/h)	Health from increased physical activity: <i>see Transport</i> ; social interaction & mental health (m/m)	Air quality and reduced ecosystem and health impacts (m/h)
Mixed land use	Commute savings (r/h); higher rents and property values (m/m)	Health from increased physical activity (r/h); social interaction and mental health (l/m)	Air quality and reduced ecosystem and health impacts (m/h)

**Table 4.6 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Example of actions</b>
<b>Africa</b>	Most national governments are initiating governance systems for adaptation. Disaster risk management, adjustments in technologies and infrastructure, ecosystem-based approaches, basic public health measures, and livelihood diversification are reducing vulnerability, although efforts to date tend to be isolated.
<b>Europe</b>	Adaptation policy has been developed across all levels of government, with some adaptation planning integrated into coastal and water management, into environmental protection and land planning, and into disaster risk management.
<b>Asia</b>	Adaptation is being facilitated in some areas through mainstreaming climate adaptation action into subnational development planning, early warning systems, integrated water resources management, agroforestry, and coastal reforestation of mangroves.
<b>Australasia</b>	Planning for sea-level rise, and in southern Australia for reduced water availability, is becoming adopted widely. Planning for sea-level rise has evolved considerably over the past two decades and shows a diversity of approaches, although its implementation remains piecemeal.
<b>North America</b>	Governments are engaging in incremental adaptation assessment and planning, particularly at the municipal level. Some proactive adaptation is occurring to protect longer-term investments in energy and public infrastructure.
<b>Central and South America</b>	Ecosystem-based adaptation including protected areas, conservation agreements, and community management of natural areas is occurring. Resilient crop varieties, climate forecasts, and integrated water resources management are being adopted within the agricultural sector in some areas.
<b>The Arctic</b>	Some communities have begun to deploy adaptive co-management strategies and communications infrastructure, combining traditional and scientific knowledge.
<b>Small Islands</b>	Small islands have diverse physical and human attributes; community-based adaptation has been shown to generate larger benefits when delivered in conjunction with other development activities.
<b>The Ocean</b>	International cooperation and marine spatial planning are starting to facilitate adaptation to climate change, with constraints from challenges of spatial scale and governance issues.



**Table 4.7 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]**

<b>Policy Instruments</b>	<b>Energy</b>	<b>Transport</b>	<b>Buildings</b>	<b>Industry</b>	<b>AFOLU</b>	<b>Human Settlements and Infrastructure</b>
<b>Economic Instruments – Taxes (carbon taxes may be economy-wide)</b>	- Carbon tax (e.g. applied to electricity or fuels)	- Fuel taxes - Congestion charges, vehicle registration fees, road tolls - Vehicle taxes	- Carbon and/or energy taxes (either sectoral or economy-wide)	- Carbon tax or energy tax - Waste disposal taxes or charges	- Fertilizer or nitrogen taxes to reduce nitrous oxide (N <sub>2</sub> O)	- Sprawl taxes, Impact fees, exactions, split-rate property taxes, tax increment finance, betterment taxes, congestion charges
<b>Economic Instruments – Tradable Allowances (may be economy-wide)</b>	- Emission trading - Emission credits under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) - Tradable Green Certificates	- Fuel and vehicle standards	- Tradable certificates for energy efficiency improvements (white certificates)	- Emission trading - Emission credit under CDM - Tradable Green Certificates	- Emission credits under CDM - Compliance schemes outside Kyoto protocol (national schemes) - Voluntary carbon markets	- Urban-scale cap and trade
<b>Economic Instruments – Subsidies</b>	- Fossil fuel subsidy removal - Feed in tariffs (FITs) for renewable energy	- Biofuel subsidies - Vehicle purchase subsidies - Feebates	- Subsidies or tax exemptions for investment in efficient buildings, retrofits and products - Subsidized loans	- Subsidies (e.g., for energy audits) - Fiscal incentives (e.g. for fuel switching)	- Credit lines for low-carbon agriculture, sustainable forestry.	- Special Improvement or Redevelopment Districts

Policy Instruments	Energy	Transport	Buildings	Industry	AFOLU	Human Settlements and Infrastructure
<b>Regulatory Approaches</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Efficiency or environmental performance standards</li> <li>- Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) for renewable energy (RE)</li> <li>- Equitable access to electricity grid</li> <li>- Legal status of long term CO<sub>2</sub> storage</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fuel economy performance standards</li> <li>- Fuel quality standards</li> <li>- GHG emission performance standards</li> <li>- Regulatory restrictions to encourage modal shifts (road to rail)</li> <li>- Restriction on use of vehicles in certain areas</li> <li>- Environmental capacity constraints on airports</li> <li>- Urban planning and zoning restrictions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Building codes and standards</li> <li>- Equipment and appliance standards</li> <li>- Mandates for energy retailers to assist customers invest in energy efficiency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Energy efficiency standards for equipment</li> <li>- Energy management systems (also voluntary)</li> <li>- Voluntary agreements (where bound by regulation)</li> <li>- Labelling and public procurement regulations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National policies to support REDD+ including monitoring, reporting and verification</li> <li>- Forest laws to reduce deforestation</li> <li>- Air and water pollution control GHG precursors</li> <li>- Land-use planning and governance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mixed use zoning</li> <li>- Development restrictions</li> <li>- Affordable housing mandates</li> <li>- Site access controls</li> <li>- Transfer development rights</li> <li>- Design codes</li> <li>- Building codes</li> <li>- Street codes</li> <li>- Design standards</li> </ul>
<b>Information Programmes</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fuel labelling</li> <li>- Vehicle efficiency labelling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Energy audits</li> <li>- Labelling programmes</li> <li>- Energy advice programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Energy audits</li> <li>- Benchmarking</li> <li>- Brokerage for industrial cooperation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certification schemes for sustainable forest practices</li> <li>- Information policies to support REDD+ including monitoring, reporting and verification</li> </ul>	-

<b>Policy Instruments</b>	<b>Energy</b>	<b>Transport</b>	<b>Buildings</b>	<b>Industry</b>	<b>AFOLU</b>	<b>Human Settlements and Infrastructure</b>
<b>Government Provision of Public Goods or Services</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Research and development</li> <li>- Infrastructure expansion (district heating/cooling or common carrier)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Investment in transit and human powered transport</li> <li>- Investment in alternative fuel infrastructure</li> <li>- Low-emission vehicle procurement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Public procurement of efficient buildings and appliances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Training and education</li> <li>- Brokerage for industrial cooperation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Protection of national, state, and local forests.</li> <li>- Investment in improvement and diffusion of innovative technologies in agriculture and forestry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Provision of utility infrastructure, such as electricity distribution, district heating/cooling and wastewater connections, etc.</li> <li>- Park improvements</li> <li>- Trail improvements</li> <li>- Urban rail</li> </ul>
<b>Voluntary Actions</b>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Labelling programmes for efficient buildings</li> <li>- Product eco-labelling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Voluntary agreements on energy targets, adoption of energy management systems, or resource efficiency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Promotion of sustainability by developing standards and educational campaigns</li> </ul>	

**Figure 1.1 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**





Figure 1.2 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



**Box 1.1, Figure 1 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**




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



Figure 1.4 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]





**Figure 1.5 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**






Figure 1.6 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



**Figure 1.7 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**

**Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sectors**



**Figure 1.8 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**





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**Figure 1.10 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**




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




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




**Box 2.2, Figure 1 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**



**Figure 2.1 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**



**Figure 2.2 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**




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


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




Figure 2.5 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]

Increasing risk from RCP2.6 to RCP8.5


(A) Risk for terrestrial and freshwater species impacted by the rate of warming



(B) Risk for marine species impacted by ocean acidification only, or additionally by warming extremes



(C) Risk for coastal human and natural systems impacted by sea level rise



**Figure 2.6 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**






Figure 2.7 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]





**Box 2.4, Figure 1 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**



**Figure 2.8 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**






Figure 3.1 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]

(A) Risks from climate change... (B) ...depend on cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions...




(C) ...which in turn depend on annual GHG emissions over the next decades

**Figure 3.2 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**




**Figure 3.3 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**

**Global Mitigation Costs and Consumption Growth in Baseline Scenarios**




**Figure 3.4 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**




**Box 3.2, Figure 1 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**

**Panel A: Weighting of current emissions over time**



**Panel B: Contributions by sectors to total GHG emissions using different metrics**



**Figure 3.5 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**






Figure 4.1 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]






Figure 4.2 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]




1	2	3	4
High energy demand scenarios show higher levels of oil supply.	In high energy demand scenarios, alternative liquid and hydrogen technologies are scaled up more rapidly.	High energy demand scenarios show a more rapid up-scaling of CCS technologies but a more rapid phase-out of unabated fossil fuel conversion technologies.	In high energy demand scenarios non-fossil electricity generation technologies are scaled up more rapidly.

Figure 4.3 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



**Figure 4.4 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**



**Figure 4.5 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]**

